Forced displacement is one of the most acute and visible consequences of disasters and conflict. Its scale and complexity have increased dramatically in recent years. The World Disasters Report 2012 makes a critical contribution to our understanding of how the changing nature of conflict, climate change, population growth and urbanization interact with and accentuate vulnerability. The report articulates a vision which places displaced and other affected communities, and their protection and assistance needs, at the heart of our collective response.

– António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

World Disasters Report 2012
Focus on forced migration and displacement

This year’s World Disasters Report focuses on forced migration and on the people forcibly displaced by conflict, political upheaval, violence, disasters, climate change and development projects, whose numbers are increasing inexorably each year. The enormous human costs of forced migration – destroyed homes and livelihoods, increased vulnerability, disempowered communities, and collapsed social networks and common bonds – demand urgent and decisive action by both humanitarian and development actors.

The report analyses the complex causes of forced migration and its consequences and impacts on displaced populations, their hosts and humanitarian actors. It looks at the significant gaps in humanitarian protection for ever-increasing numbers of forcibly displaced people who do not fit into conventional categories of protection, and the public health challenges caused by forced displacement, particularly for women, children and those with mental health problems. It examines the “urbanisation” of forced migration, the role of climate change and environmental factors in forced displacement and how new communications, information and social networking technologies are reshaping the links between aid providers and migrants. It also tracks humanitarian funding for forcibly displaced populations, as well as the positive and negative economic impacts they have on host communities and countries.

The World Disasters Report 2012 features:

• The dynamics of displacement and response
• Reducing risk and promoting security for forced migrants
• The impact of forced displacement on health
• Forced migration in an urban context
• Development and displacement
• The costs and impacts of forced migration
• Forced migration and the humanitarian challenge
• Disaster data

Plus photos, tables, graphics and index.

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A global humanitarian organization

Founded in 1919, the International Federation comprises 186 member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies – with an additional number in formation – a secretariat in Geneva and offices strategically located to support activities around the world. The Red Cross is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world's largest volunteer-based humanitarian network, reaching 150 million people each year through its 186 member National Societies. Together, we act before, during and after disasters and health emergencies to meet the needs and improve the lives of vulnerable people. We do so with impartiality as to nationality, race, gender, religious beliefs, class and political opinions.

Guided by Strategy 2020 – our collective plan of action to tackle the major humanitarian and development challenges of this decade – we are committed to 'saving lives and changing minds'.

Our strength lies in our volunteer network, our community-based expertise and our independence and neutrality. We work to improve humanitarian standards, as partners in development, and in response to disasters. We persuade decision makers to act at all times in the interests of vulnerable people. The result: we enable healthy and safe communities, reduce vulnerabilities, strengthen resilience and foster a culture of peace around the world.

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies embody the work and principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. They act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, health and social programmes. During wartime, National Societies assist affected civilian populations and support the military services where appropriate. This unique network of National Societies comprises 13 million active volunteers, serving vulnerable communities in almost every country in the world. Cooperation between National Societies gives the International Federation greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Together, all the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are guided by the same seven Fundamental Principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. In the same manner, all Red Cross and Red Crescent activities have one central purpose: to help those who suffer without discrimination and thus contribute to peace in the world.

Cover photos: When disaster strikes or conflict breaks, people are sometimes forced to flee. Their vulnerability increases; their needs are great. They need help to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, reshape the social networks that help bolster their resilience and feel safer again. People like 60-year-old Joelmae Semillano, seen here in her new Philippine Red Cross-built home, displaced after floods destroyed her family’s house in 2009. © Cheryl Ravelo/IFRC

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

Humanity
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering whenever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace among all peoples.

Impartiality
It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality
In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage, at any time in controversy of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Independence
The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

Voluntary service
It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity
There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

Universality
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.
Saving lives, changing minds

A global humanitarian organization

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Cover photo: When disaster strikes or conflict flares, people are sometimes forced to flee. Their vulnerability increases, their needs are great. They need help to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, reconnect the social networks that help bolster their resilience and feel secure again. People like 6-year-old Jellemie Semiliano, seen here in her new Philippine Red Cross-built home, displaced after floods destroyed her family’s house in 2009. © Cheryl Ravelo/IFRC

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Fundamental Principles | inside back cover
More than 70 million people are forced migrants

Forward thinking and decisive action are needed to tackle the enormous human costs and global impacts.

The escalating numbers of forced migrants present huge challenges for humanitarian actors. Facing this reality requires enhanced preparedness, improved instruments for protection, new tools for assessing vulnerability and building resilience, more effective community engagement and capacity building with a longer-term lens, and innovative approaches for delivering assistance.

Over 70 million people are forced migrants – more than one in every 100 of the world’s citizens – displaced by conflict, political upheaval, violence and disasters but also by climate change and development projects. This figure rises relentlessly each year and most migrants are either in protracted displacement situations or permanently dispossessed. People forcibly displaced within their own countries far exceed the number of global refugees – and others who have crossed international borders. The cost to the international community is at least US$ 8 billion a year.

The figures alone compel attention. But it is the human costs of forced migration – destroyed livelihoods, increased vulnerability especially of women and children, lost homelands and histories, fractured households and disempowered communities, and the destruction of the common bonds and shared values of humanity – which require urgent solutions and decisive action.

Over the last 40 years or so, the humanitarian response to these conditions has expanded enormously. The international community has established a sophisticated and highly professional framework in which the IFRC and National Red Cross Red Crescent Societies play a key role. The humanitarian concerns of forced migrants living at the margins of conventional health, social and legal systems were further strengthened by the adoption of the IFRC’s Policy on Migration at its General Assembly in November 2009.

Yet enormous challenges remain.

This year’s World Disasters Report aims to widen and sharpen the focus on the complex causes of forced migration and the diverse consequences and impacts for both affected populations and humanitarian actors.
More than ever, the complex nature of disasters and conflicts is accompanied by the enormous potential to uproot large numbers of people. In Haiti, Japan and Pakistan, in Iraq, Libya, the Horn of Africa, Mali and now Syria, we have witnessed major population displacement within and across borders. Other factors, such as population growth, rapid urbanization, increasing poverty and inequality, hazardous and environmentally contaminated sites, global climate change, new technological hazards, all combine to accentuate vulnerability and increase the propensity for forced displacement to occur.

Significant protection gaps and increasing vulnerability exist for many forced migrants who fall outside the well-established legal and normative instruments. This report emphasizes our pressing duty to develop responsive and responsible tools and policies to address these gaps.

Those who are uprooted and relocated must cope with adapting to new or radically transformed environments, the fear of social exclusion, discrimination and the loss of dignity. Mobilizing social and cultural resources to restore adequate levels of material and communal life largely depends on the humanity and resilience of the forced migrants themselves. They have important capacities that those supporting them must better understand and mobilize in order to provide assistance and protection when displacement occurs.

The report draws attention to the diverse health needs of forced migrants, stressing the importance of enhancing professional standards and mainstreaming the health care of displaced persons. Ensuring strategic and operational priority for reproductive, maternal, mental and child health is emphasized.

The World Disasters Report highlights how forced migration has ‘urbanized’. Cities, towns and peri-urban areas are the main destinations for refugees, IDPs and people affected or impacted by disasters and conflicts. In response, humanitarian actors must sustain and enhance progress in developing toolkits, strategies and ‘good practice’ appropriate to urban-based displaced populations and their vulnerabilities.

Development is a major, but often ignored, driver of forced displacement. As well as recognized economic benefits, it can also cause impoverishment and social fragmentation for some. Humanitarian actors must acknowledge and respond more effectively to these concerns.

Forced migration produces significant economic impacts and costs for displaced populations, their communities of origin and those that host them, and humanitarian actors and donors. Negative outcomes tend to dominate our thinking. But this report calls for far greater attention to measuring and analysing these costs and impacts in
order to provide the evidence to minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive social and economic potential which forced migration can provide.

To improve the humanitarian response to forced displacement, we must increase the links between humanitarian and development actors. For example, humanitarian actors can benefit from the experience of development actors in deploying social protection tools and safety nets to better provide support, protection and assistance to forced migrants.

New communications, information and social networking technologies have the potential to reshape fundamentally the relationship between humanitarian actors and the recipients of assistance and between the migrants themselves. We must be better attuned to the many new practical possibilities and challenges which these developments offer in accessing and working with vulnerable and at-risk communities.

Regrettably, the majority of the world’s refugees and IDPs – and increasingly those displaced by disasters – are locked into crisis situations of protracted displacement. Radical thinking and action is proposed in this report to improve their socio-economic conditions and opportunities, to protect and enhance their rights, and to reduce long-term risks and vulnerabilities.

Finally, recognizing the propensity for climate change and environmental factors to contribute to the growing number of forced migrants, the World Disasters Report calls for us to mainstream our tools and strategies for identifying vulnerability, promoting resilience and adaptation, and securing better access to protection for people susceptible to displacement.

Bekele Geleta
Secretary General
Forced migration: the dynamics of displacement and response

Migration is a large and growing phenomenon affecting virtually all countries as the source, transit and/or destination of migrants. Many migrants move voluntarily, seeking better economic opportunities and different lifestyles. Others, such as refugees, asylum seekers and trafficked persons, are forced to flee their homes due to conflict, repression or persecution. But disasters, environmental degradation, development projects, poverty and poor governance are also increasingly large-scale drivers of forced displacement. These individuals, their families and communities, who are displaced in their own countries or across international borders – broadly termed ‘forced migrants’ – are the focus of the 2012 World Disasters Report.

Currently totalling more than 72 million (see Box 1.1), forced migrants are too often confronted by life-threatening dangers in transit (such as people smuggling and trafficking) and exploitation and abuse upon reaching their destinations. Regardless of their legal status, they face serious humanitarian and human rights challenges. With their traditional support systems removed, they are often unable to access basic health, welfare and education services. They may lose links with their families and communities, and experience severe socio-economic loss and impoverishment. Detention or deprivation of freedom is widespread for those seeking asylum. Challenges such as cultural and language barriers, discrimination, exclusion and violence have to be overcome. Women, children and unaccompanied minors are particularly at risk.

Migrants in these vulnerable situations, often living in society’s shadows, are a major focus for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. In November 2011, the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent reiterated the concern of National Societies, IFRC, ICRC and supporting governments “about the often alarming humanitarian situation of migrants… at all stages of their journey and ongoing risks that migrants, in situations of vulnerability, face in regard to their dignity, safety, access to international protection as well as access to health care, shelter, food, clothing and education” (IFRC, 2011). The 2011 International Conference also reaffirmed “the role of National Societies… in consultation with the public authorities, in providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable migrants irrespective of their legal status” and called upon governments to remove barriers impeding access to migrants (IFRC, 2011).

This chapter discusses the contemporary causes, patterns, dynamics, processes and consequences of forced migration in different displacement situations. It focuses on
how humanitarian actors and other agencies respond to the challenges of these diffuse, complex and diverse dynamics and consequences, made more difficult by the implementation challenges and limitations of existing legal and normative frameworks to deal adequately with these contemporary manifestations and new categories and vulnerabilities of forced migrants.

**Context**

Migration in general, and forced migration in particular, have been issues of growing international attention and concern. The majority of people move voluntarily; there are currently an estimated 214 million international and 740 million internal migrants (UN DESA, 2012; UNDP, 2009) and these numbers have grown significantly over the past 50 years. This report focuses on those who are forced to leave their homes due to events beyond their immediate control. Only about 15 million of these (UNHCR, 2011a) are counted as refugees by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the United Nations Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the two international organizations with specific responsibility for refugees. UNHCR has a broad mandate to provide assistance and protection to persons displaced by persecution and conflict worldwide, while UNRWA’s mandate is narrower. Almost a million more are asylum seekers awaiting status determination. A much larger number, about 26.4 million, are internally displaced by conflict; a further 15 million are displaced by hazards and disasters; and another 15 million displaced by development projects. Official figures almost certainly underestimate the scale of forced displacement.

**Box 1.1 Forced migration in numbers**

How many forced migrants are there? An obvious and important question for an international report on this subject. Determining an accurate answer is fraught with difficulties. Firstly, as this chapter shows, the term ‘forced migrant’ involves many, sometimes overlapping, categories and labels, which make things more complicated, not less (Zetter, 1991; 2007). Secondly, most statistics probably underreport the numbers – refugees are reluctant to register for fear of harassment or refoulement, while for IDPs in disasters, data are limited outside camps or for more localized disasters. Thirdly, the data sets are subject to substantial caveats about quality, reliability, methodologies and comparability, especially for protracted displacement and people displaced by slow-onset disasters.

And yet, while individual stories tell a lot about the experience of displacement, numbers tell a broader story, giving an overview of major trends. Indeed, the facts and figures of displacement on a global scale can serve as one reference point for understanding displacement’s patterns and processes and responding accordingly.
Acknowledging all the statistical limitations, several broad parameters are evident:

- globally more than 72 million people are forced migrants, displaced by violence, conflict, disasters and development – more than 1 in every 100 of the world’s citizens
- IDPs displaced by conflict increased from around 17 million in 1997 to more than 26 million today; they far exceed refugees, whose numbers fluctuated between 13 million and 16 million in the same period
- conflict and violence account for 60 per cent of forced migrants, almost 43 million people
- the substantial fluctuations in IDP numbers are mainly due to the incidence of disasters
- the majority of forced migrants live in conditions of protracted displacement reflecting the international community’s inability to find durable solutions to these humanitarian crises
- regional variations inevitably reflect the particular ebb and flow of conflict and violence.

Although the global totals of refugees and IDPs related to conflict and situations of generalized violence remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2011, regional variations are large and annual figures may hide the extent of forced displacements that takes place each year. Analysing the data by categories and regions reveals some significant patterns. Low- and middle-income countries hosted four-fifths of the world’s refugees, with the 48 least developed countries providing asylum to some 2.3 million refugees (UNHCR, 2012a). Likewise some three-quarters of the world’s refugees reside in countries neighbouring their country of origin, a trend with important implications for global responsibility-sharing in assisting refugees. Just three countries generated more than 50 per cent of the world’s refugees under UNHCR’s responsibility – Afghanistan (2.664 million), Iraq (1.428 million) and Somalia (1.077 million). The recent situation in Somalia also resulted in an additional 300,000 Somalis fleeing to neighbouring countries in 2011. Pakistan hosted the largest number of refugees

Table 1.1 Total numbers of refugees and IDPs by category, 2008–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>category</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR refugees¹</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>10.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers²</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians under the care of UNRWA³</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFUGEES</td>
<td><strong>15.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.05</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.37</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs (conflict and generalized violence-induced)⁴</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>26.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural-hazard disaster-induced⁵</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>42.30</td>
<td>14.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td><strong>62.10</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.30</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development-induced⁶</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (in millions)</td>
<td><strong>92.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>74.85</strong></td>
<td><strong>101.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>72.67</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1.7 million), followed by Iran (887,000) and Syria (755,400). However, relative to the size of their economies, Pakistan, DRC and Kenya hosted the largest numbers of forced migrants.

IDP figures are far more volatile. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Africa had the highest number of IDPs, approximately one-third of the world’s total, with the Americas, South and South-East Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa each accommodating about one-sixth of the world’s IDPs. However, Africa also had some 1.4 million fewer IDPs in 2011 than in 2010. The Middle East and Latin America were the main sources of the global increase, with increases of 400,000 IDPs in the Middle East due to social upheaval and 200,000 in Latin America due to continuing violence in Colombia and Mexico. In South and South-East Asia, IDPs decreased by about 300,000. Countries with significant IDP populations include Colombia (11.2 per cent of the population), Iraq (about 9 per cent), Somalia (16 per cent) and Sudan (at least 7 per cent). Within the regions the dynamics of internal displacement reflect the incidence of violence and conflict. Following the disputed 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, at one stage up to 1 million people were newly displaced in 2011, although the number of IDPs has since receded.

Displacement related to natural hazards (such as floods and earthquakes) and technological disasters is a category of displacement that is gaining greater attention. The numbers in Table 1.1 tell an episodic story with disaster-induced displacement substantially surpassing conflict-induced internal displacement in some years. IDMC (2012a) reports that disasters have doubled over the last two decades (from about 200 to more than 400 per year), and will likely cause further displacement. Global figures for new displacement of approximately 17 million in 2009 contrast with a record number of more than 42 million in 2010, receding to just under 15 million last year. But even in 2011, nearly 15 million people were newly displaced by disasters (IDMC, 2012a). The drastic fluctuations in these figures strongly correlate with the occurrence and scale of mass displacements by mega-disasters such as the 2008 Sichuan (Wenchuan) earthquake in China, the 2009 floods and cyclones in India, or the Pakistan floods and Haiti earthquake in 2010 (IDMC, 2012; 2012a). Large-scale disasters, each displacing more than 100,000 people per event, caused more than 90 per cent of the total displacement reported in 2009 and 2010. Although all continents were affected, the Asian region had the highest total numbers of displaced each year, with China, Sri Lanka, Japan and the Philippines having the worst disasters in scale.

Broadly speaking, global data from the last few decades show that disasters and the number of people affected by them are on the rise, and it is expected that this will only increase with climate change affecting the frequency, intensity and patterns of events. Climate- and weather-related disasters, like floods and storms, are the main sudden-onset triggers for displacement.

Although not usually ‘forced’ in the sense used above, development-forced displacement
Although countries hosting refugees and asylum seekers are widely distributed across the globe, low- and middle-income countries host a disproportionately large number of refugees. People often flee conflict-ridden and failed states, only to find themselves in almost equally unstable situations – Afghans in Pakistan, Iraqis in Syria and Somalis in Yemen. Countries of origin are equally concentrated – Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia account for 50 per cent of UNHCR’s refugee case load, while Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and Sudan account for almost 60 per cent of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within its mandate (UNHCR, 2012).

A broad set of events precipitate forced migration, not only conflict, persecution and human rights abuses that generate the designation refugee. Disasters, food insecurity,
environmental factors, nuclear and industrial accidents and other life-threatening situations, as well as large-scale development projects such as dams and urban infrastructure, account for a much larger number, as Box 1.1 demonstrates. Often it is a combination of such factors that cause displacement, and poor governance and poverty are frequently at the core of these forced movements. Those who are forcibly displaced within their own countries far exceed the number that cross international borders.

Designating migrants as ‘voluntary’ or ‘forced’ has become much more difficult in the contemporary era and the labels are much less clear-cut than in the past (Zetter, 2007). Although rapid-onset events such as conflict or disaster may be the immediate reason forcing people to leave their homes, the search for better economic opportunities, slow-onset and progressive environmental deterioration, increasing suppression of rights (especially for minority communities) and the availability of family networks in more stable locations may determine precisely where they move and for how long. The term ‘mixed migration’ (UNHCR, 2007) is now used to describe the combination of such factors. The Arab uprisings of 2010–2011 – notably in Libya and Tunisia – exemplify these complex mixed migration processes and challenges for international protection and response. In this case asylum seekers, refugees and stateless people mingled with labour migrants fleeing conflict (see Box 1.6). But the term mixed migration should neither detract from the severity of the original ‘push factor’ – life-threatening situations – nor minimize the vulnerability, protection needs and threats to human rights that such people experience. Pictures of ships overladen with migrants or frightening narratives of clandestine border crossings orchestrated by human smugglers are all too familiar. Human traffickers – those who coerce or deceive people into migrating to exploit their labour – also take advantage of the chaos of conflict and disasters, as well as economic hardships, to prey on those with no other alternatives (Martin and Callaway, 2009) (see Box 1.3).

Forced migration has grown in recent decades – and will probably increase in the future – for a number of reasons. Civil conflicts within many countries lead to physical and political instability, separatist movements, new nations and warlord economies and thereby more forced migrants. In the last two decades ethnic cleansing and genocide have produced millions of refugees and displaced people who have been unable to remain safely in their home communities, in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina for example. Violence, kidnapping, rape and other manifestations of insecure societies induce still more people to migrate both internally and across borders in search of safety.

Vulnerability or resilience – i.e., the capability to cope or adapt to these extreme situations – establishes which individuals and groups are forced to migrate or remain at home, underpinned by the protection that is afforded in terms of physical and material
security, and human rights. Chapter 2 explores this complex interplay between vulnerability and protection.

Urban areas are increasingly recognized as locations which produce intra- and inter-urban forced displacement as individuals and communities seek safety among co-ethnic or co-religious urban dwellers. Almost half a century of sectarian extremism in Northern Ireland has produced segregated cities. Indeed, urban areas are increasingly both a location where forced migration occurs and the principal destination for forced migrants (see Chapter 4). The significance of these conditions is reflected in the priority which the United Nations (UN) Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gave to the production of its urban strategy in 2010 (IASC, 2010).

Migration can have both positive and negative consequences for the affected populations and the communities from which, and to which, they migrate (see Chapter 6). Negative impacts stem particularly from emergency mass movements, generally related to rapid-onset disasters and large-scale or episodic conflict. Substantial humanitarian assistance is needed, particularly when people flee to countries with limited resources of their own. Negative impacts may also be more extreme if receiving communities are unprepared or unable to absorb large numbers of spontaneous migrants. The more positive impacts tend to occur in the longer term when refugees or IDPs have established new livelihoods and may contribute to the host economy – even in cases of mass displacement and refugee camps such as Dadaab in Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2010; Box 6.3). Positive impacts also occur when migration is a more deliberative, albeit still involuntary, process that allows people time to weigh alternatives, link with their diaspora and use migration as a coping strategy to reduce household risk and improve their own and their new hosts’ economic opportunities.

These and other phenomena and the countries impacted by them are explored in more detail in this and subsequent chapters of this World Disasters Report.

Processes and drivers

Understanding the complex causes of forced migration is an important step towards identifying appropriate responses. But great caution is needed in ascribing a ‘cause’ that precipitates forced migration. Rather, there are multiple triggers, usually occurring in combination and often deriving from unpredictable events; this clustering is what imparts complexity to the contemporary dynamics of forced migration. Some factors precipitate acute crises of forced migration while others are slow-onset emergencies in which displacement impacts may only become slowly or incrementally visible. Among the most prominent are:

- Persecution, torture and other serious human rights violations. Forced migration that fits best into current legal and policy norms involves persecution of
individuals or groups on the basis of such factors as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group (often used to address gender) and political opinion.

- **Armed conflict.** One of the principal drivers of forced migration is internal armed conflict, now usually involving non-state actors rather than the military, such as in Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Mali and Somalia. Displacement may be a form of collateral damage as civilian populations get out of harm’s way, but in many conflicts forcing the relocation – or in the case of al-Shabab in Somalia, preventing relocation – of civilians is an overt aim of warring parties. Significant levels of forced migration accompany international armed conflict as well, although this is less prevalent in the contemporary era.

- **Political instability, weak governance and state repression.** The recent events in North Africa and the Middle East broadly fit this category, where the severity of political instability and weak governance precipitated conflict with hundreds of thousands of nationals and foreigners fleeing across international borders from countries such as Libya and now Syria. Violence and large-scale forced displacement followed contested elections in Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008) and Côte d’Ivoire (2011), and communal violence has occurred and resulted in displacement from the Karamoja region of Uganda.

- **Indiscriminate violence.** As the means for, or the by-product of, ‘land-grabbing’ and the activities of drug cartels and gangs, such violence may be comparatively less visible than other drivers, but it is an increasingly significant cause of forced displacement, particularly in urban areas.

- **Natural hazards and disasters.** Although forced displacement does not necessarily accompany disasters, the tendency for this to happen is increasing. Recent examples of crises resulting from extreme natural hazards that have had large-scale forced migration impacts include hurricanes and cyclones (e.g., Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar), tsunamis (e.g., Indian Ocean in 2004 and Japan in 2011), flooding (e.g., Pakistan in 2010), earthquakes (e.g., Haiti in 2010) and prolonged droughts (e.g., Somalia in 2011). Generally, the hazard itself does not cause the crises of disaster and displacement but the lack of disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies, poor emergency preparedness, lack of adequate building codes, high levels of poverty and similar weaknesses in local and national governance capacity. The enormous death toll and displacement caused by the Haitian earthquake compared to the very modest impacts of a seismically much larger quake in Chile in 2010 are indicative of these factors.

- **Man-made environmental crises.** These include nuclear, chemical or biological accidents and attacks, accidental or deliberate starting of fires and similar situations that make large areas uninhabitable and cause displacement. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, for example, resulted in the evacuation of more than 100,000 people. Japan’s 2011 earthquake and tsunami led to further
crisis and displacement when nuclear power plants lost their capacity to cool reactors, forcing the evacuation of more than 77,000 people (see Box 5.3).

- **Climate and environmental change.** Evidence increasingly links changes in climate – manifest in more frequent extreme weather events, rising sea levels and desertification – to migration, although these changes are rarely unique drivers of population displacement (see Chapter 7). With vulnerability set to increase as climate change advances, substantial population movements can be expected with concomitant humanitarian challenges concerning rights, preparedness and assistance to affected populations (Brown, 2008; Zetter, 2009; Martin, 2010; Nansen Conference, 2011).

Box 1.2 captures the complexity of factors that precipitate forced migration in the case of Somalia, a long-running and episodic humanitarian crisis.

### Box 1.2 Somali displacement – complex causes, patterns and processes

The Somali regions have undergone several phases of forced migration in recent decades. The year 2011 saw particularly dramatic levels of internal and regional displacement, with estimates reaching 1.5 million and 1 million people respectively. Contemporary displacement processes and patterns in south-central Somalia, the worst-affected area, display three key features: they are multi-causal, complex and transforming (Lindley, 2010).

Intricate webs of causation are often at play in people’s migration, as multiple forces have combined to create a ‘perfect storm’ for ordinary citizens in south-central Somalia. Global geopolitics (as the Horn of Africa became another stage in the ‘war on terror’ in the mid-2000s) have blended with changing regional politics, Somali domestic governance shifts and local constellations of power to produce severe violence, persecution and abuse affecting large numbers of civilians.

This combines with the considerable environmental challenge of recurrent drought, with 2011 bringing the worst drought in 60 years, and spiralling food prices. In the context of conflict and governance failure, these have generated widespread food insecurity and livelihood loss. While some individuals’ movements relate very closely to incidents of political violence or the change in climatic conditions, the majority have been displaced by a combination (and quite often also a culmination) of forces, rather than a single identifiable factor.

This results in complex processes and patterns of displacement. Analysts and aid agencies typically focus on one-way displacement over significant distances, but by stepping back from that, an array of ‘spatialized’ disruptions, suffering and strategies can be seen.

Movement is not the only form of spatial disruption. Even those ‘staying put’ have seen their life projects and mobility fundamentally unsettled by the experiences of recent years. People are often rendered involuntarily immobile because fighting makes it dangerous to move or because they lack the resources to
leave. In recent years al-Shabab has made extreme efforts to prevent people leaving areas under its control, signalling a more deliberate political attempt to control mobility.

People deploy a range of spatial strategies to minimize or manage conflict risk, including reworking day-to-day activities, micro-displacements within or between urban neighbourhoods, to city outskirts and rural hinterlands, and the strategic splitting of family members across locations. In many cases these strategies have built up to departure on more significant journeys, but in others they have been sustained over long periods of time.

Moreover, as violence flared across south-central Somalia, many recent and long-term IDPs have found themselves moving back and forth or onwards again, between insecure locations, displaced many times in search of safety. This is not a particularly new phenomenon, but has become especially pronounced in recent years due to the conflict’s intensification and its rapidly shifting front lines. All this overlays patterns of protracted displacement: in many locations displaced people who arrived 20 years ago live alongside people who arrived yesterday.

Contemporary Somali displacement is also transforming, in two senses. Firstly, since 2006, displacement has affected an increasingly wide socio-economic spectrum, with earlier socio-political protection mechanisms and coping strategies disintegrating as power was contested, reconfigured and contested again across south-central Somalia. As such, displacement is a key factor in a society in flux.

Secondly, the massive scale and pace of displacement has also resulted in rapid and dramatic physical transformations of urban and rural landscapes. In 2007–2008, whole neighbourhoods of Mogadishu emptied as some two-thirds of the city’s residents fled, leading journalists to characterize it as a ‘ghost city’. Meanwhile, there was the symbiotic emergence of a sprawling IDP complex in the Afgoye corridor, a stretch of road outside Mogadishu, where some 400,000 people had settled by the end of 2010, making it the third most populous urban concentration in the Somali territories, after Mogadishu and Hargeisa, and probably the largest IDP settlement in the world. Satellite imagery testified to the rapid urban intensification of the area, with more permanent structures emerging alongside makeshift shelters.

However, the durability of these kinds of transformations is uncertain: by late 2011 Mogadishu was once again a major hub for newly displaced people. The long-term socio-demographic, political and economic legacies of these transformations remain to be seen.

All this suggests that displacement is not a marginal phenomenon but central to any analysis of Somali society. The mobile dimensions of the current political crisis are not only occurring at great scale and affecting a wide spectrum of society, they also contain great nuance: understanding this is key to developing appropriate policy responses.

Extreme natural hazards, conflict and heightened insecurity lead to situations of abrupt displacement, often within, but also across, state borders, which can readily be defined as forced migration. By contrast, forced displacement generated by slow-onset conditions – such as food insecurity, low but sustained levels of violence, intensified drought and rising sea levels – poses new humanitarian challenges. This displacement may often be mistakenly perceived as voluntary and anticipatory since the problems
are less immediately visible and the urgency to migrate seemingly less pressing. In general, economic factors such as poverty, however intense, or weak governance are not considered sufficient in designating people as forced migrants. Yet such perceptions ignore the reality faced by millions of the world’s poor, since these conditions often combine with political instability or social and economic marginalization to compel people to leave their homes and territories at least for a period of time. For example, prolonged or recurrent drought undermines livelihoods and is a principal cause of displacement for millions who rely on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism in substantial parts of East and West Africa. Already this year, displacement from Mali and Mauritania exceeds 300,000 people, the result of intensifying Sahelian drought and additionally, in the case of Mali, conflict. Since many of the affected populations resemble others who migrate to obtain better economic opportunities, it can be difficult to distinguish those whose loss of livelihood is environmentally related. But when, for example, drought combines with conflict or other political factors, food insecurity may be the factor that forces populations who have exhausted all their coping capacities to migrate or starve. Indeed, without alternative livelihoods or humanitarian assistance and protection, migration may be the best or only option available, as witnessed by large-scale flight from parts of Somalia (Lindley and Haslie, 2011) (see Box 1.2).

In almost all of the situations discussed above, most migration is internal or into contiguous countries. According to UNHCR in 2011, “Developing countries hosted 8.4 million refugees, or four-fifths of the global refugee population” (UNHCR, 2011). By contrast, the majority of those displaced by disaster remain in their own country.

**Box 1.3 Migrant smuggling and human trafficking**

Many of the world’s estimated 50 million irregular migrants are believed to have used the services of smugglers at some stage of their journey (UNDP, 2009). The Smuggling of Migrants Protocol, which supplements the 2000 UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention (TOCC), defines migrant smuggling as the facilitation, for financial or other material benefit, of another person’s illegal entry or stay in a country where he or she is not legally entitled to be. Migrants who lack the economic resources to use high-cost, low-risk smuggling options are forced to undertake low-cost, high-risk journeys, where unscrupulous smugglers maximize profits by reducing the standard of service and increasing the number of people they smuggle (UNODC, 2011). In human terms, the consequence is people crammed into the back of trucks, costing many of them their lives (UNODC, 2010a). In financial terms, the consequence is an overcrowded, unseaworthy vessel representing significant profit for smugglers, regardless of whether its human cargo safely reaches its destination. While criminals gross an estimated US$ 150 million annually from smuggling migrants from Africa to Europe
between 1,500 and 2,000 lives are lost in the Mediterranean Sea every year (UNHCR, 2012b).

In the course of being smuggled – over a period ranging from days to even years – forced migrants may be extorted, beaten or raped by smugglers. Some may fall victim to human trafficking. According to the Trafficking in Persons Protocol supplementing the TOCC, human trafficking is perpetrated for purposes of exploiting the prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or similar practices, servitude or the removal of organs. Many people begin their journeys paying to be smuggled, only realizing at the point of exploitation, if at all, that they have fallen victim to human trafficking. The lack of livelihood options available to irregular migrants makes them susceptible to and sometimes even grateful for the traffickers’ offers, regardless of the subhuman living and working conditions they may be subjected to.

Several layers of vulnerability exist at the point where forced migration and crime converge. Asians trafficked into domestic servitude in the Middle East may have little choice but to submit to abuse in order to support their families (HRW, 2008). Traffickers may threaten individuals or their families if their demands are not met. Central Americans trafficked into exploitative prostitution in North America may be controlled by threats against the children they were forced to leave behind in the custody of traffickers. Organized crime networks in Eastern Europe and elsewhere may corrupt immigration officials in countries of origin, paid to turn a blind eye to smuggling, and police in destination countries who obtain sexual services from trafficked victims (UNODC, 2011a).

Even where state institutions and actors are not corrupt, they may be unable to identify and assist smuggled or trafficked migrants. Despite non-criminalization provisions in international instruments, smuggled migrants may not be treated as individuals in need of protection but as ‘illegal’ migrants, and those trafficked risk prosecution for crimes they were trafficked to commit. Trafficked individuals have been detained for drug smuggling, and trafficked Roma children arrested for street crimes including pickpocketing. Similarly, notwithstanding international protection obligations, authorities may deport trafficked individuals without identifying them as victims of serious crime. Men whose organs have been removed by traffickers have been deported without receiving medical attention, while trafficked women have been detained and deported for illegally working as prostitutes. Without adequate support, these people are stigmatized for what they have survived, further entrenching their vulnerability.

Long-term and effective response requires that greater attention be paid not only to the circumstances that force people to migrate, but also to the criminal phenomena that fuels and feeds off the vulnerability of forced migrants.

Firstly, incidents of migrants setting sail in dangerous conditions at sea, or being concealed in vehicles for clandestine border crossings, must be recognized as missed opportunities in countries of origin and transit to protect vulnerable people and prevent them from being smuggled or trafficked. Destination countries inherit the responsibility of confronting crimes that were not detected and intercepted earlier along the route.

Secondly, responses in destination countries that focus only on ‘irregular migration’, without considering the criminal processes involved in moving and exploiting migrants, will fail to disrupt smuggling and trafficking. Returning intercepted migrants to the circumstances from which they were originally forced
to flee gives criminals the opportunity to profit again from re-smuggling or re-trafficking vulnerable people. Meanwhile, prosecutions of smugglers and traffickers will fail unless those who could testify against them are empowered to support the process of bringing criminals to justice.

Thirdly, humanitarian assistance that is provided to migrants without acknowledging the criminal actors and processes behind them results in protection and assistance services playing into the hands of criminal actors and ultimately being weakened by them. In the meantime, smugglers and traffickers carry on with impunity, reaping profits from exploiting unidentified individuals.

Finally, humanitarian and criminal justice actors must harmonize their work to close the gaps in response that smugglers and traffickers abuse to commit their crimes. Defending the integrity of protection and assistance systems requires that humanitarians cooperate with criminal justice actors. At the same time, adequate protection and assistance of forced migrants is necessary to prosecute successfully those who prey on their desperation and profit from their exploitation (UNODC, 2010; 2011).

In short, migrants cannot be deterred from migration they are forced to undertake, but their vulnerability to criminal exploitation can be reduced by removing them from the cycle of migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

How migrants leave their own countries, pass through transit countries and enter destination countries also affects both designations and impacts. A decreasing number of forced migrants receive permission to enter another country; others travel without documentation or otherwise on an ‘irregular’ basis. As causes and complexity of forced migration have grown well ahead of the legal avenues for admission to other countries, so too have human smuggling and human trafficking operations that prey on migrants and render them highly vulnerable (see Box 1.3). Frequent media reports indicate that the horrific experiences of many of those who have been trafficked or smuggled show little sign of diminishing (Koser, 2008; Grant, 2012).

**Consequences and responses**

Responding to the complexity of forced migration raises significant challenges for intergovernmental and humanitarian actors. They have established a number of strategies and approaches which fit into three broad categories. The first, built around legal and normative frameworks found in international humanitarian and human rights law, concerns the status, entitlements and rights which forced migrants might enjoy in different circumstances – protection is key here. The second approach is based on the precepts and practices of humanitarian actors and represented by the sophisticated and highly professional delivery of assistance and support that responds to the needs and vulnerability of affected people. Here the IFRC, ICRC and National Societies play a key role. The third approach is framed around the diverse array of operational responses to forced displacement. These are mediated by, among other factors, the nature of the crises, the modes of forced migration, the duration of displacement and how receiving countries define their role as host. As with the causes of forced migration, these three
frameworks frequently overlap and are often complementary, but they result in different priorities in different situations and the duty bearers vary as well.

Firstly, UNHCR leads in legal and normative responses using a status- and rights-based approach to secure protection and deliver assistance based on defined categories of people facing a well-founded fear of persecution set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Protection and non-refoulement – i.e., no forced repatriation – lie at the core of the Convention. The 145 states parties to the Convention have an obligation to determine a claim for refugee status and thus permission to remain on their territory. Refugee status is the most secure, but states are increasingly reluctant to provide sanctuary in this way.

Because refugee status inadequately defines the complex reasons why people may be forced to leave their homes, in recent years humanitarian organizations have invoked more general human rights-based instruments and norms that seek to ensure that everyone, including forced migrants, is able to benefit from recognition of these core rights. Prompted by crises such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 1990s, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 (see Chapter 2). But states have been very cautious about adopting rights-based responses to forced migrants and pre-emptive intervention in sovereign territory on human rights grounds alone.

The rights-based approach has been more effective for internally displaced people. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998) afford a range of rights, including protection, before, during and after displacement resulting from disaster or conflict. While the principles do not have the force of international law, national governments are gradually adopting the norms in their policies or embedding the principles in national law. As Box 1.4 explains, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (AU, 2009) has been hailed as a landmark in the process of rights-based responses to forced migration.

**Box 1.4 The ‘Kampala Convention’: a regional framework for protection**

The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the ‘Kampala Convention’) was adopted by a special summit of the African Union (AU) in October 2009 (AU, 2009). By July 2012, 13 states had ratified and 36 countries signed the Convention. The summit also adopted an important declaration, the Kampala Declaration on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, which sets out broad policy objectives and implementable plans for states and the AU.
The Kampala Convention was preceded and inspired by an equally significant sub-regional agreement, the Great Lakes Pact of 2006, which presents a comprehensive response to that region’s protracted instability and humanitarian crises which resulted in the suffering and displacement of millions of civilians. The Pact’s two most important protocols are on the protection of and assistance to IDPs and on the property rights of returning persons. These treaties adopt a comprehensive approach to internal displacement by linking IDP protection to the search for a durable solution including the protection of property rights upon return.

While these normative developments were driven by a regional strategy for solutions to forced displacement, the process benefited from successful and effective international cooperation. By supporting these processes, key international organizations and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons provided international solidarity, created opportunities for promoting and creating linkages between international trends and regional developments, and also ensured consistency among international and regional norms and standards on displacement.

As binding legal treaties on internal displacement, the Kampala Convention and the Great Lakes Protocol reinforce and strengthen the status of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998). Indeed, giving legal effect to the Guiding Principles has been one of the principal objectives of both the Great Lakes Protocol and the Kampala Convention.

They also further develop and consolidate key normative standards governing internal displacement. For example, the Kampala Convention incorporates concepts applicable to early warning and DRR strategies, and strengthens approaches that will greatly assist states in taking preventive measures regarding forced displacement. These instruments complement the Guiding Principles by outlining key state obligations and responsibilities. The Kampala Convention urges states to take measures to prevent arbitrary displacement; develop national legislations, policies and strategies; designate a national coordination mechanism or focal point; ensure the allocation of resources; protect IDPs, particularly those who are vulnerable; and cooperate with international humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other partners in fulfilling their obligations. Beyond the responsibility of states, it also sets out the role and responsibilities of non-state actors, armed groups, private companies and development actors. The same is true for the Great Lakes Protocol which provides similar key provisions.

These regional instruments bring together and consolidate new developments from relevant legal fields. They have also benefited from key developments in international humanitarian law, disaster law, climate change-related normative standards, development-related forced displacement and the African regional human rights framework. These conditions have enabled both the Convention and the Protocol to adopt a comprehensive regional framework to tackle the challenges of internal displacement, covering all key phases of displacement, from prevention to durable solutions.

Regional and international cooperation is now required to ensure effective and full implementation of the Kampala Convention and the Great Lakes Pact. One example of progress is in Kenya where important initiatives on developing normative frameworks on internal displacement have been implemented with the help of key international agencies. Thanks to a creative and effective inter-agency process
that supported the government in developing national legislation and policy on internal displacement, the Kenyan parliament is now expected to debate and adopt a national instrument on IDP-specific legislation in 2012. In Kenya in June 2012, the AU, together with the World Bank, organized a regional meeting, which brought together legal and development experts from key signatory states of the Kampala Convention. The meeting highlighted the relationship between humanitarian response to forced displacement and national development initiatives. Regional and country-specific initiatives on institution building are also relevant in the area of climate change, disaster prevention and response, and related concerns.

Progress on securing rights for IDPs is not matched by development at the international level. Migration-related frameworks at the national, regional and international levels are inadequate to meet the challenges ahead (Martin, 2011). In particular, receiving communities and countries increasingly determine the response to forced displacement crises and prospects are bleak. Most destination countries’ immigration laws are not conducive to receiving large numbers of forced migrants, unless they enter through already existing admission categories such as highly regulated and minimal refugee quotas.

The moniker ‘Fortress Europe’ depressingly epitomizes the restrictive turn of many high-income countries over the last two decades (Buzan et al., 1998; Geddes, 2000). This has been reinforced by the ‘securitization of asylum’ in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, i.e., the tendency for high-income countries to perceive asylum seekers, particularly from Muslim regions, as a ‘vector of terrorism’ (Zetter, forthcoming). These outcomes further diminish the opportunities for legal migration by those most in need of protection. As most forced migrants do not meet the legal definition of a refugee under international or national law, they increasingly resort in desperation to ‘illegal’ means of entry, often with the assistance of criminal networks (including smugglers), thus reinforcing the anti-refugee rhetoric. There seems little prospect of this vicious cycle being curtailed let alone reversed. Indeed, the recent response of European Union (EU) member states to the arrival of migrants from Libya and Tunisia bodes ill for the future.

The concept, but not the practice, of ‘temporary protection’ is gaining ground, particularly for those displaced by disasters or other severe upheavals where there are no
The ‘externalization’ of border controls – i.e. the process that uses various methods to transfer migration management beyond national borders – is a recent dimension of high-income countries’ migration policies. Practised in other parts of the world such as Australia (which developed reception centres for asylum seekers in micro-states within its sphere of influence), externalization was formalized by the EU in 2004 and confirmed by the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 2008. By increasing their vulnerability, externalization has serious consequences for migrants and those seeking international protection.

Externalization in the EU involves transferring responsibility and in effect outsourcing its immigration and asylum policy by subcontracting controls. A work programme, adopted in 2004 at The Hague European Council, devoted an important part of the agenda to “the external dimension of asylum and immigration” (EU, 2004). The programme stressed the need for the EU to support specific third countries, through targeted partnerships (such as Neighbourhood Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Balkans Stability Pact, relations between the EU and Africa), in order to improve these countries’ ability to manage migration, protect refugees, and prevent and combat illegal immigration. Coupled with the tightening of border controls and a highly selective immigration policy, these partnerships are developing into an instrument of deterrence at source with respect to those who, in one capacity or the other, need to migrate.

Using a flexible approach, the EU forces or persuades its partners – migrants’ countries of origin or transit – to collaborate in its migration policy to the detriment of respect for human rights. In line with these collaborative agreements for ‘migration flow management’, usually concluded under pressure from the EU, officials from these countries in effect play the role of EU border guards to prevent potential migrants from travelling to Europe. This was the case in 2005, when more than a dozen Africans died, some killed by Moroccan army bullets, during attempts to cross the ‘fences’ of Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves in North Africa. This form of subcontracting often enables the EU to discharge its responsibilities towards refugees, based on unfair ‘burden sharing’. In early 2012, when it was announced that a wall would be constructed in eastern Greece to prevent border crossings from Turkey, that country actively cooperated with EU policy by locking its eastern border with Iran and organizing a thorough search for refugees in the region.

Readmission agreements are a key tool in these collaborations. Negotiated by the EU with ever more source or transit countries, they require the countries to ‘take back’ not only their own nationals who have entered and/or stayed illegally in an EU member state, but also any other person in this situation, irrespective of their nationality. This means that the EU gives these countries a free hand to deal with the people sent back to them, regardless of the conditions for return in these countries. The 2010 agreement with Ukraine well illustrates this cynicism, since Ukraine is regularly criticized by international organizations for racist violence against migrants and refugees.

European policy relating to combating illegal immigration is symbolized by FRONTEX, the European agency established by EU member states in 2004 to manage, reinforce and streamline cooperation between national...
clear prospects of return within a definable period. Nordic countries have taken the lead in providing this special status, notably in the context of environmental displacement. The practice has been a vital tool to assist those who fled the Arab uprisings but were ineligible to claim refugee status. However, resistance to the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers, and others in need of humanitarian assistance and protection, is

border authorities in the EU. This agency’s effect is to distance people seeking international protection. FRONTEX’s maritime interceptions in the Mediterranean Sea are designed to prevent would-be migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the Spanish, Italian and, since 2010, Greek coasts. The conditions under which the identification of potential asylum seekers takes place – in principle a compulsory EU standard for those seeking access to EU states – are questionable. The European Parliament was so concerned that in 2008 it requested that the mandate of FRONTEX “explicitly include an obligation to meet international human rights standards and a duty towards asylum seekers in rescue operations on the high seas” (EU, 2008a).

Another consequence is that externalization diminishes the role of civil society organizations advocating on behalf of asylum seekers and migrants. This reduces democratic accountability and commitments to fundamental rights which EU member states have ratified. It may also encourage migrants to take even more dangerous routes. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, pointed out in 2008 that “there are more and more barriers to entry to the European territory, the consequence being that many people seeking protection have no other choice but to resort to smugglers and traffickers in order to cross borders”.

The increasing power of these measures and the resulting fragility of the right to asylum are illustrated by a dramatic drop in asylum claims over the past decade. For all high-income counties including the EU, UNHCR recorded a decrease of approximately 42 per cent in the decade to 2011 (UNHCR, 2011a).

Ironically, while the Arab Spring was welcomed by European governments, their first reaction in February 2011 was to deploy FRONTEX off Tunisia and Libya in order to prevent populations freed from dictatorship from approaching their coasts. UNHCR estimates that 1,500 people died or were missing at sea during the first six months of 2011.

In March 2011, a boat carrying 72 people (Eritreans, Ethiopians, Ghanaians, Nigerians and Sudanese) drifted for more than two weeks between Libya, which they were fleeing, and Italy, which they sought to enter. Despite their distress and the large presence of NATO ships and helicopters in the area, no one came to help; 63 passengers died. An investigation led by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly clearly points the finger at European states and their border-control measures to discourage fishermen and merchant ships from fulfilling their obligations of rescue at sea (PACE, 2012).

The balance of power may appear unequal between an increasingly aggressive ‘Fortress Europe’ and the thousands of migrants on the move due to conflict and poverty. But an encouraging sign came in early 2012, when the European Court of Human Rights condemned Italy for deporting migrants to Libya in 2009 without previously assessing the scope and provisions for international protection which these individuals could claim. A first step towards rolling back the policy of externalization?
a regrettable outcome of the international community’s inability to manage positively international migration in the era of globalization, except for highly skilled migrants.

The second means of responses to forced migration is framed around the precepts of humanitarian actors in conflict and disaster contexts. Among leading proponents of this approach are the three components of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, IFRC and National Societies) which deploy a wide definition of, and response to, humanitarian principles and responsibilities. UNHCR provides the major strategic and coordinating function in delivering humanitarian assistance for refugees and conflict-induced IDPs, and thus plays a significant role in establishing humanitarian precepts and practices working with its operational partners, which are mainly drawn from the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector. Despite being ‘guardians’ of humanitarian values, challenges to accountability and responsiveness have increased over the last decade and development of the Sphere guidelines (Sphere Project, 2011) reflect the concern of humanitarian organizations (see Chapter 2).

The recent emergence of new types of humanitarian agencies (see Box 6.1), alongside the resurgence of interest in faith-based NGOs, illustrates the dynamic characteristics of the sector (JRS, 2011). At the same time the ‘architecture’ of humanitarianism, predicated on a strong emergency and crisis response capability, has had to adapt to the changing processes, drivers and consequences of forced migration discussed earlier. Most significant has been recognition that the complexity and diversity of humanitarian emergencies called for far better coordination of the delivery of humanitarian assistance among both major intergovernmental actors and the large number of NGOs. The Humanitarian Response Review, completed in 2005, and the current ‘Transformative Agenda’ (IASC, 2012), responding to the considerable shortcomings evident in the response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010, are explored in Chapters 6 and 7.

The protracted displacement of many refugees and IDPs, the greater weight now attached to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, and the prominence given to longer-term post-disaster recovery all highlight the pressing need for developmental strategies to deliver sustainable responses to what have always been labelled humanitarian crises. The World Bank is now collaborating with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR in the new Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) to promote ‘developmental’ approaches to humanitarian situations (World Bank, 2011; UNHCR, 2011).

In responding to crises of forced migration, two core precepts dominate. The first lies in identifying and addressing the distinctive socio-economic vulnerabilities of forced migrants that result from their uprooting (see Chapter 2). Generally, those most vulnerable to displacement’s harms – unaccompanied and separated children, women at risk of gender- and sexual-based violence, adolescents at risk of forced recruitment into gangs and insurgencies, ill and disabled people, the elderly and trafficked individuals
– are already in very difficult or marginalized economic and social situations and are most in need of specific approaches to ensure their safety and access to assistance.

Of particular concern to humanitarian agencies seeking to meet needs and reduce vulnerability is that the complexity and unpredictability of current conflicts, indiscriminate violence, multiple (and usually) non-state actors and political instability severely narrow the ‘protection space’ and civilian security. Responding to these conditions has required innovative and risky actions. But lasting solutions will only come from sustainable economic, social and human development that reduces the pressures precipitating or underlying forced migration whether caused by disasters or by conflict and violence. Humanitarian actors do not have the capacity or mandate to make these changes alone, but too often they are left to respond to forces that they cannot control. Here, the TSI may offer a new, developmental way out of crises of forced migration (UNDP, UNHCR and World Bank, 2010).

Firmly rooted in humanitarian action is a second precept: efforts to prevent, reduce, mitigate and help individuals adapt to the risks of events that lead to forced migration are clearly the best course of action in limiting the humanitarian consequences of displacement. Of particular importance is disaster risk reduction, which involves “systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events” (UNISDR, 2009). DRR and early warning mechanisms do not prevent extreme natural hazards or violence from occurring but help communities to cope with their damaging effects and may reduce the scale of the displacement impacts. Given the highly political nature of many of these emergencies, efforts to improve governance in crisis-prone countries are equally important. This helps both to mitigate the risks and reduce the tensions that can escalate into communal or political violence, which in turn affects the nature of the resulting displacement.

Closely linked to the humanitarian response, the third approach to forced migration is framed in terms of operational perspectives and these must be addressed through different mechanisms depending, for example, on the displacement’s duration or its phase. Some of the causes discussed above produce protracted crises whereas others lead to more temporary dislocations. In Timor-Leste political instability was relatively quickly resolved and a new government put in place (see Box 7.3). But other cases, such as DRC, Iraq and Somalia, are protracted with little prospect of resolution in sight. Indeed, one of the most disturbing statistics on forced displacement is that almost 70 per cent of the 10.4 million refugees are in protracted exile (UNHCR, 2012) and in at least 40 countries IDPs are living in protracted displacement, the majority “considered to be in a severely protracted situation, in which a generation had grown up in displacement” (IDMC, 2011). Unlocking these protracted situations calls for political will and innovative solutions (see Chapter 7).
Similarly, reconstruction after extreme natural hazards sometimes moves ahead quickly and people are able to return to their homes with little loss of livelihoods, such as in the Philippines after Typhoon Ketsana in 2009. In other cases, return is delayed or impossible because governments have too little capacity to implement reconstruction programmes, the likelihood of the same type of natural hazard recurring is great and/or the home community has been damaged beyond repair. Recovery after the Haiti earthquake in 2010 illustrates many of these challenging conditions.

Forced migrants’ needs also differ depending on the migration stage. Those who have recently migrated will generally have greatest need for such basics as shelter, means of livelihood, orientation to host country’s social, cultural and political norms and some knowledge of the language. Over time, those who remain in the destination country may need assistance to integrate more fully into the host community – for example, skills training to move up the economic ladder, language training and civics education if required for citizenship or services for their children. Those who return to their home countries or communities may have very similar needs to those they had when they first migrated. Deciding whether return is possible involves a range of variables, including, for example, the extent to which the causes – either direct or indirect – are likely to persist. Reintegration will be affected by plans and programmes to mitigate future dislocations from the hazards that caused the movements.
Whether the migration is internal or international will also affect the likelihood for return or resettlement in the new location. In addition to immigration policies, the policies affecting return and settlement include land use and property rights, social welfare, housing, employment and other frameworks that determine whether individuals, households and communities can find decent living conditions and pursue adequate livelihoods. However, despite the relative success stories of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda in recent times, overall the prospects of return are diminishing and protracted displacement has become the norm.

In these circumstances, some refugees turn to third-country assisted resettlement as one conclusive way of ending a process that started as forced migration. Usually organized by UNHCR through quota schemes in receiving countries, it is one of the so-called three durable solutions to refugee displacement. However this barely scratches the surface of needs with an annual uptake of only 10 per cent of an estimated 805,000 people seeking this option (UNHCR, 2012).

Another forced displacement situation concerns the rescue of people who are endangered in countries in crisis or neighbouring countries and who are evacuated to other states for safety. The most common form of evacuation is of citizens who are caught in the middle of a crisis. Governments in Haiti, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan, for example, have evacuated their citizens from earthquake-, cyclone-, tsunami- and flood-affected areas. In conflict zones very different international efforts are required. The recent evacuation of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers trapped by the crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya illustrates the complexity of responding to large-scale and spontaneous exodus. In Libya, migrant workers, Libyan refugees, refugees from other countries but resident in Libya, stateless people and others stranded at borders were all mixed together. Conditions such as these, where large-scale population displacement has already commenced, call for the rapid mobilization of innovative forms of support and assistance to facilitate orderly evacuation and repatriation, new mechanisms for coordinating the principal international actors such as UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Red Cross Red Crescent, and creative ways of securing humanitarian protection, especially for those with uncertain immigration status who get caught up in these crises. UNHCR’s 10-Point Plan of Action illustrates such a response (UNHCR, 2007) while Box 1.6 explores this nexus of rights, humanitarian and operational challenges. Yet little or no assistance was provided to help the countries of origin – notably in sub-Saharan Africa – respond to the huge burden caused by the massive repatriation of their migrants caught up in the crisis. These countries do not have the capacities and structures to absorb large-scale return.

In contrast to the reactive response in Libya, the international community has, in rare cases, planned the evacuation of large groups of vulnerable people, such as the humanitarian evacuation of Kosovars in 1998. In order to convince countries of first asylum to keep their doors open to Kosovars, other countries agreed to accept a certain
The wave of political unrest that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to many countries in North Africa and the Middle East has forced rulers out of power in four countries and induced several others to announce their intention to step down when their current term ends.

The uprisings have caused the deaths of thousands of people and more than 2 million others have been forced to leave their homes. Difficulties in accessing health care, basic services, education and food security is of concern, particularly in areas still affected by civil unrest and military intervention.

Ongoing civil uprisings in Syria and major protests in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon indicate that the region is facing an extended period of political and social turbulence. The disruption of local economies, as well as the eurozone and global economic crises, further complicates the work of new political leaders in consolidating institutions and matching the expectations of an increasingly disillusioned youth who have taken to the streets in recent months.

One of the uprisings’ impacts is the extent to which they have impacted migration dynamics, and migration and refugee governance.

The political turmoil and NATO military campaign in Libya produced large-scale, complex and diverse migration flows that exposed protection gaps in the international humanitarian regime. Three key issues came to the attention of the international community: the protection and rights of migrants and refugees caught in crisis; the role of state actors and international agencies in such situations; and the impact of mechanisms of migration management on broader societal dynamics (Koser, 2012).

Three groups of migrants have been particularly affected by the uprisings. Firstly, third-country nationals (TCN), both legal and undocumented residents, working in the affected countries. Some 800,000 migrant workers fled from Libya to Tunisia and Egypt in a relatively short time, highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the legal status of migrant workers who are subsequently displaced, and for the protection of whom no clear institutional responsibility exists in the current international legal system. IOM and UNHCR recognized the ‘mixed’ nature of these migration flows and worked together to evacuate TCNs. This meant the agencies had to merge their mandates, expertise and resources to prevent the crisis from escalating into a humanitarian emergency or a protracted displacement crisis, and potentially spilling over to Europe (IOM, 2012b). Indeed, their joint initiative to resettle 5,000 Somali and Ethiopian refugees sheltering in Libya did not convince EU countries that they had obligations (UNHCR, 2012). However, the long-term impacts of this mass return operation on already fragile economies and polities in the countries of origin are of concern and should be closely and independently monitored.

The second group of migrants affected are resident refugee populations. Their protection during and after the uprisings also deserves close attention, in particular, the situation of more than 1 million Iraqi refugees who have been living in Syria since 2006 and who risk being victimized by both sides of the ongoing conflict. Early assessments of the situation of Egypt’s large refugee population after the
revolution also highlight a deteriorating protection environment.

Finally, the international community must closely monitor the situation of IDPs in Syria and Libya and plan immediate, medium- and long-term actions to secure their protection and sustainable and durable solutions.

The hundreds of thousands of African and Asian migrant workers stranded in Libya during the civil war suddenly exposed the scale of intra-African and international migration to the global public. Overall, IOM recorded migrant workers from more than 120 countries crossing the borders to Egypt and Tunisia.

But recent migration events are not simply a side effect of the uprisings. The links between declining opportunities for migration from North Africa to the EU (due to the economic crisis and intensified border controls), the exclusion and discontent of disenfranchised Arab youth and the wave of social unrest deserve closer consideration. Cecilia Malmström, EU Home Affairs Commissioner, noted the ambiguity of the EU response to the unfolding crisis: “In 2011, the EU missed a historic opportunity to show North African countries and the world that it was committed to defending the fundamental values upon which it was built. It is as if we’d said ‘It is wonderful that you make a revolution and want to embrace democracy but we have an economic crisis to deal with so we can’t help’” (EU, 2012).

The threat of a ‘human tsunami’ of immigrants towards the Mediterranean’s northern shores permeated public perceptions and EU members’ policy responses even though this exodus never materialized.

The EU response also revealed the tension between internal and external dimensions of migration governance. The EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility paper (EU, 2011) claims to offer a ‘migrant-centred’ approach articulated around four pillars: facilitating regular migration and mobility; preventing and reducing irregular migration and human trafficking; maximizing development impact; and promoting international protection and enhancing the asylum policy’s external dimension. But it remains locked in a securitarian logic in which migration enforcement and control is paramount as FRONTEX’s renewed and expanded role and resources exemplify (PACE, 2012).

The popular movements towards more democratic governance in North Africa have upset the collaboration between the EU and authoritarian North African governments on migration governance. Before the revolutions, this had succeeded in significantly reducing the crossing of EU external borders by ‘undesirables’. In fact, alongside increasingly restrictive internal immigration regimes, the EU championed the externalization of border controls (see also Box 1.5) to North African countries, for example through bilateral agreements between the former Libyan regime and Italy, or Tunisia and France, or Morocco and Spain. These measures, while not stopping migration, increasingly restricted and irregularized migration channels in the Mediterranean and made migration more costly and risky, ultimately increasing migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation and suffering (De Haas and Sigona, 2012).

number of evacuees under conditions of temporary protection discussed earlier. With UNHCR assistance, more than 90,000 Kosovars were evacuated to 28 countries, many of which set up reception facilities for the evacuees. When the fighting ended and Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, many evacuated individuals returned to their homes.
There are fewer mechanisms for permanent admission of people during crises. A number of countries accelerate or facilitate processing of visas during crises so that people who otherwise would not be admissible for permanent residence are able to enter. Canada and Brazil, with its grant of five-year residency, have given priority to processing visas for people directly and significantly affected by the Haitian earthquake.

To date, the means to address involuntary migration from slow-onset crises which over time destroy lives, habitats or livelihoods have yet to be satisfactorily developed. Yet, some of these migrants may well come from life-threatening situations, especially if persistent drought, for example, combines with political instability to create conditions of food insecurity. Climate change did not trigger conflict in Darfur but exacerbated environmental degradation and pre-existing tensions over scarce resources. Although the immediate threats of food insecurity and conflict have receded, a legacy of nearly 2 million IDPs remains. High levels of instability persist, reflecting the complex cocktail of forced displacement, conflict and food insecurity.

Conditions such as these pose new challenges for humanitarian actors to discern needs and vulnerabilities and develop appropriate mechanisms of rights protection. While there is potential to apply the 1998 Guiding Principles to protect those at risk of displacement due to slow-onset climate change (see Chapter 7), in practice countries lack the capacity or willingness to protect their citizens affected by these circumstances (Zetter, 2011).

**Conclusions**

Forced migration is complex and related to economic, political, environmental and social causes that defy easy solutions. For many, preventing displacement without addressing the underlying factors precipitating these movements would be cataclysmic. A recent report on migration and global environmental change, issued by the British government, drew attention to the likely plight of poorer households who could be ‘trapped’ by “circumstances where they are at once more vulnerable to environmental change and less able to move away from it” (Foresight, 2011). The same conclusion can be reached for many others ‘trapped’ by violence, conflict and natural hazards who cannot escape these risks and vulnerabilities even as forced migrants. Government policies that restrict migration – whether internal or international – place millions in situations where they face dire consequences if they remain at home but no clear-cut way to either reach safety within their own country or migrate to another country.

Forging appropriate responses to forced migration is a challenge for all countries. It is complicated by the wide range of reasons that people are forced to migrate and the dearth of international and national law, norms and policies to respond adequately to their needs, whether they are displaced internally or across international borders. Governments often believe that they must balance humanitarian concerns for the
uprooted with concerns about security and the needs of their own populations. The very complexity of forced migration, particularly the ways it can blur with voluntary movements, makes it even more difficult for states to determine who among the forced migrants requires assistance and protection, because return to their homes would place them in dangerous situations. Nevertheless, the alternative – to make no distinctions for forced migrants – would violate all humanitarian tenets.

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CHAPTER 2
Vulnerability and protection: reducing risk and promoting security for forced migrants

Forced migration is both a highly significant cause of vulnerability and a major threat to civilian protection. The increasing complexity and unpredictability of violence and conflict accentuate vulnerability and diminish the scope for protection. Increasingly restrictive migration regimes worldwide reflect shrinking protection space for forced migrants, thereby increasing their vulnerability.

This chapter outlines some of the main displacement vulnerabilities and their root causes, and discusses how people find protection and the importance of community-based protection. It also reviews protection gaps in normative and political frameworks and looks at current experiences and challenges in enhancing protection and reducing vulnerability.

The chapter advocates a concept of ‘displacement vulnerability’ – vulnerability from, during and after forced migration – arguing that humanitarian actors must address the interplay between vulnerability and protection of forced migrants more fully in their policy and praxis.

While the chapter focuses on the role of humanitarian actors in reducing risks and promoting security, it is important to realize that protection initiatives by outside agencies are often viewed as relatively unimportant by people at risk (Box 2.1). Civilians requiring protection mostly rely on individual or communal self-protection. It is therefore necessary to understand the many determinants of vulnerability and protection, including religion, ethnicity, gender and sexuality, age, occupation or other aspects of identity, which may determine how vulnerability and protection are perceived (Collinson et al., 2009).

‘Displacement vulnerability’ and forced migration

Among humanitarian actors there is no universally agreed definition of vulnerability (Zetter, 2011), but there is shared agreement about general principles – the characteristics and circumstances of a community that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard (UNISDR, 2009). These principles have largely been developed by humanitarian actors in the context of disaster risk reduction, but they are widely deployed by other actors, for example, in relation to food security (FAO and ILO, 2009; UNISDR, 2009; WFP, 2009) and urban poverty and livelihoods (World Bank, 2004). They are no less relevant to the situation of forced migrants.
The IFRC, ICRC and National Societies have generally defined their role as stemming from the migrant population’s particular vulnerability, rather than differentiating on the basis of the status of migrants or the reasons they have migrated. Indeed, the IFRC emphasizes that the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement’s common purpose is “…to address the humanitarian concerns of migrants in need throughout their journey… to provide assistance and protection to them, uphold their rights and dignity, empower them in their search for opportunities and sustainable solutions, as well as promote social inclusion and interaction between migrants and host communities” (IFRC, 2009). The scope of the Movement’s work underlines the diversity of vulnerability which motivates its action: humanitarian assistance; restoring links between migrants and their families; protection of migrants in detention; advocacy on behalf of vulnerable migrants; supporting the social inclusion of migrants; and help to establish new community links for migrants.

Displacement often challenges in specific ways the safety, dignity and integrity of the individuals involved thereby increasing their vulnerability. For humanitarian actors, it is the vulnerability of refugees that has largely driven the development of concepts and tools, in the context of forced migration. However, contemporary causes and consequences of forced migration, discussed in Chapter 1, create new challenges and expose many other groups of people to vulnerability, in addition to refugees.

Three different contexts are explored to highlight the interaction between forced migration, vulnerability and protection needs: the increasing diversity and complexity of violence; vulnerability to disasters; and urban vulnerability.

The World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011* highlights established humanitarian responses that do not fit with contemporary patterns of conflict and violence and the real-life consequences for civilians. It illustrates how, while interstate and civil wars have declined over the last 25 years and deaths from civil war are one-quarter of what they were in the 1980s, violence and conflict still affect one in four people globally (World Bank, 2011). Thus, at least 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by fragility, violence or conflict, conditions which threaten their protection and expose their vulnerability. They risk becoming trapped in conflict zones (Lubkemann, 2008), particularly with the increasingly restrictive migration regimes worldwide and shrinking protection space. Those who do manage to cross borders often continue to face material and physical insecurity in their host countries.

These findings present two crucial but interlinked implications for humanitarians’ understanding of and response to vulnerability.

Firstly, as shown in Chapter 1, direct attacks on people’s lives under the classic conditions of persecution found in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees are not necessarily the greatest cause of forced displacement and vulnerability. In
most contemporary conflicts and post-conflict situations, violence may erupt spontaneously and derive from unpredictable and multiple triggers, leading to a state of radical uncertainty for those affected. Today, these unpredictable and indiscriminate conditions generate high levels of vulnerability. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, war is seen as a recurrent event, like the rainy season, not as an exception (Vigh, 2008). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), while no longer in a situation of ‘generalized warfare’, exemplifies the contemporary conditions of ‘generalized violence’ and the extreme vulnerability to which large numbers of the population are exposed. These forms of violence and conflict that precipitate forced migration are neither ‘war’ nor ‘peace’ (Richards, 2005; Suhrke and Berdal, 2012).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is no longer in a state of ‘generalized war’ but human rights violations, recurrent insecurity and protracted displacement still prevail in parts of the country, keeping large numbers of civilians in a lingering state of fear. Accounts of violence against civilians are plentiful and horrific, in a context of quasi-constant instability and lawlessness, causing both chronic and acute displacement crises.

The exact numbers of IDPs are impossible to ascertain, but in 2011, 1.7 million people were estimated to be internally displaced (UNHCR, 2012; IDMC, 2012). In certain areas of DRC, such as Masisi in North Kivu, the populations have ‘always been on the run’ having experienced displacement for the past 20 years: most IDPs have been displaced several times (HRW, 2010). Protracted and multiple displacements have eroded resilience and heightened vulnerabilities.

Shocking forms of violence, such as rape and child soldiering, have captured the international community’s attention, with DRC women and children being systematically labelled as ‘vulnerable’. Yet, tracking specific violations gives a partial view of the multiple risks civilians are exposed to and can fall short of addressing the intrinsic vulnerability of certain groups that is caused and sustained by societal, economic or cultural practices. It can also obscure indirect forms of vulnerability through exposure to risks that are engendered by coping strategies (e.g., women increasingly resorting to prostitution to support their families).

Displaced and non-displaced people are often exposed to similar immediate threats to their physical security especially as most IDPs are with host communities. But although flight from danger is a survival strategy, displacement in itself can trigger certain risks, such as direct attacks, abduction or separation. IDPs’
vulnerability is also exacerbated by the fact that they are deprived of their normal environment, shelter, sources of livelihood and community support systems (Kellenberger, 2009). Vulnerability is heightened in remote locations, as illustrated by a 2011 survey conducted by Oxfam, in areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army, where an overwhelming portion of the population said they “felt abandoned, isolated, and vulnerable”.

At the ‘micro’ level, ICRC has identified four main types of internal displacement in the DRC:
- ‘reactive’, in response to an actual attack or specific event
- ‘preventive’, in anticipation or fear of an attack or abuses
- of a ‘pendulum’ nature, with people returning to their areas of origin either during the day or intermittently for planting or school seasons
- of an itinerant nature, whereby IDPs move from one place to another, often in search of humanitarian aid (Kellenberger, 2009).

At a ‘macro’ level, displacement patterns have been characterized by two simultaneous yet opposite trends:
- large-scale returns when the security situation improved either durably or temporarily
- massive new displacements caused by military operations against armed groups and the subsequent reprisals of those groups, and by the withdrawal of troops from certain areas.

Such a complex and fluid situation of internal displacement has further hampered the task of humanitarian organizations.

While violence in DRC is commonly depicted as ‘generalized’ and ‘indiscriminate’, the perpetrators of human rights abuses are well known and civilians are often targeted for specific reasons. Although numerically weaker following years of military operations, foreign armed groups and local militias have continuously violently retaliated against civilians. The other main perpetrator of abuses is the national army, the Armed Forces of the DRC, made up for the most part of former elements of armed factions who have been poorly integrated. Despite the scale and seriousness of violations committed, very few perpetrators have been held accountable for their actions. With the prevailing state of impunity, civilians remain vulnerable, unprotected and exposed to abuses.

The ‘externalization of neighbouring instability’ (Paddon and Lacaille, 2011) is often depicted as having led to massive violence and displacement, especially in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. But local economic and social grievances, especially uneven citizenship rights and ethnic discrimination, unequal access to arable and grazing land and growing demographic pressure, are the root causes of recurrent conflict and displacement. Furthermore, the development of a war economy based on the unregulated exploitation of natural resources controlled by corrupt or opportunistic national and foreign elites and military rulers is another element sustaining the pursuit of the conflict and endemic violence. This has led to more permanent demographic and socio-economic changes, with populations that previously farmed in rural areas now concentrating around mining sites, which is generating food insecurity and new forms of vulnerabilities.

For Oxfam, vulnerability is ultimately “the result of political indifference that allows it to endure” (Oxfam, 2012). This applies to DRC where the “absence of a functioning state and the fragility of state power” (Paddon and Lacaille, 2011) means that “power dynamics are systematically exploited, putting vulnerable groups increasingly at risk” (Oxfam, 2011). This
The changes in the types of vulnerability to which forcibly displaced people are exposed are also profound. It is not direct attacks alone that create vulnerability today, but the deprivation caused by war – the material impacts and the undermining of social networks that are so crucial for survival (Slim and Bonwick, 2005; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006).

Forces that engage in violence overwhelmingly target and disrupt people's livelihood systems and society's core institutions on which households depend for survival. Food is often illegally acquired during violent conflict (Young et al., 2005), while access to natural resources, jobs, markets and institutions is restricted, further negatively impacting livelihoods. Maintaining or recovering access to key institutions and livelihood options is one of the biggest challenges to reduce vulnerability in situations of randomized violence. When protection fails and vulnerability is traumatic, people may be driven to move out of the area to become refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Fadnes and Horst, 2009).

Out-movement, however, creates comparable problems as people are usually forced to flee to areas with similarly limited access to markets, institutions and civil society. Conversely, vulnerability may be just as acute when movement is deliberately restricted by curfews, roadblocks, closing borders or forcibly returning people to unsafe areas, for example in Somalia (see Box 1.2). But ‘self-imposed’ restrictions of movements can also be a means of protection, due to the extreme fear caused by conditions of violence and insecurity (see Box 2.3). This particularly applies to women, who are more often targets of sexual violence, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Skjelsbaek, 2011).

Turning now to disasters, the changing characteristics of disaster similarly require a reappraisal of vulnerability. One example is increasing vulnerability due to slow-onset environmental degradation induced by climate change. This reduces the capacity of people to cope with acute environmental hazards. In Kenya, for example, pastoral communities have been “increasingly susceptible to ecosystem vulnerability and a
weakening of coping capacity... wider patterns of mobility in search of pasture... contrast with government policies of sedentarisation which lead to urban settlement and marginalisation” (Zetter, 2011; see also Hammond, 2011). Chronic and progressively increasing vulnerability distributed over a wide geographical area is in marked contrast to the more familiar conditions of acute vulnerability precipitated by a geographically concentrated rapid-onset disaster.

Other, slow-onset ‘global’ challenges such as water scarcity, food insecurity, global financial crises and sub-standard urban environments are less immediately dramatic than acute vulnerability in disasters. Yet these emerging structural determinants account for the increasing scope and complexity of vulnerability for which humanitarian actors must develop new or adapted tools and policies.

Concern for humanitarian crises in urban areas has surged, as Chapter 4 explains, (IASC, 2010; Pantuliano et al., 2012). Rapid urbanization in low-income countries has long been recognized as a major cause of vulnerability for poor people who live in informal urban settlements and face degraded and hazardous environmental conditions, non-existent health care and urban violence. But, as the world urbanizes, vulnerability increasingly shifts to cities where proportionately more people now live. Urban populations’ multiple vulnerabilities to factors such as urban violence, flooding or landslips and conditions of deprivation further expose them to humanitarian emergencies, which may force them to displace (Zetter, unpublished). Residents of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, for example, were poorly equipped to cope with the earthquake, and displacement exacerbated pre-existing insecurity that threatened both lives and livelihoods (Box 2.2). For women and girls, a consequence of repeated displacements was reduced freedom of movement and social networks. Whether chronic vulnerability is related to environmental stress or a fragile and insecure urban environment,

**Box 2.2 Haiti: understanding community-led protection**

When Red Cross Red Crescent emergency response delegates arrived in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, they were confronted by interpersonal violence in a number of settings. Their work was regularly affected, at times even undermined, by violence and crime. They witnessed violence at community distribution sites, forced evictions and demonstrations in the communities and were threatened by local power holders. Their medical units received people with injuries related to violence from beatings and fractures to lacerations and knife and gunshot wounds. However, less public forms of violence, particularly in the camps, were far more difficult to recognize and respond to. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, there were few opportunities or safe environments where individuals, families and communities could talk about their safety and what they could do to
preventing context made for difficulties; for example, security issues meant that needs assessments could only be made in daylight, even though communities were most vulnerable to violence at night. Owing to the sheer size of the emergency and the millions of people affected, questions were often directed towards ‘representatives’ of a household, a community or its social groups, with the risk that this left the voices of those vulnerable to violence watching from a distance. Women were not willing to speak on sensitive issues in front of men, while young girls became silent in front of boys and vice versa. With much infrastructure destroyed, and an overwhelmed police force, survivors of violence had little information on where they could receive help, or access to the few services available.

The IFRC’s Safe Spaces assessment methodology is being piloted for the first time in Haiti as a community-led protection approach to help residents prevent, mitigate and respond to violence. It was inspired by Haiti’s displaced communities in recognition of their efforts to ensure their own protection in areas where insecurity threatened their lives and livelihoods. The tool aims to help programme teams better recognize a community’s, neighbourhood’s or family’s vision of their world and perceptions of security. In doing so, it helps identify measures the Red Cross Red Crescent can put in place to support the positive efforts individuals make to stay safe. The approach combines a mapping of safe and unsafe spaces, a community safety audit and participant-led discussions implemented through community focus groups.

The assessment was initially carried out in 2011 in La Piste camp in Port-au-Prince, where the IFRC has built 358 transitional shelters with water and sanitation, and livelihoods opportunities. The shelters predominantly serve a large section of the city’s deaf and handicapped community. In all, 51 people across five focus groups participated in the assessment and discussed issues, such as what is the community? Where do you feel safe in this area and why? Where do you tell your children not to go? What does safety and security mean for you? What do you do to protect yourself and your family in this area?

A disabled woman living in La Piste camp describes how she tries to protect herself from violence: “Sometimes you can do little things and you’re safer. If I hear someone trying to get in by the door at night, I turn the radio on, and make a lot of noise so they think I’m not alone … and then I’ll throw a little stone against my neighbour’s window. It means if I really need help, she can get others and then they’ll all step outside together. That’s what we try at least.”

The assessment identified a number of risk factors for this displaced community’s vulnerability to violence including:

- Women and girls, unlike other members of the community, have far more limited freedom of movement and social networks, tending to have few friends beyond their immediate neighbours, and rarely leave their shelters after dark.
- Violence was reported as a daily problem in community life.
- Violence was taking place in home, camps, schools, streets, transport stations, work, discos and carnivals.

The most dominant form of violence perceived to threaten communities was sexual violence against women and girls particularly between the ages of 14 and 24. Physical violence, kidnapping of children and crime were also reported by focus groups.

The assessment showed clearly that communities want programmes that address the risk
states have a primary duty to protect their populations in order to diminish vulnerability. In practice such protection is often hard to find.

Moreover, the majority of refugees and IDPs now self-settle in urban areas, not rural locations or camps. This has enormous implications for interlinked vulnerabilities and protection needs to which they are exposed and how these can be mitigated. Some vulnerabilities may be reduced: for example, livelihood opportunities may be greater in urban areas. But others may increase such as violence, risk of harassment, extortion, threats of expulsion and *refoulement*, especially where the migrants do not have permission to live in the cities (see Chapter 4). The protection gaps for urban refugees and IDPs are considered later.

Symptomatic of the significance of these urban-based challenges, two of the six strategic objectives of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) urban strategy...
These considerations point to two conclusions. Firstly, vulnerability is multi-dimensional and dynamic. Increasingly, populations are exposed to a range of vulnerabilities – livelihoods, health, nutritional status, environmental and shelter conditions – and they move in and out of acute and chronic vulnerability dependent on their respective coping capacities. Secondly, in virtually all situations where people become vulnerable they are also exposed to significant ‘protection gaps’.

**Protection frameworks and gaps**

Displacement vulnerability exposes the protection and security needs of refugees, IDPs and other categories of forcibly displaced people. Protection of civilians from the worst effects of violent conflict, human rights abuses and persecution – as well as from food insecurity and loss of livelihoods – lies at the heart of the humanitarian agenda (Collinson et al., 2009).

Protection is a recognized responsibility of states towards their citizens. International law – in particular international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) and refugee law – provides for protection by others when states are unable to provide protection (Ferris, 2011). (Note that the focus here is on treaty law; for displacement-related customary law, see ICRC, 2011a.) Refugee law, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, provides the strongest source of protection, but only covers relatively circumscribed categories of people. The situation of those who are forcibly displaced but have not crossed international borders is different. Their rights under IHRL and IHL have been reaffirmed under the non-binding 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998). Regional conventions, such as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration for Latin and Central American states, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention (OAU, 1969) and the recent African Union Kampala Convention on IDPs (AU, 2009) (see Box 1.4) provide a wider scope of protection for refugees and IDPs.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols (ICRC, 2012) identify civilians as an essential social group to be protected in armed conflict. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention includes a clear prohibition of forced movement of civilians with the exception of temporary evacuations for population security or imperative military reasons. The Geneva Conventions and Protocols apply to civilians and people with protected status, including the displaced, in situations of armed conflict only.

Paradoxically, although international law makes reference to protection, it does not define it. In the aftermath of the horrors of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and in particular the international community’s failure to protect civilians in these and similar cases, ‘protection’ became firmly re-established on the international agenda. Humanitarian actors recognized the importance of defining a more clearly shared understanding of the concept of protection. Not only was this a response to concerns about the safety, dignity and integrity of the individuals involved, it was also prompted by concern that failures in state security were leading to massive displacement. More than 60 years since the Geneva Conventions were drafted, protection was failing.

In contemporary situations, civilian protection and forced migration are interconnected in two ways. Firstly, as discussed earlier, violent conflict has taken on new manifestations. States, which have the legal and normative duty to afford protection, are either unwilling to do so (for example in Sudan or, more recently, Syria) or unable to do so, for example in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, where non-state actors defy their obligation to protect civilians. Indeed, non-state armed actors are increasingly the perpetrators of the violence and conflict that leads to forced migration. Although bound by the Conventions, insurgents in Colombia, northern Uganda (Lord’s Resistance Army) and DRC rarely if ever abide by their obligation to protect civilians.

In all these countries, forced displacement is the most obvious symptom of the ‘failure to protect’. The provision of protection is not only most often broken by parties that are responsible for upholding it, but regional and international actors’ political priorities also determine the extent to which protection is implemented (Ferris, 2011). For example, in the case of Libya, NATO’s military action was, ostensibly, provided to protect civilians whose security was threatened by troops loyal to the regime. Yet massive population displacement was not averted. Conversely, in the case of Syria, international actors have yet to provide similar modes of protection, although far more civilians have been killed by government troops than in Libya and refugee numbers are rapidly escalating.

Secondly, whereas certain categories of forced migrants – notably refugees – have a special protection status in treaty law and normative practice, concern is persistent and increasing for the growing number who do not have such a status in law, including those fleeing low-level inter-communal violence, gang violence, disasters, ‘land-grabbing’ and development-related (re)settlement schemes (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.5).

Reducing vulnerability and enhancing protection

What has been the response of humanitarian actors and the international community to these contemporary challenges? To what extent has the interplay between vulnerability and protection been recognized and enhanced in humanitarian responses? What new policies and practices are being developed? With few exceptions, such as trafficking of persons (UN, 2000; Council of Europe, 2005) or the African Union’s Kampala
Convention (AU, 2009), new treaties or conventions are not being adopted. Instead, the scope of ‘soft law’ is being extended, existing norms are being refined or adapted, and institutional structures are being reconfigured.

Traditionally, humanitarianism has been guided by the principles of neutrality and impartiality, principles that in the 1990s “proved difficult to uphold in situations of severe insecurity” (Holt and Berkman, 2006). Emerging ‘new humanitarianism’ increasingly challenges “humanitarian actors to address not only needs (e.g. for food and medicine), but also the causes of vulnerability, including socio-political (and possibly economic) structures of violence” (South and Harragin, 2012). The rights-based approach fits well here, an approach increasingly advocated by humanitarian organizations that face the difficulty of justifying providing protection and assistance to people whose legal protection status is clear (such as refugees), while denying this to others who have exactly the same needs but no clear legal entitlement. In Somalia, for example, the 2010–2011 drought intersected with governance failures and conflict to produce widespread livelihood loss, food insecurity and displacement (Lindley, 2011; Box 1.2). How then to distinguish between individuals who are persecuted due to their political conviction, those who flee from conditions of general violence and insecurity, and those who flee drought and loss of livelihood opportunities? A rights-based approach recognizes a diversity of needs while still incorporating targeted efforts for particular vulnerable groups.

A rights-based approach stimulated a range of initiatives to reaffirm international commitments to the protection of civilians. It is a thematic subject of UN Security Council deliberations, and has been a separate item since 1999. At the 2005 UN World Summit, the norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) was adopted with the aim of preventing and halting mass atrocities during times of both war and peace. The work of Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen, who devised the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ to urge states to protect their internally displaced populations, served as inspiration for the norm and eased its acceptance. They stressed that sovereignty is not just protection from outside interference; rather, it is a matter of states having positive responsibilities for their own citizens’ welfare (Kikoler, 2009). Nevertheless, R2P remains a conceptual doctrine, not an operational tool: its rhetorical success has not been matched by practice on the ground as the UN Security Council’s failure to support intervention in Dafur or Kosovo confirms (Adelman, 2010).

A potentially more promising set of initiatives for rights-based entitlements pertains to the promotion of complementary, subsidiary and temporary protection. Complementary protection is the generic name given to that protection which cannot be claimed under the 1951 Refugee Convention, but results from international legal obligations not to return a person to serious ill-treatment such as torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (Zetter, 2011). Protection gaps are clearly visible in a number of violent conflict situations, such as low-level inter-communal violence,
gang violence, urban violence, discrimination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals, general human rights violations and the situation of environment-ally displaced persons. In situations like these, which are not sufficiently covered in legal and political frameworks for protection, complementary or subsidiary protection measures may apply by invoking a range of international conventions such as the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Articles 6 and 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The practice of offering temporary protection status (TPS), invoked to provide safe haven for Hondurans and Nicaraguans following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, is also gaining wider international interest. It offers some scope to resolve certain protection gaps for disaster-affected populations who cross international borders but are not covered by other norms. Temporary protection was offered by Brazil and the United States to Haitians following the 2010 earthquake. Both Finland (in 2004) and Sweden (in 2005) have strengthened the normative potential of TPS by adopting similar protection measures to apply to those displaced by environmental factors. According to the 2005 Swedish Aliens Act, TPS applies under prescribed conditions to “an individual who is unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster” (Zetter, 2011). While the protection needs of those displaced by climate change are covered in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and, with some qualifications, by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998), the issue of displacement triggered by the effects of climate change has been largely neglected in international discussions (Kälin and Schrepfer, 2012). Measures such as these may go some way to filling the protection gaps highlighted by many different researchers (Boano et al., 2008; McAdam, 2011; Kälin and Schrepfer, 2012) and by the UN’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2011) and Norwegian Refugee Council (2012). In Chapter 7 the potential for humanitarian responses is examined in more detail.

Just as the vulnerability of urban populations has come to the fore in recent years, so has awareness of the protection needs of urban populations – existing residents as well as refugees and IDPs, the majority of whom now live in urban areas. The IASC’s 2010 urban strategy, as noted above, pays particular attention to protection needs in Strategic Objective 4. It calls for improved policies and operational tools to limit the effects of urban violence and to recognize and prioritize protection measures for specific ‘at-risk’ groups “such as children or women threatened by conflict or localised violence carried out by armed actors, gangs, drug cartels, crime syndicates” (IASC, 2010). The strategy also points out that, although rights protection is a government prerogative and responsibility, “humanitarian actors have a key role to play in supporting these responsibilities and in monitoring adherence” (IASC, 2010).
In 2009, the UNHCR policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas (UNHCR, 2009) was introduced, a much needed revision of its 1997 policy. In addition, the UNHCR and its protection cluster partners are finalizing guidance for Initial Rapid Protection Assessment implementation and adoption in specific field contexts.

The institutional and operational remit for many of these developments is the creation of the protection cluster as part of the 2005 Humanitarian Reform Process, which is discussed in Chapter 7.

While the legal mandates for protection rest with agencies such as UNHCR and ICRC, many humanitarian organizations now mainstream protection in their response to forced migration and other humanitarian emergencies. The IFRC has focused on these challenges (IFRC, 2010) and a significant development was the adoption, in 2011, of protection principles in the Sphere Project’s Minimum Standards for Humanitarian Response (Sphere Project, 2011). Many humanitarian organizations have specialized protection staff and have developed their own policy, strategies and guidance on protection.

Of course, it is not the role of non-governmental organizations to protect people from actual violence or conflict. But they can enhance protection by measures that remove or reduce the threat of violence and conflict. Examples of this approach are programmes that enhance community responsibility, promoting gender awareness, wider advocacy with police and military, facilitating self-protection measures (see Box 2.3) and implementing what Oxfam terms “safe programming”, i.e., ensuring that sectoral projects such as in the water, sanitation and hygiene sector, or enumeration processes “do not inadvertently put affected populations in further danger and that aid does not negatively impact on conflict dynamics” (Oxfam, forthcoming).

**Enhancing community-based protection before, during and after forced migration**

In populations at risk, individuals and communities play a central role in their own protection. As Slim and Bonwick (2005) note, “protection is not just a commodity or service that can be delivered like food or healthcare. It is also something that people struggle for and achieve… or secure more widely in the politics of their own society.” This requires a move beyond a ‘victim’ approach by recognizing refugees and other forced migrants as active agents coping with the conditions of their lives (Horst, 2006). It also leads to different understandings of protection, as local views of security for example encompass not just physical safety but also life-critical sustenance and services. The protection and livelihood concerns of people themselves are thus deeply interconnected (Jaspars et al., 2007; O’Callaghan and Jaspars, 2009).
Displaced families seeking protection from aerial bombardment in caves in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains, while surviving on roots, leaves and fruit. A Christian family deliberately choosing to travel with Buddhist friends in government-controlled parts of south-east Myanmar. In another part of Myanmar, survivors of Cyclone Nargis organize their own survival for weeks before they see the first traces of outside assistance. Youth in the cattle camps of Jonglei in South Sudan protecting their family and communities in the face of ongoing cattle raids, a weak state and a UN mission struggling to find its relevance. A Zimbabwean family trying to mitigate threats from a violent political conflict by demonstrating political sympathies designed to reduce threats – rather than reflecting their political convictions.

Since 2010, the Local to Global Protection (L2GP) project has undertaken research in Myanmar, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe, documenting how people living in situations of disaster and/or armed conflict take the lead in protecting themselves and their communities. The research also examines how affected communities view the roles of others, including the state, non-state actors, community-based organizations, and national and international aid agencies. Are they seen as protection actors or sources of threat – or a combination of both?

In the past ten years or so, humanitarian and development agencies have tried to encourage affected people to participate in programming, including in relation to protection. However, protection continues to be widely viewed as an activity undertaken primarily by outsiders, on behalf of vulnerable communities. Affected communities and their representatives are rarely consulted in a meaningful sense in the design of protection interventions. This is problematic because external interventions that fail to recognize and support indigenous efforts may inadvertently undermine existing coping mechanisms, disempowering local communities.

The L2GP studies found that protection initiatives by outside agencies were viewed as relatively unimportant by people at risk, especially in conflict-affected areas such as south-east Myanmar or South Kordofan in Sudan, where the state in question is perceived by many as the main agent of abuse. Local understanding of ‘protection’ is often at variance with – or extends beyond – how the concept is used by international agencies. People at risk experience and describe livelihoods and protection as intimately linked, as illustrated for instance by the Zimbabwe and South Sudan studies. Customary law and local values and traditions mattered at least as much as formal rights. In Zimbabwe and Sudan, psychological and spiritual needs and threats were often considered as important as physical survival. Furthermore, self-protection activities help to build ‘social capital’ and develop inter-community bonds. In other words, protection is far more than ‘survival’.

Protection concerns and responses are interlinked with politics and a range of social and cultural issues. The Zimbabwe case, for instance, illustrates the complex connections between politics and livelihoods; the Jonglei study demonstrates how the social and economic importance attached to livestock relates directly to a number of protection issues including armed conflict and social protection of vulnerable members of the communities. In both Karen (Myanmar) and South Kordofan (Sudan), natural features such as dense jungle and mountains are seen as being of paramount importance.
Preparedness at the local, regional and national levels is crucial in reducing the vulnerabilities of (potential) forced migrants, although it is not without potentially high social costs. Given the unpredictable and complex causes of conflict and violence, preparedness, in order to mitigate susceptibility to forced migration, is easier to accomplish in the context of disasters. Indeed disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction have been the mainstream tools of humanitarian agencies for decades.
Much has been achieved and undoubtedly many more lives are now saved that in the past. And yet, as Box 2.4 illustrates, investment in preparedness lags far behind the costs of humanitarian assistance in disaster relief.

**Box 2.4 Investing in preparedness pays**

While disaster preparedness has gained increasing importance in recent years, financial investment in preparedness remains very modest. The Hyogo Framework for Action promotes building the resilience of communities and nations to disasters and emphasizes the importance of defining longer-term disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy. Yet, most low- and middle-income countries have limited resources and capacity to integrate a strategic approach and allocate sufficient resources to preparedness in their national development plans.

The root of this problem is that preparedness expenditure has traditionally been very low, totalling less than 5 per cent of all humanitarian funding in 2009. From 2005 to 2009, for every US$ 100 spent on humanitarian assistance in the top 20 countries that received humanitarian assistance, only US$ 0.62 went to disaster preparedness (Development Initiatives, 2011). Funding for either disaster preparedness or response is viewed by international donors as the responsibility of their humanitarian aid departments rather than development departments. Since disaster preparedness is a long-term process, it is essential that needs be addressed more widely with greater and more predictable financial and resource support.

Investment in preparedness makes sense. The average global economic cost of disasters increased approximately sixfold from 1970 to 2000 (Munich Re, 2001). The World Bank and US Geological Survey suggest that investments of US$ 40 billion in preparedness, prevention and mitigation would have reduced global economic losses caused by disasters in the 1990s by US$ 280 billion. According to the World Meteorological Organization, every US$ 1 invested in prevention could save US$ 7 in recovery (UNISDR, 2010). Although measuring the exact benefits of DRR and mitigation efforts is difficult, the potential impact of disasters, particularly those that are localized and regular, can be reduced by enabling disaster-prone communities to implement measures such as constructing seismically resistant public buildings and houses. Such a response would have the potential multiplier effect of reducing forced displacement (temporary or otherwise) caused by disasters and, perhaps, reducing damage and enabling the displaced to return ‘home’ more quickly.

The example of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake well illustrates the need for DRR and investments in preparedness: failure to invest resulted in preventable deaths and widespread destruction of infrastructure. The earthquake resulted in approximately 73,000 deaths (including almost 30,000 children), 70,000 severely injured or disabled and 4 million made homeless. More than US$ 5.4 billion in aid was donated for relief and reconstruction efforts.

A lack of consciousness about seismic and non-seismic risks is a key challenge in Central and South Asia. Low levels of public education contribute to widespread ignorance and fatalistic attitudes, and reduce the motivation of governments and communities to address physical hazards and invest in preparedness and planning. Indigenous knowledge about
appropriate building practices is diminishing, while building designs that appear more progressive than traditional, time-tested ones are being promoted. For example, traditional timber and stone constructions resisted the 2005 Kashmir earthquake. Unfortunately, the loss of traditional building know-how in favour of inferior building techniques and materials has aggravated seismic risk and contributed to the loss of centuries-old building designs and cultural identities (Halvorson and Hamilton, 2007).

At present, as regards both seismic risk and emergency response, the capacities of government institutions to address risks are limited, regional cooperation is weak and greater international engagement is necessary. Yet, there is little that at-risk communities in the low-income countries of Central and South Asia can do to invest in risk reduction without external assistance and leadership. Moreover, competition for government resources in urban areas dramatically reduces the assistance available to remote, marginalized parts of these countries (USGS, 2009).

Reflecting on DRR experiences in Central and South Asia, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) considered how to apply the lessons learned from a disaster such as the Kashmir earthquake to disasters that are smaller, more localized and often in remote locations. These disasters occur more frequently, but they tend to be largely ignored and inadequately supported.

For the AKDN, the key lessons of the value of preparedness are:

- investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation is essential to allow affected communities to return home more quickly
- both public buildings and houses must be retrofitted and longer-term retrofitting programmes need to be initiated early
- areas need to be more carefully assessed for degrees of risk before construction and development – however, this is not often the case
- communities and civil society need to be involved in developing and implementing DRR, disaster preparedness and capacity-building programmes, which should make use of community coping strategies, knowledge and experience to reduce vulnerability to disasters
- disaster preparedness is a long process that extends from relief to development and has a critical impact on the quality of life and should be incorporated in all development approaches.

To strengthen its natural hazard risk management capabilities in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Tajikistan, the AKDN established the Disaster Risk Management Initiative (DRMI), a three-year, multi-input programme which is currently based in Tajikistan. The initiative promotes regional coordination and standardizing best applicable practices, working with donors, academia, government agencies and civil society to strengthen existing capacity in disaster risk mitigation and preparedness. It also focuses on mobilizing international donors to invest sufficiently in disaster mitigation and preparedness, using science-based strategies (but translating high science to local application) to encourage the agencies to provide support before disasters occur.

The lessons learned from the Kashmir earthquake and other disasters continue to inform the AKDN’s DRR work in Central and South Asia and influence its mandate of coordinat- ing DRR activities in the region, much of which is hazard-prone but lacks basic standards of safety and preparedness. The ultimate aim of both the DRMI and the AKDN’s approach to DRR and disaster mitigation is to improve local populations’ quality of life by reducing vulnerabilities and involving civil society in its core response efforts.
Leadership-driven social cohesion is essential in protecting communities from forced migration. This was illustrated by experience from two trading cities in DRC. Butembo in North Kivu had a socially cohesive community and was far more successful in resisting attack than Dongo in Equateur Province, where ethnic divisions and bureaucratic leadership prevented collective action prior to the city’s sacking by rebels (Brookings, 2010a).

Social protection tools and safety nets are increasingly used by development agencies to support people who lack basic endowments (e.g., skills and assets) and in conditions of chronic poverty or hunger. Social cohesion, in particular supported by leaders and civil society, is also crucial in developing ‘resistance as protection’ strategies, such as those developed in Colombia (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007).

Similar evidence from the disaster context recognizes the vital role of community-based protection, but also the leadership challenges it may present. The development of community-based ‘safe spaces’, promoted by IFRC (see Box 2.2), offers another approach to supporting the protection needs of vulnerable communities.

When protection from forced migration is not an option, it is important to acknowledge that people protect themselves through forced migration (see Box 2.3). Moving out of a war zone is often one of the most effective protection mechanisms for people affected. Decisions on where to flee are rarely arbitrary, and sanctuary is sought in places where some assistance and security can be found, provided by familial or kinship relationships, national authorities or humanitarian agencies (see Box 1.2; Lindley, 2011; O’Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007). Furthermore, it is very common for families to disperse in attempts to minimize risks. Paradoxically, migration can be empowering, even if taking place under ‘forced’ circumstances.

The increasing humanitarian focus on the ‘right to remain’ needs to be critically examined. The right not to be displaced should not be used to deny individuals the fundamental right of freedom of movement, the right to leave any country. With increasing numbers of people trapped in highly insecure and fragile areas in conditions of chronic crisis situations (Vigh, 2008), it may not be appropriate to stress the right not to be displaced especially if causes of chronic vulnerability are not addressed in a systematic way.

Yet migration in areas that experience violent conflict or natural hazards may still involve high security risks. For example, in the first days of the Libya crisis it was men who arrived at the borders seeking refuge. It was three or four weeks later that children (often unaccompanied) and women (often victims of trafficking into Libya prior to the conflict) managed to get to the borders seeking protection and assistance. Now, many months after the crisis, Chadian migrants are expelled and left in the desert without any protection whatsoever.
Moreover, the consequences of displacement can be harmful in the longer term. For example, forced migrants face specific vulnerabilities and secondary risks such as separation from families; encampment and other restrictions of movement; limited livelihood opportunities due to loss of assets and social networks; the undermining of protective social networks that may place tension on relationships in the family; potential conflict over scarce resources in the area of settlement; encouragement to return home under less than optimal circumstances. As such, protection during and after forced migration is crucial.

Support for community self-protection mechanisms can take place on three levels of intervention, which are well illustrated in ICRC’s ‘egg’ model (Figure 2.2). This model distinguishes:

- ‘responsive action’ undertaken in an emerging or established pattern of abuse to prevent its recurrence and/or alleviate its immediate effects
- ‘remedial action’ taken to restore people’s dignity and to ensure adequate living conditions after a pattern of abuse
- ‘environment-building’ efforts to foster a political, social, cultural, institutional and legislative environment that enables or encourages the authorities to respect their obligations and the rights of individuals.

![Figure 2.2 ICRC protection model – spheres of action](source: based on ICRC, 2001)

The model’s importance lies not only in addressing protection needs, such as those arising during and after forced migration, but in emphasizing the necessity to build an environment that restores the protective relationship between the state and its citizens. Even so, environment-building efforts should go beyond state-related authorities, encouraging any protective entity to respect rights and duties towards individuals, and providing individuals with the tools to claim their rights vis-à-vis the authorities.
Challenges and dilemmas in addressing protection needs and vulnerability

Humanitarian actors face severe challenges in reducing risks and promoting security for forced migrants. The ultimate protection measure in relation to forced migration is prevention, but it is also the most difficult. Supporting governments to protect their own people, while at the same time diminishing a population’s exposure to risk, is not easy in situations where the state is party to a conflict. Success ultimately depends on the political will of the parties to conflict – but the tools to ensure that will are not necessarily available. Taking international action to prevent atrocities is very difficult, as noted regarding R2P. Often, violent conflict escalates gradually, but cannot be addressed until it reaches the level of armed conflict with large-scale atrocities. Moreover, since humanitarian actors are already dealing with far more crises than they can realistically manage, it is nearly impossible to mobilize prevention.

A second question is whether to have a categorical approach. In other words, should the protection needs of the affected population as a whole be taken into account, or should the focus be on mitigating vulnerability for predetermined categories of persons? Should the approach be status-based, rights-based or needs-based? The central dilemma here is the risk of diminishing protection and support for vulnerable
people. Extending the current list of vulnerable groups in need of protection is likely to weaken the legal status of those existing categories that are already under threat. Conversely, targeting support for vulnerable people too wide usually means that many more people fall through safety nets.

Another dilemma relates to humanitarian actors targeting support to vulnerable groups by building on community resilience. Identifying and supporting people’s own protection strategies is not straightforward. Communities and vulnerabilities are not necessarily geographically identical or concentrated, especially in urban areas: they may be identified ethnically, religiously, by gender or political affiliation. As a consequence, ‘local communities’ – people living in the same area – may face different vulnerabilities and have different interests and strategies. Moreover, supporting local preparedness or providing assistance to reduce vulnerability, especially acute vulnerability, may raise the visibility of those who receive it, which might undermine their protection.

Community protection strategies are not necessarily always without harmful effects: strategies developed during conflict may become liabilities during peace. Self-protection at times depends on engagement with actors of conflict, which can prolong conflict and also compromise international actors. Also, it is important to ensure that such an approach is not simply about passing on responsibility from the international communities to those forced to move.

Protection is central to forced migration responses

Protection lies at the core of addressing vulnerabilities related to forced migration. Securing protection and reducing vulnerability are complex, but also interlinked, tasks. Population movements today include people on the move who do not fit easily into established protection categories, yet are vulnerable and require protection. A rigid dichotomy of ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ is problematic due to the range of motivations of those who move, those who instigate the displacement of others, and states that do not take the responsibility to protect their vulnerable people.

While a number of these challenges have been highlighted in this chapter, it concludes with three practical recommendations for governments, humanitarian organizations and donors.

Address shrinking protection space

Individuals have a fundamental right to search for protection through migration, in anticipation of or in response to crisis situations. Fleeing the area is one of the most important protection mechanisms available to individuals and communities to deal with acute and chronic crises such as violent conflict, severe drought and food insecurity, or climate change-related disasters.
Lobbying, advocacy and action to address shrinking protection space is urgent as increasing numbers of people are trapped in situations of chronic crisis, ‘unending’ war (Gregory, 2011; Duffield, 2007), chronic urban vulnerability or environmentally induced livelihood problems. Although the right not to be displaced is important, a focus on it misses the point when causes of chronic vulnerability are not being addressed. The risk is that protection activities guided by international legal and normative frameworks are prompted by concerns with state security related to massive displacement, rather than by concerns with the safety, dignity and integrity of the individuals involved. The shrinking protection space of forced migrants – caused by increasing restrictions on them, such as in Europe (Box 1.5) – is another factor impacting the mutual interaction between forced migration and protection.

**Integrate protection and livelihoods support**

Protection and livelihoods support (and thus reduction in vulnerability) go hand in hand in addressing conditions of forced migration. As Jaspers et al. (2007) stress:

“during conflict, people’s options become more limited, but the risks to consider increase, including in particular the risks to personal safety. Livelihood strategies are still pursued, although often at extreme risk to people’s security. Similarly, minimising security risks frequently involves short- or long-term costs to livelihoods.”

This analysis calls for policies which combine protection with needs-based livelihoods support. Some humanitarian organizations, notably ICRC and UNHCR, are already integrating protection and livelihoods support with considerable benefit. Nevertheless, maintaining or recovering people’s access to key institutions and livelihood options is one of the biggest challenges in protection work.

**Box 2.5 ‘Expedited’ adoptions: forced migration by another name**

In the wake of virtually every humanitarian crisis or major disaster since the Viet Nam war and its notorious ‘baby-lift’ of thousands of ‘orphans’ to the United States and Europe, initiatives are devised to move children to ‘safety’ – and often adoption – in another country. The list is long, including the armed conflict in Bosnia (1992), the Rwandan genocide (1994), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) and, most recently, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

While many expressed interest in adopting children affected by the tsunami and plans were mooted to airlift children out of Aceh, Indonesia in particular, both the international community and the national authorities respected the principle that “efforts to reunify a displaced child
with his or her parents or family members must take priority” and “premature and unregulated attempts to organise the adoption of such a child abroad should be avoided and resisted” (HCCH, 2008). Receiving countries declined to accept adoption applications while Indonesia quickly banned the removal of unaccompanied children to other countries and Sri Lanka suspended all departures as a precautionary measure.

There was considerable optimism that adherence to such an approach was now generally accepted. Unfortunately, the response to prospective foreign adopters following the 2010 Haitian earthquake demonstrated just how fragile that apparent consensus was.

Inter-country adoptions from Haiti at the time of the earthquake were legion, with well over 1,000 children adopted abroad in each of the two preceding years, mainly to Canada, France and the United States. The adoption process was also widely recognized as totally lacking necessary safeguards, and many countries had long ceased processing adoptions from Haiti. Despite the inadequacy of safeguards, the process could take up to two years, so at any one time some 2,000 children could be either simply ‘identified as adoptable’ or legally adopted but awaiting travel documents. That was the case in January 2010.

The great majority of children adopted abroad were not ‘orphans’ or ‘abandoned’ but had been relinquished to a crèche, their parents often incited and misled into giving consent for adoption. It could not be said that these children required – or were truly destined by their parent(s) for – adoption abroad.

In this context, several governments immediately pressurized the totally overwhelmed Haitian authorities to approve ‘expediting transfer’ of children already with an adoption judgement. But within seven days of the disaster, the United States announced that its Humanitarian Parole Program – which eventually moved some 1,200 children to the US – would also include children simply matched with prospective adopters (i.e., ‘expediting adoptions’ without going through the normal legal processes). Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland followed suit. The Netherlands expanded this further to include certain children deemed ‘adoptable’ but not yet matched (‘expediting evacuations’ without heeding the acknowledged vital procedures) (ISS, 2010). In all, more than 2,300 children were moved abroad for adoption by year end, most under special dispensations, some with inadequate preparations for their future.

UNHCR has ‘three rules’ for evacuation: “first, to protect and assist in the place where the child and his or her family are physically located; second, if evacuation cannot be avoided, a child must be moved with a primary care-giver; and third, never evacuate unless a plan has been made that will protect children’s rights and well-being” (UNHCR, 1994). Objectively, there was no justification for removing these children from Haiti on an urgent basis. ‘Expediting adoptions’ in practice meant circumventing vital protection procedures regarding adoption, evacuation, verifying consent and family situation, and examining possibilities for in-country care. After the trauma of the earthquake, therefore, these children were subjected to the trauma of unnecessary and rapidly implemented forced migration to a totally unfamiliar place without family or known caregivers.

In situations such as these, the onus for ensuring protection falls on the international community and, in particular, on the potential destination country’s authorities. Individually and collectively they have de facto power
Adapt ICRC’s protection model

Engaging in responsive and remedial action, while also building safe and secure environments, is crucial in protection work in any humanitarian crisis, but may need to be adapted to situations of forced migration. Responsive and remedial action needs to target both the country of refuge and the country of origin – ideally through a transnational approach that builds bridges between those who stayed in an area and those who fled. Environment building, then, should move beyond a national focus to one that addresses all potential providers of protection – at local, regional, national and international levels. This includes not only clan elders, village leaders, religious leaders and business leaders, but also police authorities, regional agencies and host countries, in light of the shrinking protection space and increasing vulnerability of forced migrants.
Chapter 2 was written by Roger Zetter, Emeritus Professor of Refugee Studies, University of Oxford, assisted by Cindy Horst, Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). Box 2.1 was written by Héloïse Ruaudel, independent consultant and former policy programme manager, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. Box 2.2 was written by Juliet Kerr, Violence Prevention Movement Coordinator, IFRC, Haiti. Box 2.3 was written by Nils Carstensen, Senior Humanitarian Adviser to DanChurchAid/ACT Alliance, and Ashley South, independent analyst and consultant specializing in humanitarian and political issues in Myanmar and South-East Asia. Box 2.4 was written by the Aga Khan Development Network. Box 2.5 was written by Nigel Cantwell, a Geneva-based international consultant specializing in the protection of children’s rights in inter-country adoption.

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Health on the move: the impact of forced displacement on health

Good health is dependent upon access to key resources within the environment, control of major disease threats and adequate coordination of preventive and curative health provision. Forced displacement represents a challenge to each of these elements. Whether as a result of disaster, conflict or political oppression, population movements trigger major public health challenges, which are present at the onset of displacement and, in differing forms, can persist for years within migrant communities.

Acute challenges add to prevailing vulnerabilities

After any rapid-onset disaster, the most immediate health issues facing displaced populations typically concern access to food, water and shelter, and adequate sanitation to avoid spread of disease. The March 2011 Japanese tsunami, the floods and landslides in the Philippines following Tropical Storm Washi in December 2011 and tornadoes hitting west Kentucky, USA, in March 2012 all resulted in acute health challenges. In Japan, immediately following the tsunami, almost 2,000 people had to share fewer than 20 working latrines (Sanitation Updates, 2011). More than 100,000 bottles of water were provided to impoverished communities in the Kentucky Appalachians who were left with no access to safe drinking water after the severest tornadoes in 25 years (AmeriCares, 2012).

Problematic as these disruptions are, they are most threatening when combined with a population’s prevailing vulnerabilities. For example, the acute challenges presented by the Haiti earthquake, including a high number of crush injuries, were exacerbated by the chronic pre-existing weaknesses of the health system (Iezzoni and Ronan, 2010), reflecting the lowest per capita health spend in the Western hemisphere. The current crisis in Somalia reflects interaction of acute health challenges related to shortages of food and water with prevailing vulnerability regarding chronic undernutrition, weak governance and exposure to political violence (Young and Jaspars, 2006; Diallo, 2011; Guida, 2011). Whether internally displaced in Somalia or fleeing to Kenya or Ethiopia, these migrants face emergency situations with resources eroded by years of struggle within a politically and environmentally hostile context.

This combination of acute and chronic threats to health can lead to extraordinarily high mortality rates in refugee and displaced populations. By convention, a health emergency is defined by a mortality rate of more than 1 death per 10,000 of population per day (Waldman and Martone, 1999). This corresponds to 3 deaths per 1,000 of
population per month, a rate that in the 1990s was exceeded among displaced populations in, for example, Angola, Bhutan, Bosnia, Burundi, Iraq, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan (Toole and Waldman, 1997; Salama et al., 2004). Advances in managing health emergencies (discussed below) have contributed to reducing excess mortality among displaced populations over the last decade, but the health emergency

**Box 3.1 Health on the move: children and adolescents in displacement**

Improved child survival and mortality reduction have led to increased life expectancies and thus an ageing of the world’s population. They also have contributed to creating a generation of young people that is the largest in human history (Lane, 2008; Blum and Nelson-Mmari, 2004). Of the world’s population, half is aged under 25 years and 20 per cent are adolescents. More than 85 per cent of these adolescents live in low- and middle-income countries, primarily in Asia and Africa (Shaw, 2009), live increasingly in urban areas (Blum and Nelson-Mmari, 2004) and are “increasingly mobile, whether by choice, necessity, or force” (Lane, 2008).

Movement by force or necessity puts displaced children and adolescents at increased risk. UNHCR (2012b) noted that 46 per cent of refugees and 34 per cent of asylum seekers were children below 18 years of age – although the proportion varies widely by region. Some 17,700 asylum applications were lodged by unaccompanied or separated children (UASC) in 69 countries, or about four per cent of asylum claims in those countries; about half of these UASC were Afghan or Somali children. The proportion of children among refugees who returned home was 52 per cent and, perhaps most alarming, the proportion of children among stateless populations was 54 per cent in 2011 (UNHCR, 2012b).

Stressors affecting refugee children can occur:
- pre-flight through witnessing murders and wartime atrocities or combat experience as child soldiers
- during flight with separation from care-givers and in the deprived and dehumanizing environments of refugee camps and detention centres
- in resettlement through ‘cultural bereavement’ (grieving the loss of homeland, family and friends) and the stresses of marginalization from and assimilation into a new society (Lustig et al., 2004).

Whether settled in urban areas or more remote rural camps, youth and adolescent refugees face new vulnerabilities and increased reproductive health risks (Austin et al., 2008). The “alteration of community routine, normalcy, boredom, and lack of positive alternatives may precipitate young people’s involvement in risky behaviors, including early sexual activity and unprotected sex. Youth are also likely to face increased exposure to sexual coercion and violence” (Lane, 2008). A 1999 study in Sierra Leone found that 37 per cent of prostitutes were under the age of 15 and 80 per cent had been displaced by war. In El Salvador, Ethiopia and Uganda, one-third of all child soldiers are girls (Austin et al., 2008). During the
Mozambican civil war, 77 per cent of children aged between 5 and 15 years had witnessed murder and 64 per cent were abducted from their families (Ager et al., 2010).

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) offers evidence of the vulnerabilities of displaced children and adolescents. For nearly 15 years, in the wake of severe food insecurity in 1996–1997 and in the face of ongoing economic hardship, disaster and political repression, forced migrants having been crossing the northern border into China, seeking short-term relief or longer-term settlement, including permanent settlement in third countries (nearly 25,000 have now settled in the Republic of Korea). Much of this movement, internal or external, has occurred without adequate aid or protection, as China generally does not recognize the DPRK refugees’ claims, and detains and deports those who have entered the country without documentation. For its part, DPRK does not permit UNHCR access to returnees. Among the refugees and IDPs are unaccompanied or separated children, sometimes referred to as kotjebi or ‘flower sparrows’, who move about in search of food, shelter and means of survival. Due to access restrictions, UASC numbers in DPRK are a matter of speculation. The number of DPRK-born children in China has dwindled from what was probably tens of thousands at the peak of the migration in 1998–1999 to perhaps less than 1,000, as repatriation (forced or spontaneous), third-country settlement, and ‘ageing-out’ have worked their various effects. In their place, and of equal concern, are an estimated 10,000–15,000 children born in China to DPRK mothers and Chinese fathers. As the mother is both undocumented and subject to deportation, many of these children are growing up in households where the mother is absent – and often the father, too, due to family dysfunction or work opportunities elsewhere – and the children frequently lack a hukou (household registration) making problematic their access to education, health and social services and rendering them effectively stateless (Robinson, 2010).

Comprehensive reviews of risk and protective factors for mental health of displaced and refugee children worldwide (Reed et al., 2012; Fazel et al., 2012) concluded that since resources for health and social care are especially restricted in low- and middle-income settings, intervention strategies should be targeted to children who are in most need. Risk factors for children in low- and middle-income countries included exposure to pre-migration violence, settlement in a refugee camp and internal displacement. Girls were at higher risk of internalizing or emotional problems while boys were more at risk of externalizing or behavioural problems. The review in high-income countries found similar patterns, although with more nuanced results, likely due to the broader and deeper evidence base found in high-income countries. Exposure to pre-migration and post-migration violence, including parental exposure to violence, was a risk to children. Being unaccompanied was a risk as were moving several times in the host country and perceived discrimination. However, protective factors included having high parental support and family cohesion, support from friends, positive school experience and same ethnic-origin foster care. The high-income country findings, in particular, supported the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings (IASC, 2007), which recommend mobilizing community self-help and social support; providing appropriate cultural, spiritual and religious healing practices; and focusing support particularly on younger children (0–8 years) and their care providers (Fazel et al., 2012).
threshold is still exceeded in situations such as Afghanistan (Bartlett et al., 2002), Darfur (Guha-Sapir and Degomme, 2005) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (HNTS, 2011). Elevated mortality rates reflect increased risk for all members of a population, but the most vulnerable to premature death are children.

**Health challenges specific to camps**

For many forced migrants, displacement often leads to living in some form of organized refugee or internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp. Camps provide shelter and orderly and efficient food distribution – significant advantages from a public health perspective. They also facilitate key actions to protect health: active monitoring of mortality and morbidity rates; establishment of surveillance systems; and rapid response to outbreaks of communicable disease (Waldman and Martone, 1999). Such measures commonly lead to a steady reduction in migrants' mortality, as much as a 75 per cent decrease in deaths in six months (Burkholder and Toole, 1995).

However, camp conditions also present significant public health concerns. Crowded conditions create risks for rapid transmission of disease, such as cholera (Roberts and Toole, 1995; Van Damme, 1995) and hepatitis E (Guthmann, 2006). These risks are closely linked to limited access to water and sanitation in camps. A global analysis of water and sanitation indicators across refugee camps shows a clear relationship between access to water and risk of ill health (Cronin et al., 2008). Households reporting a case of diarrhoea within the previous 24 hours collected on average 26 per cent less water than those not reporting any cases.

Conflict and disaster in general contribute to an erosion of structures and practices regarding sexual behaviour (Muhwezi et al., 2011) and unsafe sexual practices and transactional sex in such environments present health threats across the displaced community (UNHCR, 2010). Conditions in camps may further exacerbate the disruption of cultural norms, social conventions and community governance. With the power that military personnel and camp staff potentially have over IDPs in camps, their sexual behaviour is an important factor that can heighten risk (Chamberlain, 2009). The humanitarian ‘efficiency’ of camps creates population density and anonymity that strains accountability and exposes residents to increased risk of exploitation and abuse.

Management of risk for HIV and AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases is a key focus of concern in the camp context (Spiegel, 2004). But sexual and gender-based violence also emerges as a prominent issue, notably in terms of exposure to rape or other sexual abuse by military and fighting forces, who may attack women and girls during the course of firewood collection outside the camp or of raids on camps themselves. Such risks are significant and widespread.
Evidence of high levels of gender-based violence (GBV) is growing within camps, where insecurity and the erosion of accountability structures are major contributing factors. A study in IDP camps in northern Uganda found women to be at between eight and ten times greater risk of violent assault by their husband than by a stranger (Stark et al., 2010). More than 50 per cent of women reported physical abuse and 41 per cent forced sex by husbands in the preceding year, compared with five per cent reporting rape by a stranger. The latter figure indicates that rape, by people either outside or inside a camp, is a major concern. One woman noted in the course of this study: “How should we prevent rape… since it is rampant in our camp and it is being [ignored] by the law keepers?”

The figures suggest that the home itself does not represent a place safe from assault for women in these camps. Another participant in the study said: “Every woman has been beaten by her husband since there is always struggling for food and non-food items, when one may decide to sell the household properties.”

The reason for such high levels of sexual violence at the hands of domestic partners is unclear, but the loss of traditional male roles and authority within refugee camps has been frequently noted as a potential factor (Turner, 2004; Fouéré, 2007).

**Enduring impact of disruption of health systems**

In camps or integrated settlements for IDPs or refugees, the ongoing health consequences of displacement are due less to the specific health risks associated with migration than to the weaknesses of health systems to deliver adequate care. Other than in immediate aftermath of a major disaster, such as an earthquake, when there are very specific health threats, most displaced populations fall prey to the same health problems as non-displaced populations – but in greater numbers. Even in contexts of active conflict, mortality more typically reflects inflated risk of existing patterns of disease than deaths due directly to military action. The principal impact of conflict, in other words, is that the health system becomes less capable, or incapable, of providing childhood immunizations, treating respiratory infections and diarrhoea, providing treatment for malaria, supporting skilled delivery of a child and other key measures supporting population health.

In many contexts of forced migration, public health systems are chronically weak – and are weakened further by disruptions to logistics and drug supplies, and loss of staff, due to disaster, conflict and resulting migration. Forced migrant populations are especially vulnerable to these disruptions and those affecting public health infrastructure and coordination since, with few or no security nets and savings to support them, they tend to be more reliant on these systems than non-migrant populations (Abdalah and Burnham, 2000). In areas affected by the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, 70 per
cent of health facilities were destroyed, seriously constraining response to displaced communities’ health needs (NDMAP, 2007).

Delivery of effective maternal and reproductive health services is particularly vulnerable to disruption. A survey, carried out in six conflict-affected areas of DRC, Sudan and northern Uganda, examined displaced women’s family planning knowledge, attitudes and behaviours regarding contraception and assessed availability of family planning services in health facilities (McGinn et al., 2011). Between 30 and 40 per cent of women reported they did not want a child within the next two years, but in a majority of sites use of modern contraceptive methods was less than four per cent, around one-quarter of the norm for sub-Saharan Africa. Two-thirds of the health facilities mandated to provide family planning did not have the necessary staff, equipment and supplies to do so adequately. These findings, along with similar work after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake addressing displaced women’s access to health care (Anwar et al., 2011), emphasize that reproductive health may have been neglected among displaced populations.

Continuity of care is another major challenge presented by the disruption of access to health systems for forced migrants. Continuing to provide pre-existing treatment has major implications for the health of both individuals and the population as a whole. In the case of tuberculosis, for example, displacement and disruption will potentially result in failure of a patient to complete the six months of DOTS (directly-observed treatment, short-course) treatment. This not only has implications for the individual failing to complete treatment, but for the emergence of resistant strains, which are harder to combat with available drugs and potentially foster the development of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis within the population (WHO, 2010).

Similar continuity of care challenges concern IDPs who are receiving anti-retroviral therapy for HIV infection. Disruption of treatment, which in this case needs to be continued on a permanent basis, again has individual and wider population impacts. Those unable to sustain their treatment are vulnerable to sickness, with consequences for reduced household productivity and increased care requirements, and present a greater risk of transmission to others through higher viral loads. These concerns have led agencies to integrate anti-retroviral and related treatment services into referral health centres and hospitals, such as the International Medical Corps (IMC) in DRC’s South Kivu Province, where it helps meet the needs of returning refugees and displaced populations (IMC, 2012a).

A third – and, until recently, much neglected – area where continuity of care among displaced populations is crucial concerns people with severe and enduring mental health problems. Although mental health and psychosocial well-being in the wake of forced migration have received significant attention since the mid-1990s (Ager, 1999;
Ahearn, 2000), much less attention has been paid to the needs of people with pre-existing psychiatric conditions (van Ommeren et al., 2005). During displacement, social networks of care and formal health systems may be disrupted, leaving these individuals particularly vulnerable, such as a man in Darfur suffering from psychotic illness who was chained to a tree for lack of alternative means of containment (Jones et al., 2009). These individuals’ needs are now increasingly being recognized. Between 20 and 30 per cent of individuals attending IMC community mental health clinics in Aceh (Indonesia), Chad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), Sierra Leone and Somali Province (Ethiopia) presented symptoms associated with schizophrenia or other psychotic illnesses.

**Restricted access to health care**

These issues are of major significance in the wake of acute emergencies and major population displacement. But they continue to affect displaced populations in more protracted situations, including countries of asylum or programmed resettlement. Here the issues concern less disease risks or health system weaknesses, but focus more on restricted access to the health system as a result of legal, economic or cultural barriers: this potentially contributes to major health inequalities.

Access to health care plays out somewhat differently in different contexts of protracted displacement or permanent resettlement in a third country. In the former case, for Iraqis in Jordan the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is generally responsible for ensuring refugees’ access to health facilities, through either specialist refugee clinics or supporting access to host government provision. However, access is often severely restricted, with a minority of refugees in practice receiving such support. For example, UNHCR targeted some 8,500 Iraq refugees to access primary and secondary health care in 2012. But its own figures suggest registered Iraqi refugees number more than 29,000 people and estimate unregistered refugees to be more than 400,000 (UNHCR, 2012). In such contexts the work of the IFRC and National Societies may be crucial. In Jordan, for example, IFRC and the Jordanian Red Crescent Society have facilitated access to health care for unregistered refugees with an innovative cash transfer scheme engaging local health service providers.

In the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya, the population of more than 420,000 people is served by a network of three hospitals and 22 health posts run by five agencies: the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Médecins sans Frontières, GIZ (the German international development agency), IMC and the Kenya Red Cross Society (UNHCR, 2012a). More than 400,000 outpatient consultations take place in the camps annually; utilization is therefore close to the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline of one consultation per capita per year, a creditable outcome in such demanding circumstances.
By contrast, in countries of resettlement, barriers to health care for refugees may be more subtle. In the United States, only refugees whose resettlement in the US stems from a successful refugee claim in a country of temporary settlement can register with a health-care provider within 60 days of arrival. Despite eligibility for Medicaid (the joint federal–state health insurance programme for low-income families), refugees consistently underutilize health provision (Willis and Nkwocha, 2006; Morris et al., 2009). The major barriers to accessing health care are often related to language and communication (regarding everything from making an appointment to filling a prescription) and cultural beliefs about health care, including general reluctance to consult health practitioners and issues of stigma regarding mental health issues (Morris et al., 2009).

One morning, Georgi* waits to be attended at the Swedish Red Cross health-care centre in Stockholm. He has been here before and he knows that he will be taken care of safely. He has a prescription for medicine that he is unable to pay for, since he has no money.

Georgi and his wife Alina* came from a former Soviet Republic some years ago. Alina had been persecuted for political reasons. They have not yet been granted asylum in Sweden: they live without documents as irregular migrants and under very harsh circumstances. Alina is suffering from deep depression and the social authorities have placed their children in a foster home. Now the same authorities, according to Georgi, have refused to pay for the children’s medicine.

He tries to explain his problem, though his Swedish is not that good. The staff at the centre tell him they will try to get the medicine paid for and ask him to come back in two days.

Operating since 2006, this is one of two Swedish Red Cross centres, both run by a few employees and volunteer doctors, nurses and therapists. They receive irregular migrants and, when necessary, refer them to hospitals and other institutions. More than 750 people are taken care of each year and, in 2011, 2,200 separate consultations took place, a 30 per cent increase over 2010.

The centre represents one of the Swedish Red Cross’ important roles, according to Secretary General Ulrika Årehed Kågström. “We consider irregular migrants among the most marginalized and vulnerable in our society,” she says. “We feel obliged to contribute to their health and well-being. At the same time our aim in the long run is to be able to end our involvement, but that will not happen as long as the state doesn’t fulfil its obligations.”

Informal estimates suggest about 35,000 irregular migrants live in Sweden, among them at least 3,000 children. Some saw their request for asylum rejected but refuse to leave; some came to work but never applied for permission to stay in the country. Fear is often a significant driver in both instances. Many are too scared to return to their country of origin, electing instead to go into hiding, staying with friends and moving around.

Many irregular migrants live under very difficult circumstances, lacking the most basic...
needs – food, clothing, housing and, of course, health care. They are often forced to find insecure jobs in the informal sector or ‘black’ economy. If they are lucky they can earn an income, but most of them cannot.

Studies show that their health is very poor; many have experienced torture and suffer from post-traumatic stress. Many of the children have documented psychosomatic problems.

That these irregular migrants have not had the right to subsidized health care has been criticized by, among others, Paul Hunt, who was the UN Special Rapporteur on Health from 2002 to 2008. He noted that this situation is not in accordance with the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Sweden has ratified. The Swedish Red Cross agrees. Today, irregular migrants are granted urgent care, but generally have to pay full costs. The majority cannot afford this and many are not willing to run the risk of going to a public health-care centre, for fear of being identified as irregular migrants.

Ingela Holmertz, national director of the Swedish Red Cross, is very clear about the connection between health care for irregular migrants and human rights: “The present situation implies a gap in the health services and is also a violation of fundamental human rights. It is a matter of exclusion and discrimination,” she says. “We demand that health care should be given equally and on the same grounds for all, based on ethics, knowledge and medical praxis. And as long the gap is not filled by the state, we have to act.”

In January 2010, the Swedish government launched a commission of inquiry on the right to health care for irregular migrants. The report, presented in May 2011, proposed that health care be provided to irregular migrants on the same basis as the host population. After a long period of consultations, an agreement was reached in June 2012. It states that new legislation will provide subsidized health care, though only urgent care, to irregular migrants. The Swedish Red Cross and partner organizations in a network advocating for this cause welcomed the decision, but stated they would continue to argue for the irregular migrants’ right to the whole spectrum of health care.

The Swedish Red Cross has a long tradition of advocating support for vulnerable groups through lobbying elected representatives and informing the public. Highlighting the health-care situation of irregular migrants is a case in point.

Ingrid Andersson, a nurse with professional experience from many conflict zones and now working at the health-care centre, confirms the importance of political advocacy. Her tireless work is really proof of the value of daily commitment. “We have to put every individual case in focus and try to solve each one. When we need more advanced care we use the phone and the e-mail. We try to convince professionals in the public health-care sector to act according to their ethical standards and, in fact, we see an increasing number of them defending this right to health care,” she explains. “We have gained credibility at hospitals and other public health-care centres and we know by experience where to direct our patients and where they are well received. We are a real ‘life line’.”

Back in the health-care centre two days later, Georgi unfortunately did not show up. But the phone call the other day gave a positive result: the medicine was to be paid for by social services.

*Georgi and Alina are not their real names.*
Analysis and response

Previous sections have sketched some of the major issues shaping the health of forced migrants. How are these issues being responded to? And where is further attention and action required?

Professionalization of health response

Health care in disasters and complex emergencies has become more professional and advanced significantly in recent years. ‘Stock-taking’ studies (e.g., Toole and Waldman, 1997; Salama et al., 2004) undertaken in the last 20 years have distilled experience and established a platform for further advance. Surveillance and field-based epidemiology have played a key role in such developments, documenting the magnitude of disease risks to displaced populations, the factors associated with their increase and decrease and, in consequence, effective means of their control. For example, measles, once a major threat to refugee populations, is generally well controlled now that children aged over 6 months are routinely immunized on arrival in a camp. Much of the ‘field craft’ of managing health for displaced populations is now codified in relevant sections of The Sphere Handbook (Sphere Project, 2011). This provides guidance on important health-related themes including water and sanitation, hygiene promotion, food security, nutrition, shelter, and preventive and curative health-care provision, as well as other cross-cutting themes of broader relevance (children, disaster risk reduction, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS, ageing populations, people with disabilities and psychosocial support).

But the evidence base for ‘best practice’ remains weak. More than a decade since Banatvala and Zwi’s (2000) specification of a key research agenda for public health humanitarian response, many of their questions remain unanswered and a systematic review of published evidence provides little support for many of the practices specified as Sphere minimum standards with regard to mental health and psychosocial support (Tol and van Ommeren, 2012). The evidence base backing recommended practice is stronger in other areas, but many areas of guidance with respect to health would benefit from robust research to validate or challenge practice. The work of organizations such as ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) in supporting coherent impact assessment in the health sector is thus of real value (see ALNAP, 2012).

The professionalization of practice requires not just the robust evaluation and codification of effective interventions, but also the harmonization of standards and principles. While reaching far wider than health, the Joint Standards’ Initiative (JSI, 2012), which draws together the work of the Sphere Project, the Humanitarian Accountability Project and People in Aid, is also to be welcomed.

Professionalization is also marked by improved coordination. The humanitarian field has witnessed significant investment in this area over the last decade, with wide
recognition that this has brought mixed results. The Cluster Approach has benefited the health sector, with the global health cluster providing clear technical guidance, training support and coordination procedures (WHO, 2012a). Practice on the ground appears to be varied however, with wide acknowledgement that the Haiti response, for example, was inadequate. Coordination appears to pose problems, particularly when government capacity to co-chair the cluster is weak (Shepherd-Barron, Cyr and Jenson, 2006). The cluster’s recent moves to establish mechanisms to register foreign medical teams are welcome in this regard. So is the clear re-statement of WHO’s role – nationally and globally – in terms of health cluster leadership and wider response in its new Emergency Response Framework (2012b). This articulates commitments, performance standards and procedures which are acknowledged to reflect “lessons learned from recent humanitarian response experiences in Haiti and Pakistan, in 2010, and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Horn of Africa, in 2011” (WHO, 2012b).

**Mainstreaming refugee health issues**

A study by Rowley et al. (2008) provides vivid insight into the determinants of the health challenges of camps noted earlier, and the importance of addressing the health needs of those living in such situations within national health planning. Their survey of those living in Lugufu refugee camp and also surrounding host villages, located near Tanzania’s western border with DRC, identified factors that distinguished refugees from the surrounding population, who were otherwise comparable in terms of ethnicity and historical patterns of livelihood. Refugees were likely to initiate sexual activity four years earlier, twice as likely to have sex with ‘high-risk’ partners, three times more likely to have limited access to income, two-and-a-half times more likely to have experienced forced sex against their will and three times more likely to have engaged in transactional sex. Widowed, divorced and never-married refugee women were significantly more likely to have engaged in transactional sex.

This is a daunting portrayal of the social and health consequences of life in a refugee camp. Chronic poverty and lack of opportunity to work increase risk from transactional sex (Rowley et al., 2008). Along with commodity distribution that allows men to control resources more typically controlled by women, this provides conditions to potentially drive up HIV incidence. The ‘health sector’ response to such conditions is familiar from work in other low-resource settings: engaging men in prevention programming, targeting high-risk groups and promoting consistent condom use. However, these conditions reflect an intolerable life of ‘limbo’ within camp settings that fosters survival strategies presenting significant risk to individuals’ health and well-being. As noted earlier, camps may serve political and pragmatic ends, but much of camp life is toxic from a health perspective.

A public health perspective can be helpful in translating such awareness to policy advocacy. Conditions that promote the spread of disease represent a risk to the broader population. There is often regular interaction between communities, despite
restrictions on movements in and out of camps (Rowley et al., 2008), so health risks among refugees may not be contained within that population. This is not to argue for further restriction on refugees – as existing restrictions increase risk – but to advocate for policies that protect health which, in this case, would promote alternative income-generating opportunities to the refugee population.

More widely, this represents a call to see displaced populations’ health needs factored into national appraisals of health risk and strategy by governments hosting significant numbers of refugees. Spiegel et al. (2010) reviewed the HIV and malaria national strategic health plans prepared for submission to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for all African counties hosting more than 10,000 refugees or IDPs. Around half of the plans made no mention of refugees or IDPs and less than a quarter noted any specific activities addressing their needs and circumstances. As they noted, in addition to their obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, countries have a public health imperative to include refugees and IDPs in these groups in their national strategic health plans (Spiegel et al., 2010).

The ‘mainstreaming’ of forced migrants’ health needs in national health plans should apply not only to countries of temporary or protracted settlement, but to those of permanent settlement. As noted above, there are frequently many barriers, including economic, to effective service access in countries of resettlement. Some barriers are rooted in socio-cultural practices, and key to promoting access to health services and, in the longer term, improving refugee health is developing cultural competence by health providers (Dana, 2007). This does not only mean making translation services available, but includes better understanding of refugees’ conception of health, including the body, illness, symptoms and the expectations on health consultations.

This mainstreaming of health services is a crucial task for governments, but others such as civil society organizations (CSOs) play an essential role. Access to health care is a key indicator of migrants’ successful integration in their countries of resettlement (Ager and Strang, 2008). CSOs can advocate with government to address barriers to service access for refugees, such as the socio-cultural issues noted above, and provide direct support to address health needs. For example, the Church World Service works with faith groups, local voluntary organizations and student bodies in 22 US states to provide resettlement services to refugees, including referral to appropriate health programmes as part of its broader advocacy role at both local and national levels (CWS, 2012). In Europe non-governmental organizations and CSOs promote local initiatives supporting refugee access to health care. Crossing Borders for Health is typical of a new wave of student-led organizations, founding its work on a clear ‘right to health’ basis, connecting local groups into a broader social movement and working simultaneously at the levels of advocacy and service support (Crossing Borders for Health, 2012).
"I was scared. A marriage is a huge responsibility and I am so young. I will be killed if I return because I have brought shame on the family."

It is 2007 and Aisha* is 12 years old. She tries to explain to the migration officer why she has fled her country and is seeking asylum in Sweden with her mother, for many years a victim of domestic violence and abuse. Her mother sought protection, hoping to avoid losing yet another daughter to a forced marriage set up by her husband and his family. The interview was conducted by a male migration officer. Aisha felt uncomfortable and was unable to give more details.

Their application was rejected despite information that child marriages are widespread and girls and women are exposed to gender-based violence in their country of origin. Their claims were considered trustworthy but the decision was that they return home and seek protection.

Aisha and her mother were desperate when they turned up at the Swedish Red Cross' weekly advisory service for migrants. They had exhausted all legal remedies and were no longer entitled to legal aid. The volunteers present that evening were trained to give preliminary orientation on asylum and restoring family links proceedings. They collected the relevant documents and wrote a case description, referring the family to legal advisers for further assessment. Following a careful investigation of the case and individual interviews with Aisha and her mother, the legal advisory team concluded that they would indeed risk gender-related persecution if they returned to their country of origin. The team decided to take on the case, challenging the decision by requesting a review by the national migration authorities or, if necessary, filing a complaint to a relevant international human rights' forum.

Many rejected asylum seekers approach the Swedish Red Cross for legal advice on their asylum claims and proceedings. Many of them are women. Over the years it was observed that women tend to be at a disadvantage during the investigation and determination phases in spite of guidelines on gender-related persecution. They may be afraid to talk about gender-related claims for asylum to a male migration officer or interpreter.

The Red Cross therefore decided to examine how existing national guidelines on gender-related persecution, in particular due to sexual orientation, were implemented. The survey demonstrated a need for awareness-raising, capacity building and training on gender-sensitive refugee determination procedures. As a result, the Swedish Red Cross developed dissemination and training modules to meet the specific needs and knowledge of migration officers, border police, legal counsellors, judges and Red Cross' staff and volunteers.

The Swedish Red Cross applies a holistic approach when working with migrants, linking protection and humanitarian concerns to safeguard their rights and needs. The advisory service on asylum and family reunification proceedings offers general orientation and legal representation to migrants, as well as rehabilitation and treatment for torture and trauma victims, health care to irregular migrants, tracing of lost family members, voluntary return assistance and social activities for unaccompanied minors. Experiences from encounters with individual migrants and operational activities
in combination with analyses and surveys provide a strong base for advocacy and strategic work to promote migrants’ rights.

The Swedish Red Cross also advocates for the right to family reunification. At the beginning of 2010, Swedish authorities put into practice a new requirement for reunification: family members had to provide full proof of their identity such as a valid passport as a prerequisite. However, this is often impossible due to the circumstances connected with flight. Many family reunifications failed due to lack of identity documents accepted by the Swedish migration authorities. Thousands of families who had fled conflict in the Horn of Africa were prevented from reuniting. The Swedish Red Cross called for a political intervention to facilitate and safeguard the right to family reunification and to enable families who were granted protection to reunite with their families. It noted that the difficulties in obtaining documentary proof due to the consequences of war and conflict should be taken into account. And the absence of valid travel documents should not categorically impede the right to family reunification. These concerns were also raised in the common response to the green paper on the European Union’s family reunification directive, signed by 27 European Red Cross National Societies in March 2012.

Fatima* is one of the many refugee women separated from her children in the chaos caused by armed conflict in the Horn of Africa. She was granted a residence permit in Sweden on protection grounds in 2009. She was hoping to reunite with her two young daughters when the new practice was introduced.

The Swedish Red Cross’ legal advisory team challenged the decisions concerning Fatima and other migrants to the migration courts while advocating for a sustainable and humanitarian solution to the situation. A ruling concerning one of the cases represented by the legal team was handed down in January 2012 to the effect that exceptions can be made for families with biological children, if a DNA-test is positive. However, this does not apply to spouses without children or families with foster or adopted children; this continues to be of concern to the Swedish Red Cross.

But for Fatima who has struggled to reunite with her children for more than four years, there is new hope. DNA-tests will prove that she is the biological mother. “I thought I had lost the children. I feel like I’m on fire,” she says, looking at the photo of the two children who will have become teenagers before the family can reunite.

*Fatima and Fatima are not their real names.

In settings of protracted settlement and post-conflict recovery, the role of CSOs in advocating for and facilitating access to health care for displaced populations can also be crucial. Here, perceived equity in health-care provision may serve as a pre-requisite for stable governance. In settings such as South Sudan, health care is certainly under scrutiny in indicating the state’s capacity to govern effectively and equitably, engaging communities displaced from their homes alongside all others. Current World Bank health sector investment aims at improving the delivery of primary health-care services in states, like South Sudan, with significant displaced populations and strengthening the coordination, monitoring and evaluation capacities of the Ministry of Health (World Bank, 2012). However, promoting the role of civil society in facilitating access to such services is a key element of the strategy (Sudan Tribune, 2011).
In many countries, National Red Cross Red Crescent Societies ensure civil society engagement with displaced populations. Kenya Red Cross Society youth volunteers have, for example, played a key role in the National Society’s work with displaced populations, including mediation with youth engaged in the post-election violence of 2007–2008.

The increasing urban profile of the displaced
Like other sectors, those involved with health and health care must develop new responses to the fact that the majority of displaced communities now reside in urban settings (Zetter and Deikun, 2010). UNHCR’s public health and HIV section is developing “a three-pronged strategy – focusing on advocacy, support of existing capacities and monitoring of delivery – to work with its partners to increase access to affordable and good quality health services for urban refugees” (Spiegel, 2010). Such analysis recognizes that in urban settings effective, quality health services are often available, but that legal, political, social and economic barriers frequently restrict forced migrants’ access to them. Strategies therefore involve facilitating, enabling and connecting much more than providing. This may prompt different modalities of support, for example, developing schemes to meet user fees to enable access to clinic services or advocacy to ensure reach of pre-existing immunization programmes to displaced communities.
**Reproductive, maternal and child health priorities**

Health equity is a crucial lens through which to consider priority health actions (IFRC, 2011). Due consideration of migrants’ needs is an issue of equity, even though, as noted, they are often neglected in national health prioritization exercises. All too often, effective interventions are available but not made accessible to all, such as provision of reproductive, maternal and child health care to displaced populations.

Examples of the paucity of access to basic reproductive health services for displaced communities in war-affected settings were noted earlier (McGinn et al., 2010). These surveys were conducted in the context of the Reproductive Health Access, Information and Services in Emergencies initiative which, together with technical partners including CARE, Marie Stopes International, IRC and the American Refugee Committee, works to bring integrated and comprehensive reproductive health services to displaced communities across Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America (RAISE, 2012). Such services have rarely been prioritized in the past, although their value for forced migrants is increasingly recognized, for example, by the Inter-Agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crises, which now works with some 40 agencies to improve the reproductive health outcomes of crisis-affected populations (IAWG, 2011).

Maternal and child health services are a particular priority, due to huge differentials in maternal and infant mortality across and within countries. Risks to mothers and their children can be addressed by ensuring interventions of proven effectiveness are available (RHRC Consortium, 2012). Globally, most conflict-affected countries have among the worst maternal and child health indicators: high maternal mortality, high infant mortality, high under-5 mortality and low use of modern contraception (UN, 2009). Of special emphasis is enabling skilled birth attendants to be present at delivery and strengthening systems to provide emergency obstetric care in circumstances of delivery complications.

**Mental health and non-communicable disease**

What other health risks demand closer attention? While communicable diseases remain a potential challenge (particularly in the early stages of a crisis with rapid population movements), this is generally more in terms of logistics and fostering political will for resource mobilization than a technical challenge. However, there is growing awareness of the relevance of non-communicable disease (including mental ill-health) in the lives of displaced communities.

Mental health, and more broadly psychosocial support, has become a major area of humanitarian programming over the last decade. Although some criticize the prioritization and approaches of this area of work, the adoption of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings to establish a common framework for work by national and international agencies has put psychosocial interventions on a more rigorous footing (IASC, 2007).
The lack of a firm evidence base for the field is gradually being addressed through the introduction of more precise field evaluations (UNICEF, 2011). The IASC Guidelines were reinforced in 2010 (IASC, 2010). However, psychosocial interventions aimed at supporting recovery of displaced and war-affected populations clearly take place in a context of multiple influences on well-being. Ager et al. (2011) demonstrated the impact of a school-based psychosocial programme on locally determined indicators of well-being for children displaced by conflict in northern Uganda. One year after the intervention, the children who had participated in the programme showed significantly stronger well-being than similar children who had not taken part. However, non-participating children also showed improvement over the year, indicating the operation of community-based factors in fostering overall recovery. Studying the factors that support such resilience is of growing interest. It makes sense for humanitarian efforts to facilitate such indigenous coping capacities, rather than seek to drive recovery through technical, externally resourced interventions.

In the early 1990s, 108,000 Lhotsampas, originally of Nepali descent who had settled in Bhutan, arrived as refugees in Nepal (IRIN, 2008). The government, together with UNHCR, provided them a temporary home on prima facie grounds in refugee camps. Since 2006, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has facilitated voluntary third-country resettlement. Living in protracted uncertainty in camps severely affected the refugees’ health and psychosocial well-being. Basic health-care services have been provided, but as WHO’s definition of health notes, “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 2006).

Psychosocial impacts on the Bhutanese refugee population include long-term uncertainty which, combined with daily stressors such as overcrowding, unemployment and food insecurity, fuels feelings of frustration, low self-esteem, questions of belonging and reasons for living. These feelings may result in positive coping mechanisms such as building supportive circles, but may also have negative outcomes, like substance abuse, domestic violence and attempted suicide, which seriously affect psychosocial well-being. The resettlement process causes stress. This is especially noticeable in families who were divided during this process or who cannot all agree to be resettled or to remain behind (UNHCR, 2012c). Vulnerable groups, such as elderly people, are particularly affected by the resettlement of family members in third countries. Whether they remain behind or join their family abroad, they often suffer from loneliness, depression and lack of belonging (Schininà et al., 2011).

Acknowledging the need for psychosocial support to Bhutanese refugees, in 2008 UNHCR commissioned a Nepali non-governmental organization, Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation (TPO) Nepal, to provide this support as part of the humanitarian assistance programme, which is uncommon in such settings. UNHCR, TPO Nepal and IOM assessed the refugee community’s psychosocial situation and needs, and
Even with more discrete mental health programmes focusing on psychiatric disorder rather than broader community well-being, there are attempts to embed services within community values and resources. A blueprint for mental health in complex emergencies argues for integrating activities by health providers, humanitarian workers and local healers: “A mental health system of primary care providers, traditional healers, and relief workers, if properly trained and supported, can provide cost-effective, good mental health care” (Mollica et al., 2004).

Nepali counsellors provide individual and family counselling and explain practical approaches to deal with the refugees’ situation and improve their well-being, such as cognitive behaviour therapy and relaxation exercises. Group counselling is also provided for people facing similar problems; for example, participants in the women’s empowerment group can share experiences and support each other. Psycho-education, i.e., educating people about the psychosocial issues they may encounter and how to deal with them, and awareness-raising of issues such as substance abuse and suicidal thoughts teach people to recognize problems and seek help. Refugees have been trained as community psychosocial workers and taught to organize psycho-education and observe vulnerable people. They are proud of their role in supporting their community and participate in organizing events, such as World Suicide Prevention Day and World Refugee Day, adding to their self-esteem. A suicide protocol was also developed, describing the roles and responsibilities of each agency in efforts to prevent suicide and suicide attempts, and help those concerned.

The refugees have organized CBOs to provide a platform and give themselves a voice by linking with humanitarian agencies and arranging community activities. Vocational training and events are organized to support the interests of women, youth and people with disabilities. Sewing programmes, for example, have helped refugees to earn an income and improved their self-esteem. Facilitating religious observance has proved helpful in dealing with issues related to giving meaning to one’s life and health problems. Hindu temples, Buddhist stupas, Christian churches and traditional healers have provided support and focus to the lives of refugees.

Regaining a sense of purpose and hope for the future is crucial for the psychosocial well-being of refugees, both in everyday life and in relation to potential opportunities. This programme goes some way to achieving this for the Lhotsampas in Nepal. While third-country resettlement provides a solution and gives new hope to thousands of refugees trapped in limbo, it also confronts them with the difficulty of starting a new life and keeping their family together. In these circumstances, attention to the psychosocial well-being of vulnerable groups such as elderly people is essential. For those remaining behind, services are developed and integrated with others aimed at the host community (UNHCR, 2012c). However, only the grant of status and residence to the refugees by the government of Nepal or return to Bhutan will provide a permanent solution and sense of belonging to this displaced community.
Other forms of non-communicable disease are also major threats to the health of refugees and IDPs. A recent study of Iraqi refugees reviewed records of 27,166 medical visits by 7,642 refugees in Jordan during the course of 2010 (Mateen et al., 2012). Non-communicable diseases were common, including hypertension (affecting more than one in five of refugees) and joint disorders and type II diabetes (both affecting more than one in ten of refugees). Such figures reflect global trends in the emergence of non-communicable disease, from which refugee populations are clearly not immune. Half of refugees resettling in the United States are obese or overweight; half suffer from at least one chronic disease, with one in ten suffering from at least three (Yun et al., 2012).

Perhaps the most striking illustration of such trends is among Palestinian refugees, for whom the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) is mandated to provide health care. With improvements in education leading infant mortality to well below Millennium Development Goal target levels, an ageing refugee population and changes in diet and lifestyle have resulted in a situation where between 70 and 80 per cent of deaths are now attributable to non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancer. This transition has encouraged a rethinking of the basic health provision model. Out-patient clinics which people attend when sick, receive treatment for a specific illness and see a different health provider each time, is not appropriate for these chronic conditions. Services need to provide a continuity of care for illness over the years, with a much stronger emphasis on prevention and regular testing for the warning signs of potential illness.

UNRWA is piloting a family health team model in the Middle East, deploying doctors, nurses and health workers in teams to provide greater continuity of care and emphasizing preventive and health-promoting interventions (UNRWA, 2011; 2012). Early findings are promising, with health workers and patients alike appreciating the link between service structure and key clinical needs. If health outcomes prove positive, the expenditure of around US$ 20 per annum per capita renders it a potentially scalable model of health service delivery, not only to other long-term refugee populations but to national health systems in other regions.

Box 3.5 Persecution and forced migration in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) issues currently represent the frontier of human rights work, giving rise to a new divide in global politics. In western Europe and North America, there have been important gains in LGBTI rights and increasing recognition of the so-called ‘pink’ dollar and vote, and the corresponding need to cater for this constituency in the domestic political arena. In sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, public
marginalization and persecution of sexual and gender minorities have, with support from religious and cultural conservatives, become an essential part of populist politics. Radical moves to restrict or reverse gains in LGBTI rights have been seen in recent years from Burundi, Iraq, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda to Ukraine and some parts of the United States.

As such, sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) issues serve to connect weaknesses in domestic political systems with tensions in international relations in hitherto unprecedented fashion, as exemplified in recent threats by western governments, such as Sweden, to make respect for LGBTI rights central to aid conditionality. Both these interconnections and state-sponsored homophobia are themselves a source of new activism, but also of fresh flows of asylum seekers.

Internalized homophobia, fear of disclosure and lack of vocabulary with which to explain themselves to government and humanitarian agencies cause many sexual and gender minority asylum seekers to disclose either late or not at all, thereby creating credibility problems in their claim to protection. The very label ‘LGBTI’, while a useful reference point, can also be confusing for those who have not defined themselves using those terms before, and may blind us to other forms of gender-related persecution, such as female genital mutilation. Many asylum and immigration regimes are themselves homophobic, in both first countries of asylum and countries of resettlement. For example, in the UK 76 per cent of all asylum seekers were rejected on first hearing, that figure rose to 98.5 per cent for LGBTI individuals (UKLGIG, 2010). Asylum seekers who are ‘outed’ often face intense stigmatization, shame and harm from their own refugee and host communities, with exceptionally high levels of vulnerability with regard to access to health care, housing, employment and education, as well as exclusion from social and cultural spaces. Some engage in survival sex in response to these difficulties.

The primary legal argument used in granting asylum to LGBTI individuals since the 1990s has been that they risk persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group. Until a UK Supreme Court ruling in 2010, however, many countries argued that LGBTI persons could return to their country of origin and live discreetly (Supreme Court, 2010). There is as yet inadequate recognition of the extent to which the persecution of LGBTI identities, by virtue of the shifting importance of these in domestic and international politics, have become a matter of political opinion as much as one of membership of a particular social group.

Perhaps the most important tools with regard to asylum seekers and refugees at the level of the UN are the Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity (UNHCR, 2008) and Working With Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Persons in Forced Displacement (UNHCR, 2011b). More broadly, the Yogyakarta Principles (2006) are an important source. Given that most humanitarian staff in a given context are socialized into the same homophobic religious and cultural norms which enable persecution of LGBTI persons, extensive staff training and sensitization is necessary to create safer spaces for LGBTI individuals to access protection. Efforts to address LGBTI concerns explicitly in the UNHCR’s age, gender and diversity mainstreaming framework (2007) and to include SOGI information in registration processes will be important in this regard.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998), while stressing that there should be no discrimination against IDPs on
any grounds, offers no particular protection on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, though it does provide specific clauses for women and children.

A top priority for humanitarian actors seeking to support LGBTI persons in disaster situations should be providing access to health care. This should include rapid response to sexual and gender-based violence, which sexual minorities are frequently exposed to, notably lesbian women and transgender men, but also male and female sex workers. In some contexts this requires providing home-based care to minimize public exposure of the people concerned. An important entry point to identify sexual and gender minorities is through refugee sex workers. Regular visits to places of detention may also help to identify LGBTI persons detained without charge and at risk of abuse.

Actors intervening in support of LGBTI persons in disaster situations should seek to establish linkages across groups of interest, especially women, human rights and sex worker organizations. Support for LGBTI persons must be an integral component to human rights and gender-based violence work. Organizations that are selective about the rights they support and the forms of violence they seek to address should be challenged.

Self-help organizations run by LGBTI persons and sex workers should also be supported, as they can act as a substitute ‘family’ for those who have been disowned by their own family and community. In Uganda, for example, LGBTI sex workers came together to offer self-help and access increased support from refugee service providers. The initial need was for health-care access, but as the group became organized and was able to engage with the wider community of LGBTI organizations in Uganda, its members also participated in human rights workshops. These in turn led to a shift in the group’s emphasis from sex work towards LGBTI concerns. Many group members found the ability to define themselves in terms of the LGBTI categorizations helpful both in terms of self-understanding and in facilitating better access to protection and psychosocial support services. Over time, the urban-based group has begun to reach out to other LGBTI refugees in rural camp settings and making referrals to refugee service providers.

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Forced migration in an urban context: relocating the humanitarian agenda

While in the 1980s and 1990s displacement became synonymous with camps, today approximately half of the world’s estimated 10.5 million refugees and at least 13 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are thought to live in urban areas (UNHCR, 2009; IDMC, 2012). More and more displaced people are attracted to urban areas: in 2011 IDPs were living in urban areas in 47 out of 50 countries (IDMC, 2012). Several high-profile situations of urban displacement have occurred in the last decade including in Iraq, to various cities and towns in Sudan, from Somalia to Nairobi, Kenya and Sana’a, Yemen, and within and between cities in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. Yet, a stocktake of the humanitarian system’s adaptation to operating in these environments reveals only a small body of good practice.

Urban displacement is not a new phenomenon, but there has been greater recognition of the problem and its consequences in the last decade (Pantuliano et al., 2012). Amid a global trend of increasing urbanization and in a context of continuous population growth, the world’s urban population is expected to increase by 72 per cent between 2011 and 2050 (UN DESA, 2011). Migration through displacement is speeding up this process, particularly in fragile states and their neighbouring countries. In Sudan, the IDP and refugee caseload from the 40-year-long civil war and those fleeing continuing local conflicts and disasters have contributed to massive urbanization, despite the absence of an industrial and commercial base (Pantuliano et al., 2011). In Afghanistan, Kabul increased in size from approximately 1 million inhabitants in 2001 to 4.5 million in 2010, an increase driven in part by returning refugees who hoped for a safe and sustainable life in their country of origin, but also by IDPs drawn to the capital by increasing insecurity resulting from the insurgency (Metcalfe and Haysom, 2012).

Flows of displaced people do not just converge on capitals and megacities, but also on peri-urban areas and secondary cities, such as Santa Marta in Colombia or Yei in South Sudan (IDMC, 2008; Martin and Sluga, 2011). While many megacities are already on the radar of humanitarian or development agencies, displacement crises in smaller cities often attract less attention.

Characteristics of urban displacement and its impacts

Forced migrants do not fit neatly into discrete categories. The drivers that force people to migrate are complex and overlapping (Long and Crisp, 2010). Rapid-
slow-onset disasters, conflict and generalized violence can all drive migration from rural to urban areas and between and within urban areas. A combination of factors, including economic pressure, may also force people to migrate. In cities, the displaced hope to find increased security, more economic opportunity, greater access to services, anonymity, proximity to power brokers and sometimes greater access to assistance. While the living conditions displaced people encounter in urban areas may be more difficult than expected, even unacceptably poor by international and national standards, in most cases urban areas still provide greater security and opportunity than their areas of origin (Metcalfe and Pavanella, 2011; Pantuliano et al., 2011; Metcalfe and Haysom, 2012).

The urban displaced, however, are not all from rural areas. They may have fled one urban area for another within or outside of their country. Iraqis who left the country in 2005–2006 were predominantly urban prior to their flight, and migrated to other urban centres in the region such as Amman, Jordan; Beirut, Lebanon; and Damascus, Syria (Chatelard, 2011). They may also have had previous urban experience as economic migrants or refugees or, some would argue, through their experience in refugee or IDP camps. Many Afghan refugees originated from rural areas, but sought refuge in urban centres, mainly in Iran and Pakistan, and have since returned to urban areas in Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2012). The same is true of displaced people and refugees returning to South Sudan and converging on Juba (Pantuliano et al., 2008). There is also evidence of circular movement between camps and urban areas in some contexts, such as by Somali refugees between Dadaab camp in northern Kenya and Nairobi (Sturridge, 2011).

Disasters may also cause widespread destruction of the built environment, creating displaced populations within a city. For example, IDP camps sprung up in Port-au-Prince after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and, in 2009, floods caused by Typhoon Ketsana led to short-term displacement in Metro Manila in the Philippines. In addition to sudden-onset disasters, slow-onset climate change may also induce migration. While slow-onset disasters usually result in rapid displacement when they hit crisis point, this may be preceded by a slow trickle of people displaced in the early stages of the crisis. It is difficult for humanitarians to identify these migrants, especially in the context of ongoing economic migration. Large-scale forced eviction can also be a cause of intra-city displacement (Metcalfe and Pavanella, 2011) (see Chapter 5).

The complex character of urban displacement drivers means that people arrive with very different assets, vulnerabilities, expectations and aspirations. A snapshot of Damascus in 2010, for instance, would show caseloads of destitute Syrians displaced by drought from rural areas in the north, a population of Iraqis who may have some savings, skills and education suited to an urban environment but who are barred from formal employment, Palestinian refugees who have very similar rights to Syrian citizens, and stateless Kurds who face huge legal barriers to access services and livelihoods (Haysom and Pavanello, 2011).
At the end of 2011 and after nearly 50 years of conflict, Colombia had the largest IDP population in the world. Forced displacement had affected 3.9 million people (Colombian government, 2012) or 8.4 per cent of the population. Paramilitary and guerrilla armed groups are responsible for most forced displacement, which mainly affects rural areas. It is an effective strategy to clear territories from potential opponents, instil fear in the civilian population, strengthen territorial strongholds and illegally seize assets (in particular land). A characteristic of forced displacement in Colombia is the deliberate targeting of particular groups of the population: some 80 per cent of displacement takes place on an individual basis, with the balance of affected populations forcibly displaced en masse. The overwhelming majority move to urban areas.

The socio-demographic characteristics of IDPs are akin to those of vulnerable households. Education levels are low (5.7 years of education) and household size is large (5.1 members compared to 3.9 for the Colombian population). Some 57 per cent of IDPs worked in agriculture prior to displacement. The proportion of women is greater than for the Colombian population as a whole, mainly as a consequence of violent deaths (54.0:41.8 per cent) and the percentage of single households is large – more than 39 per cent (Garay, 2008).

In addition, forced displacement imposes important economic losses on migrants. Firstly, the loss of productive assets, due to destruction and illegal seizure, weakens the displaced households’ main income sources. Nearly half of IDP households have lost their homes while land seizure from rural households or abandonment is also considerable. However, weak property rights in many rural regions mean that recovering the illegally seized land is highly unlikely – about 30 per cent of displaced households legally owned land, while the remainder had only informal access (Ibáñez and Moya, 2009). The aggregate land loss due to forced displacement is just over 2 million hectares, which is equivalent to nearly 3.5 times the amount of land granted in agrarian reform programmes between 1993 and 2002. The net present value of foregone agricultural revenue over a lifetime is US$ 15,787 per household (Ibáñez and Moya, 2009).

Secondly, returns to human capital drop. Finding a job in urban areas is a lengthy process because IDPs' employment skills are mostly in agricultural activities. Unemployment rates for all household members soar following displacement, and the pace at which labour conditions improve is extremely slow. During the first three months of settlement at destination sites, 53 per cent of household heads are unemployed and, after a year, 16 per cent. As a result, labour
Urban displacement therefore covers a wide range of phenomena, but several key generalizations can be made about the risks facing displaced populations. While displacement to urban areas mainly impacts the displaced themselves, it is also felt by the populations they settle among, local and national authorities and international actors. Urban displacement presents both risks and opportunities. The challenge is to understand what these are, how best to mitigate the threats of urban displacement and maximize its positive consequences.
Vulnerability is frequently a consequence of unplanned urban development, itself resulting in poor provision of infrastructure and services. The most vulnerable displaced people face barriers in accessing land and property and are forced to settle on the outskirts of cities or on low-value, poorly serviced land. Outlying areas are often far from livelihood opportunities and commuting into commercial and employment districts may be expensive or difficult. Low-value land is frequently at risk of natural hazards such as flooding or landslides, and slums are often prone to fires. Basic services, including health, education and sanitation, are often inadequate and/or costly. Protection threats range from domestic abuse, drug abuse, organized crime, arrest or detention and generalized insecurity. Migrants forced to flee suddenly due to conflict or disaster may leave all their assets behind; and those who sell theirs after their economic situation has worsened will likewise arrive with no safety net and little capital for restarting their lives. The displaced may also lack the city networks necessary to help access housing or employment, although in situations of protracted displacement they may find solidarity in family ties, ethnic identity, shared area of origin or other relationships.

Notwithstanding these challenges, movement to the city may help the displaced to mitigate vulnerability that stemmed from the cause of their displacement or their displacement experience itself. It can even, usually after a long and difficult period of adjustment, lead to greater opportunities for securing a livelihood, education or health care. For instance, although IDPs from Karamoja, Uganda who moved to the towns of Moroto and Mbale faced multiple challenges and often struggled to provide for their families, they did not report hunger or fear lethal raids, as rural residents did (Stites and Akabwai, 2012). Chapter 6 discusses in more detail these livelihood impacts.

Many of the risks faced by displaced people are shared by the host population. Long-standing residents also suffer the consequences of poor urban governance and they are confronted in slums with the same threats to their health, prospects for education and physical safety, and competition over land and resources. In Kabul, conflict over access to land in one district, where political figures backed the claims of competing ethnic groups, led to the displacement of hundreds of people (OCHA, 2010). Unfortunately the influx of displaced populations may compound the problems and risks that residents already experience, for example by straining overstretched public services or by purchasing or renting scarce land or accommodation. The silver lining is that the host community can also benefit from the presence of displaced communities, either by renting land or accommodation to them or by increased economic activity from the enterprises or assets the displaced bring with them. Where government or international assistance is leveraged to best effect, host communities can also benefit from investment in the displaced community.

The negative attitude of many local and national authorities towards displaced people may prevent them from harnessing the economic benefits the migrants’ presence can
create. In some instances, municipal authorities feel overwhelmed by ‘normal’ rural-urban migration, and consider the displaced an additional burden on overstretched resources and infrastructure. They may also be prejudiced against displaced populations due to ethnicity, political affiliation or perceived security threats. Many refugee-hosting countries have strict encampment policies that constrain the implementation of an urban refugee policy. However, the settlement of displaced populations in urban areas can bring economic benefits. In many cities across the world, displaced populations are making a significant (though unquantifiable) contribution to the urban economy. They contribute by providing skilled and unskilled labour, paying rents, creating new enterprises and spending remittances received from abroad.

Urban displacement also has an impact on international humanitarian agencies. While urban refugees have never been completely absent or ignored, camp-based provision has been the mainstream traditional humanitarian response for several decades. The lack of support to displaced populations in urban areas creates chronic vulnerabilities or leaves acute needs unaddressed. Humanitarians are increasingly trying to address this gap in coverage by expanding their mandate or operational mindset beyond camps and self-settled rural refugees and IDPs to those in urban areas. Many of the approaches and tools developed for camp situations are, however, ill-suited to provide effective relief or to identify correctly the cause of vulnerability in urban areas. This chapter aims to highlight both good practices and areas where greater focus or attention is required.

Institutions and policies

Some recent shifts and major policy statements from large international institutions have been encouraging. In 2009, UNHCR (the United Nations Refugee Agency) updated its position in its urban refugee policy, first issued in 1997 when UNHCR still considered urban displacement as a less important and more exceptional phenomenon than camp-based displacement (UNHCR, 2009). The 1997 policy was subsequently criticized for not recognizing the numerous protection threats facing urban refugees and focusing on the cost of providing assistance and on the security challenges to UNHCR, and not enough on the refugees themselves (HRW, 2002; UNHCR, 2009). In comparison, the 2009 UNHCR policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas focused more strongly on protection issues and affirmed the legitimacy of refugees settling in cities and towns and still having their rights recognized. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) also acknowledged the trend towards increasing numbers of urban displaced and the resulting pressure on host communities and governments (IASC, 2010).

Policies addressing key issues raised by urban displacement are starting to develop. The United Nations (UN) Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) has announced the inclusion of ‘population displacement and return’ as one of six key projects in its
new strategy. The organization will focus on interventions that prevent, mediate or resolve land disputes and grievances, facilitating return to rural areas or resettlement for urban displaced populations (UN-Habitat, unpublished). The issue of urban violence, which is often a cause of displacement or secondary movement, has also been tackled by IFRC and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), though neither organization looks at the issue through a displacement-specific lens. Rather, IFRC and MSF both identify areas where, through marginalization or neglect, civilians are suffering the direct and indirect consequences of urban violence, which in severe cases can entail state withdrawal from badly affected areas (IFRC, 2010; Lucchi, 2012). In some cities this will have a direct impact on the displaced, as they are often both victims and perpetrators of urban violence (Pavanello and Metcalfe, 2012). However, no agency has yet developed a policy specifically tailored to displaced populations.

Women, children, and displaced and marginalized people experience increased violence due to family separation, unsafe shelter or pre-existing social discrimination and inequality. In fact, violence often results from pre-existing risk factors such as overcrowding and insecure shelter, limited protection services and gender-based discrimination. These risks are known and can be anticipated, but rarely lead to effective preparedness. “We now need to give violence prevention the same urgency, leadership, attention and practical tools as other preventable public-health problems,” says Hosam Elsharkawi of the Canadian Red Cross.

Dislocation and forced displacement exacerbate existing risk factors and increase the likelihood of interpersonal or self-directed violence. While the impact of violence can be visible with injuries and scars, it is also emotionally damaging and heightens vulnerability to high-risk behaviour, low self-esteem, self-harm and health conditions. Over the long term, the cost of violence includes reducing the pace, scale and quality of economic recovery and community development.

**Box 4.2 Violence prevention**

Women, children, and displaced and marginalized people experience increased violence due to family separation, unsafe shelter or pre-existing social discrimination and inequality. In fact, violence often results from pre-existing risk factors such as overcrowding and insecure shelter, limited protection services and gender-based discrimination. These risks are known and can be anticipated, but rarely lead to effective preparedness. “We now need to give violence prevention the same urgency, leadership, attention and practical tools as other preventable public-health problems,” says Hosam Elsharkawi of the Canadian Red Cross.

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The increase in violence is driven by a combination of factors including individuals coping with loss and dislocation; they may act out in unhealthy ways such as using harmful substances or harming others (Singh, Fairholm and Wells, 2012). Overcrowded living spaces, poor security and stress on individuals, families and community support systems compound the problem. The rising incidence in urban areas of conflict or localized violence by armed gangs, drug cartels and crime syndicates constitutes particular threats to vulnerable populations such as refugees and disaster-affected communities. The IASC notes the challenge of working in situations where governments themselves might be associated with the violence against communities, thus becoming part of the protection issue for vulnerable individuals (IASC, 2010).

The role of humanitarian actors in violence prevention is multi-dimensional: to collect appropriate data; conduct risk assessments; identify support systems; conduct gender analysis; advocate; educate affected populations and humanitarian workers; and pilot
interventions that strengthen communities’ resilience to interpersonal and self-directed violence. Some prevention actions are simple (e.g., providing lights in a camp), while others are more complex (informed shelter planning to prevent violence).

An IFRC and Canadian Red Cross report (Singh, Fairholm and Wells, 2012) outlines ways that violence prevention can be integrated across the disaster management cycle. Tools and guidelines, such as the Sphere Project (2011), IASC guidelines for gender-based violence interventions (2005) and UNHCR’s urban protection policy (2009), already exist and need to be better implemented starting with risk reduction. Humanitarian agencies are responsible for ensuring that their codes of conduct, personnel screening and child protection policies are in place. Agencies conducting risk assessments should include an analysis of pre-existing factors that precipitate violence. All disaster programming needs to include the topic of violence prevention, so that both the affected population and humanitarian workers know global standards. Local laws relating to security and protection can be used to identify who is at risk, develop safety plans and support individuals who are being harmed.

The IASC Rapid Protection Assessment Toolkit provides guidance on how to tackle violence in the emergency response and early recovery phases. More informally, indicators of interpersonal and self-directed violence can be collected at health, psychosocial or food distribution facilities. Mass communication campaigns using SMS and mobile phones, radios and bulletin boards can help raise awareness and indicate where to get help.

In Haiti, where one study found that 70 per cent of women and girls interviewed feared sexual violence more after the earthquake than before, SMS and radio campaigns gave violence prevention information and support (Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). “Following the earthquake, we saw great solidarity between people. However we have also seen that the conditions led to an increase in violence. We are working… to integrate violence prevention across all our programmes and into the training of our volunteers,” says Michaële Amédée Gedeon, president of the Haiti Red Cross Society.

After Hurricane Mitch in 1998, social problems such as family and gang violence were apparent in shelters managed by the Honduran Red Cross; 18 murders took place. The Red Cross realized they had to take an active role in community organization, so they identified leaders to work on community projects, their volunteers reached out to families of gang members, and residents were grouped by age and sex to map their needs and get a full picture of what priority areas could be addressed. “We promoted the idea of self-management, involving people in the planning and management of programming,” says Maria Elisa Alvarado, Honduran Red Cross director general. During recovery phases, humanitarian agencies can promote dialogue with communities about violence and build the knowledge, skills and capacity to prevent it. The IASC’s strategy on humanitarian challenges in urban areas (2010) emphasizes the need to work with local partners and local law-enforcement agencies to reinforce protection of groups at risk and improve monitoring and conciliatory mechanisms.

For violence prevention to be effectively integrated across the disaster management cycle, ownership at all levels needs to be fostered, resiliency needs to be considered, and gender and children’s perspectives prioritized. Violence in disasters might be complex but it is not inevitable. It is predictable and preventable.
Humanitarian actors are not clear about where leadership on the issue of urban displacement should come from. No systemwide policy on urban IDPs exists and responsibility for taking on this issue has been refused by several UN agencies. Urban IDPs have been labelled “victims of institutional convenience” (Refstie, Dolan and Okello, 2010), due to an enduring assumption that urban areas are a durable solution for IDPs and to humanitarian agencies’ continued focus on camp-based IDPs despite the challenges posed by urban internal displacement. This is compounded by the lack of guidelines for operating in urban areas. This weak basis for coherent strategic change in the humanitarian system is perhaps a key factor in explaining why many innovations for urban action have been ad hoc and limited to individual programmes (Pantuliano et al., 2012).

**Box 4.3 Population displacement and humanitarian response in Haiti**

12 January 2010. Haiti is hit by a major earthquake. For the first time humanitarian agencies had to respond to a disaster massively affecting a capital city, with a population of millions dominated by informality. But the analysis of the situation and the paradigms applied for the response did not adapt to this new context (IASC, 2010a).

A major challenge was the insufficient strategic capacity to anticipate and influence population movements. The issue was not to measure them – various initiatives in Haiti demonstrated that real-time, important information about internal migration can now be captured (e.g., through mobile phone tracking) – but to gear up analysis from overly quantitative assessments (gauging immediate needs) to an appreciation of the complexity of urban dynamics. Given its scale, the response had the potential to positively shape urban redevelopment. The mechanical reliance on standard modalities of response generated, instead, detrimental patterns and processes. Two years after the earthquake, this has led to insecurity for marginalized groups, forced evictions, significant wastage of resources in non-durable measures and the creation of large-scale slums.

Immediately after the quake an estimated 500,000 people – one-sixth of the population of Port-au-Prince – spontaneously left the capital and sought refuge in other provinces (OCHA, 2010a), a process initially facilitated by the government. There was a window of opportunity to decrease pressure on the capital and encourage the necessary rebalancing of the national urban system. But it was not exploited. Only a few organizations sought to target both displaced and host populations in rural areas. By June 2010, more than half of them were back (Bengtsston et al., 2011).
The push for quick, efficient and visible aid delivery meant that agencies generally chose to operate in the capital and adopted logistics-driven and centralized solutions – the camps – over more sophisticated ‘developmental’ interventions (such as voluntary relocation out of affected areas or support to return to repair damaged homes). Earmarking funds for relief also contributed to this trend. Emergency money can buy tents, tarpaulin or temporary shelters, but cannot be used to finance housing and resettlement processes. As a result, the response tended to attract people to the places where ‘band-aid’ assistance was delivered and did not manage to balance this with dispersal and early return.

Camps and neighbourhoods of origin were closely linked; more than 82 per cent of the displaced population stayed in the same neighbourhood (UNFPA, 2010). This should have led to a community-based approach for programming and delivering emergency response, recovery and reconstruction. Putting the emphasis on creating the conditions for return to safer homes and improved neighbourhoods would have contributed to sustainable solutions and strengthened the local economy and job creation – the key element of people’s resilience.

In the early months of the response, the number of people in camps continued to increase rather than decrease. At its July 2010 peak, the estimated camp population was four times larger than in January (IOM, 2010a; 2011b), even if some of the affected families had already started to leave them. Return to houses coded ‘yellow’ (i.e., in need of repair) and ‘red’ (i.e., considered unsafe to live in) was favoured over permanence in filthy and dangerous camps (Schwartz, 2011). This is where spontaneous and relief-induced dynamics started to diverge and clash. People choosing to go back to their homes received little or no help or incentive for doing so. And camps continued to grow, fed with international aid.

One reason why the camp population did not decrease was that ‘ghost tents’ swelled estimates. People returning home often chose to leave a few household members behind, guarding their tents. They could then access the relief items distributed there and hope, eventually, to get some compensation to remove their tent.

In addition, given the pre-earthquake levels of poverty in Port-au-Prince, camps had become attractive to people unaffected by the quake but desperate to grab some of the resources flooding into the country. In the camps, extended families who lived under the same roof before the earthquake could move into separate shelters for each household. Camps were long the most visible scar left by the quake and yet, by mid-2011, 85 per cent of IDPs living in them did not come from earthquake-impacted homes (Schwartz, 2011).

Ghost tents and genuine ones, long-term and disaster-related poverty, real need and opportunism became hard to distinguish, while the debate around ‘inflated camps’ became stronger. The issue had to be urgently addressed as relief money was dwindling and humanitarian agencies pulling out. Relief solutions were protracted for two years, then there was little money and time left to work towards durable solutions. The impetus was to close camps. Lucky camp dwellers obtained compensation money, while others received nothing and experienced harsh forced evictions (Amnesty International, 2012; Oxfam, 2012; US Department of State, 2012).

In rebuilding Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas, humanitarian practices were not cross-fertilized by urban development know-how or recent successful shelter approaches in other countries such as the use
One of the key differences that humanitarian agencies must adapt to in urban areas is the dispersion of displaced populations among other residents and the multiple types of authority they fall under. Classic camp-based assistance entails a displaced population, geographically separated and (in theory) entirely registered, receiving parallel services mostly provided by international actors whose only duties are to provide humanitarian relief. In contrast, the urban displaced settle among host populations and may not want to be identified. These host populations often have similar needs to the displaced and may themselves move between chronic and acute vulnerability. In these settings, multiple actors may have authority or influence, such as community-based organizations, local councils, national authorities, local powerbrokers in the slums, as well as international development actors. Two key cross-cutting strategies then are the need to form partnerships and to adopt community-based approaches.

Humanitarian actors need to work with this variety of organizations and at multiple levels. This does not only involve contracting local ‘partner’ organizations to implement their humanitarian programmes but also aligning with actors whose strategies may not be intended to have a strictly humanitarian outcome (Crisp, Morris and Refstie, 2012; Grünewald, 2012). While this presents challenges to the capacity of humanitarian organizations to coordinate their activities with other agencies, it is vital to ensuring that the multiple threats facing displaced populations are addressed in a manner that can be sustained after humanitarian programmes are closed (Lucchi, 2012). As vulnerabilities often relate to chronic underdevelopment, reducing the vulnerabilities of affected populations and increasing their resilience to future shocks and hazards require a longer-term approach.
Perhaps the most crucial partners in urban areas are the government authorities themselves. Without their support there can be little progress – and little sustainability – to programmes. Authorities control resources and long-term planning at local, municipal, city and national levels. Working together with the authorities can be challenging when chronic or acute needs are created because populations are marginalized or systematically neglected, but it is essential if agencies are to be able to devise exit strategies that do not abandon populations to the same vulnerabilities they faced before programming began. As noted in Chapter 7, there is progress in developing these partnerships. Humanitarians will often need to partner with development actors, who are engaged in supporting inclusive long-term development. Human rights organizations can play an important role in urban areas as they may have more leverage than humanitarian agencies when seeking to address violations. The importance of the private sector in urban economies is often ignored or underplayed, yet they have the potential to provide links between humanitarian programmes and the local economy for work placements, for example. MSF, in its urban vulnerability programmes, have adopted a proactive approach to networking and in their responses in Sana’a, Yemen; Lagos, Nigeria; and Mogadishu, Somalia have hired staff specifically to identify the relevant stakeholders and form relationships with them (MSF, 2012).
The characteristics of urban displacement also give extra rationale for implementing community-based approaches. As Chapter 7 explains, these approaches should seek to build and reinforce community resilience and the methods that communities, particularly vulnerable ones, already adopt to cope with persistent stress and need. In post-disaster reconstruction, a recent IFRC–SKAT (Swiss Resource Centre and Consultancies for Development) handbook (2012) draws particular attention to community engagement and the partnership requirements discussed above. Floods in farmland near Bangkok, Thailand in 2006, for instance, resulted in community initiatives for preparedness, response and evacuation that have provided inspiration to national and international humanitarian actors. In addition to increasing the appropriateness and effectiveness of assistance, these community-generated resilience mechanisms may also help to prevent resentment between host and displaced communities. Community-based disaster risk reduction programmes – such as the IFRC and Bangladesh Red Crescent Society earthquake and cyclone preparedness programmes which address multiple hazards and social and environmental vulnerabilities – may be useful models, as they take into account cross-cutting vulnerabilities similar to those found in urban contexts (IFRC, 2012).

Providing improved shelter for those displaced by the 2010 Haitian earthquake remains a vital humanitarian priority in 2012. Despite the pace of reconstruction increasing significantly, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 421,000 vulnerable people are still living under canvas, plagued by violence, rain and floods, and the threat of eviction (IOM, 2012a). Haiti’s 602 displacement camps are a visual reminder of the desperate living conditions of hundreds of thousands of people.

In February 2011, the IFRC endorsed a membership-wide strategic recovery framework for Haiti. The framework marks a transition away from providing basic services in camps to supporting displaced families to move out of emergency shelters and return to safer, more resilient communities. This is being implemented through a large-scale camp decongestion programme carried out in unison with neighbourhood recovery projects.

Owing to the complexities – the lack of housing solutions pre-earthquake, ongoing land tenure issues, massive overcrowding in Port-au-Prince and the lack of a national reconstruction plan – meeting the varying shelter needs of the displaced population has required a flexible approach. The IFRC camp decongestion programme, one of the first to be initiated, will support more than 10,000 families to leave camps and return to safer housing.

In 2010, the IFRC piloted a Safe Spaces assessment methodology. Following extensive consultation and focus groups with communities, a series of options were identified and families could choose the support which would best enable them to return to similar, or improved, living conditions as those pre-earthquake. The
options include rental support, house repairs, financial support to host families and the building of transitional shelters on a plot of land owned by the beneficiary or that they are able to access.

To date, rental assistance has dominated with 3,948 families of the 5,000 assisted so far choosing this option. This reinforces reports (IOM, 2011a; 2012b) that suggest the majority of those still residing in camps were renters before the earthquake.

In August 2011, IOM-Haiti polled more than 15,000 camp dwellers to find out why, despite the discomfort and insecurity of living in tents or under tarpaulins, a cholera epidemic and two consecutive hurricane seasons, they remained in the camps (IOM, 2011). Some 94 per cent of camp dwellers said they would leave if they had alternative accommodation but, without the means to pay rent or repair or replace their damaged or destroyed homes, they could not leave immediately.

In response to the need for cash and resource incentives, the Self-Sheltering Solutions programme provides a US$ 500 resettlement grant to rent a property or live with a host family, supported by an unconditional grant of US$ 150 to enable families to meet their most pressing needs. A US$ 350 livelihoods grant is also distributed, in conjunction with vocational training, to help people secure an income and therefore ensure sustainability.

Supporting families to leave camps is also a priority of the Haitian government, whose 16/6 project aims to support the closure of six camps in Port-au-Prince and renovate 16 neighbourhoods. IFRC has supported this initiative by working in Camp Mais Gate, the largest camp identified in the strategy. More than 2,000 families have left the camp, primarily through rental support, and the camp itself is now a public park once again.

The scaling-up of camp decongestion programmes is scheduled to continue, with IFRC specifically focusing on decongesting smaller camps on private land and repairing rental stock, much of which is rapidly deteriorating, having been badly affected by the earthquake.

Large-scale reconstruction efforts have been hampered by the lack of an urban master plan for the capital and, in part, by prolonged political instability. Within this context, IFRC recovery programmes are working to improve infrastructure in a number of neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince, along with residents and local authorities.

The focus is on providing an integrated neighbourhood approach wherein the community determines its most pressing needs and is supported to implement solutions. These include concerted efforts to ensure shelter solutions are accompanied by increased access to water and sanitation; ensure livelihoods and skill-building opportunities are available in neighbourhoods; and, building on the Haiti Red Cross Society’s core competencies, help its volunteers in their disaster risk reduction and community health interventions. In this way communities will have the knowledge and skills to operate, maintain and sustain new infrastructure and ensure risks to future disasters are minimized.

To ensure local residents are active participants in their neighbourhood renewal, community mobilization has been a critical, and challenging, factor. Early assessments demonstrate a lack of homogeneity in communities with camps, neighbourhoods and rural areas all demonstrating a complex variety of drivers and vulnerabilities.

This has required adapting assessment tools, such as the vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA), to the urban environment in Port-au-Prince and helping community mobilization teams and volunteers to identify 'the
neighbourhood’ and its residents, many of whom may be in the process of returning. Additional VCA components focus on the social and historical aspects of a community. The results have provided additional data on violence and protection issues, health vulnerabilities and a broader perspective of how communities had previously functioned.

A community workshop, entitled Voice of the community, was held in November 2011 to provide an open forum for everyone involved in the integrated neighbourhood approach initiatives. Local community members were joined by IFRC operational colleagues and local authority and civil society representatives to debate current approaches and risks, and to provide concrete recommendations for future projects. These included the need to better recognize the ‘sociology’ of the neighbourhoods IFRC is working in and to further support income-generating activities and improve people’s access to credit. Concerns were also raised about ensuring the participation of all community members and better understanding the risks associated with working through community representatives. Government and municipality actors also highlighted the need for greater engagement in programme planning, implementation and evaluation to ensure these complement wider municipality development plans.

Participatory approaches can also heighten programme effectiveness. In its work to upgrade collective centres in Beirut, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) realized it needed to build its internal capacity to conduct people-oriented planning exercises and negotiate sensitive housing, land and property issues with a wide range of stakeholders on behalf of the refugee population concerned. Such experiences indicate that “humanitarian organisations can bring experience in participatory methodologies that local authorities and private sector contractors may not offer” (Crawford et al., 2010).

Community-based and participative approaches build on local capacity, which should be an aim of urban interventions. In Syria and Jordan, for example, UNHCR channelled funds through functioning public services to build on existing infrastructure and institutional capacities (Haysom and Pavanello, 2011; Pavanello with Haysom, 2012). This gave Iraqi refugees long-term access to public systems even as funding levels declined. Supporting existing health structures uses funds more efficiently than does creating parallel services (Spiegel, 2010). Developing local capacity can also involve building communities’ resilience to cope with future shocks or hazards, such as including disaster preparedness training in shelter interventions in locations prone to fire (Decorte and Tempra, 2010).

**Assessment tools and methodologies**

It is a truism of humanitarian response that a proper context analysis is the foundation of an effective response. This is also true for urban areas, but the emphasis of the analysis may be different and obstacles to collecting all the necessary information may be greater. These difficulties include dispersed settlement, unwillingness to be
identified, authorities limiting contact with these groups and similarities in the needs of displaced people with those of the urban poor (Lucchi, 2012).

A number of assessment tools for urban areas have been developed. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) released guidance (2008) on IDP profiling which proposes several methodologies. The Tufts University and IDMC (2008) profiling tool stratifies sampling sites according to the expected density of displaced populations. More sampling is done in densely populated sites to give statistical relevance to the displaced sample, but results are weighted afterwards to provide a comparison with the general population. This profiling tool can be used to identify key areas to focus on during monitoring (Jacobsen and Nichols, 2011). The World Food Programme (WFP), UN Food and Agriculture Organization and partner international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are developing new assessment tools to measure nutrition and food security in urban and peri-urban areas during crises (WFP, undated). These tools – for vulnerability and needs analysis, targeting, monitoring and early warning – should be available in 2013. In addition to these initiatives, profiling and assessment tools such as the Joint IDP Profiling Service and the Assessment Capacities Project have been applied to humanitarian crises in urban areas, for instance in Yemen and Haiti, respectively.

Greater Cairo, a city of 20 million people, accommodates an estimated 500,000 migrants of whom 45,000 are registered with UNHCR as refugees and asylum seekers. They come mainly from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, fleeing war, violence, persecution, human rights and sexual violations, and the death of family members (Baron, undated). They hope that Egypt will be a transit point to resettlement elsewhere – but in 2011 only around 1,500 were resettled. Most remain in Cairo with little support and few opportunities.

Access to health care, education, police and legal protection, housing, adequate food, employment and social welfare are only some of the challenges they face. While the Arab Spring revolution in 2011 gave Egyptians hope for freedom and human rights, it created greater problems and increasing fear for the migrants due to more crime, discrimination and verbal, sexual and physical harassment. With the faltering Egyptian economy, high inflation and lack of employment, they struggle alongside the Egyptians. Helpless to improve their lives, they also know they could be in Egypt for generations. Despite their despair, the basic World Health Organization standard for prevalence of mental illness (3–4 per cent of a population following an emergency) remains consistent (IASC, 2007).

The urban refugees in Cairo are like other displaced populations (UNHCR, 2009), a mix

Box 4.5  Mental health and psychosocial support to urban refugees and asylum seekers in Cairo

Greater Cairo, a city of 20 million people, accommodates an estimated 500,000 migrants of whom 45,000 are registered with UNHCR as refugees and asylum seekers. They come mainly from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, fleeing war, violence, persecution, human rights and sexual violations, and the death of family members (Baron, undated). They hope that Egypt will be a transit point to resettlement elsewhere – but in 2011 only around 1,500 were resettled. Most remain in Cairo with little support and few opportunities.

Access to health care, education, police and legal protection, housing, adequate food, employment and social welfare are only some of the challenges they face. While the Arab Spring revolution in 2011 gave Egyptians hope for freedom and human rights, it created greater problems and increasing fear for the migrants due to more crime, discrimination and verbal, sexual and physical harassment. With the faltering Egyptian economy, high inflation and lack of employment, they struggle alongside the Egyptians. Helpless to improve their lives, they also know they could be in Egypt for generations. Despite their despair, the basic World Health Organization standard for prevalence of mental illness (3–4 per cent of a population following an emergency) remains consistent (IASC, 2007).

The urban refugees in Cairo are like other displaced populations (UNHCR, 2009), a mix
of individuals who come alone or families who come without their extended network. Today, however, the urban displaced population includes large numbers of women, children and older people. Although ethnic, tribal, clan and religious communities come together in Cairo and help each other, their capacities are limited. Most lack the support of their family and communities and struggle with their life situation independently.

In order to address these issues, the War Trauma Foundation, together with a network of international and national organizations, including the UN and the American University in Cairo’s Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, established the Psycho-Social Services and Training Institute (PSTIC) in Cairo under the umbrella of Terre des Hommes. It aims to ensure that all migrants have access to mental health care and psychosocial support in their own language and in accordance with their culture and traditions. It also intends to train refugees and asylum seekers themselves as psychosocial workers to integrate community-based psychosocial support into existing services run by health, social welfare, legal, education and human rights organizations for refugee groups.

The psychosocial workers chosen for training are always selected by their communities and work from within the community. In general, they had no previous experience or training in mental health work. Therefore, during the first year, they received 450 hours of intensive training and ongoing individual and group supervision (averaging 12 hours a month). The psychosocial workers learn to provide individual, family, group and community support through community awareness-raising, 24–7 crisis response, psychosocial support, conflict mediation, problem solving, basic counselling, support groups, advocacy and referral.

The process of identifying and accessing urban-based migrants who need mental health and psychosocial support is difficult. It requires a level of understanding and trust that can take months or years for an international agency or professional to establish. Sharing the same language and culture and facing similar challenges, psychosocial workers selected from their communities have a greater chance of accessing people in need and quickly establishing trust.

PSTIC has now become a central point for a collaborative network of mental health and psychosocial support for organizations, Egyptian mental health professionals and community psychosocial workers. The institute has facilitated cooperation and regular meetings between UNHCR and international, national and community-based organizations. It trains psychosocial workers to consider themselves as a ‘family’, even though they come from the five major migrant groups and are multi-lingual. Despite working with at least 20 organizations, they are trained as a collaborative network and therefore cooperate and function well together as a team.

Although the Egyptian government offers minimal opportunities for these migrants, PSTIC cooperates with Egyptian psychiatrists associated with the Ministry of Health’s mental health department. The institute’s supervisors are Egyptian psychiatrists trained to understand the problems of displaced people. The programme’s cost is minimized by using qualified local medical personnel and access to Egyptian mental health and health services for psychosocial workers and the migrants themselves is facilitated. This networking maximizes the ability to work together with the limited resources available.

As noted by IASC in its Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in
Outreach can have a vital function, with outreach workers identifying affected people, conveying information and sometimes providing assistance directly. During the Iraqi refugee response, UN agencies and NGOs used outreach workers with positive results to identify and reach a dispersed refugee population. In Damascus, UNHCR trained women volunteers to go out and identify female-headed Iraqi refugee households, interview household heads and report their needs. The organization also used community workers in Amman to locate Iraqi refugees and inform them about the services available to them, with resulting high coverage of refugees in need of assistance (Washington, 2010). Spiegel (2010) also advocates use of community health workers for communicating treatment regimes and even delivering basic health services.

Priority programming

The key fields for priority programming in urban areas are housing, land and property; urban violence; legal aid; and livelihoods. They are priorities because they target primary sources of vulnerability and protection threats and/or cover areas where existing approaches need to be more sophisticated or better adapted.

For the reasons described above, the displaced are open to acute stresses due to poor tenure security. At particular risk for eviction are those settled on sites earmarked for development or private land which has been squatted (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2012). Authorities may also want to move populations who have settled on unsafe land, but without adequate plans for relocation to an alternative location. People have been forcibly evicted from urban camps and collective centres, such as from IDP camps in...
Port-au-Prince (Ferris and Ribeiro, 2012). However, agencies wishing to adapt programmes to address this issue face many challenges. Land has long been difficult for the humanitarian sector to comprehend (Pantuliano, 2009). In urban areas, the multiplicity of types of land ownership and land use is also much greater, such as the presence of high-rise buildings and people living with host families (Crawford et al., 2010).

An example of a holistic housing, land and property response comes from Bossaso, Somalia, a town which hosts a large number of IDPs. When IDPs were threatened with eviction, the Bossaso authorities offered land 10 kilometres out of town at a location cut off from work and markets. A response launched by a coalition of UN agencies, NGOs and local actors worked with the authorities to establish criteria for land for resettlement which included security of tenure, affordable and sustainable basic services, physical security and some integration into the host community, access to economic opportunities, promotion of sustainable urban growth and “cross subsidising possibilities and benefits for the community, for example, the sharing of infrastructure and services and increased value of the land” (Decorte and Tempra, 2010). The resulting agreement, negotiated with local landowners, the authorities and displaced populations, led to the original settlement being upgraded and land provided in a more central location for resettlement, in a manner which promoted social and economic integration for the displaced population.

Providing legal aid to enforce the fragile rights of tenants and others with insecure tenure can offer crucial support to displaced populations. Work by the NRC’s Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance programme has yielded positive results, for example in addressing concerns about mass displacement by unregistered IDPs living in urban settings in Liberia, as urban development begins to accelerate in that country’s cities (NRC, undated). Shelter guidelines for humanitarian assistance in urban areas are being developed by the Shelter Centre with input from a range of agencies and international NGOs. The guidelines will add an urban livelihoods perspective to existing humanitarian response tools and take into account the profiling, access to services, and housing, land and property issues raised by displacement in the urban environment (Crawford et al., 2010).

Legal aspects of housing, land and property may involve solving property disputes, helping returnees to claim the land they formerly occupied in their areas or cities of origin, or even dealing with the often powerful but dysfunctional bureaucracy and legal systems found in many sites (UN-Habitat, unpublished).

Legal aid could also focus on dealing with the protection threats raised by precarious legal status in urban areas. UNHCR is a key actor in preventing *refoulement* (the forced return of refugees) and in cases of refugees being arrested or detained (in some countries, such as Jordan and Syria, this is grounds for deportation). The issue
is slightly different among self-settled displaced populations, as in camps the threat of refoulement is generally a group threat resolved through advocacy. In cities this threat is experienced more typically on an individual basis. Advocacy work also has a role in contributing to the realization of rights more broadly, such as improved access to services or improved quality of the services which are already provided. Organizations are trying to work with media and public authorities to ensure positive messaging on forced migrants that counters, for example, their portrayal as an economic scourge or other scapegoating tactics. Advocacy can also aim to improve the relationship between host communities and the displaced (RSC, 2012).

An emerging concern, driven in part by the active engagement of agencies like IFRC and MSF, is in addressing the consequences of urban violence for civilians in cities. As mentioned, the work of these agencies is not displacement-specific but offers some examples of programmes targeting urban vulnerability. Urban displaced populations may themselves be at particular risk of committing or being victims of violence, particularly displaced youth (Pavanello and Metcalfe, 2012). Few programmes address this issue. Nonetheless, recent MSF documentation reveals a wealth of approaches piloted in urban areas for needs assessment, advocacy, networking and determining exit strategies, much of which humanitarian agencies could draw on for programmes targeting urban vulnerability (MSF, 2012).

In order to have secure and adequate living conditions, the displaced need to find a way to integrate into the local economy. Their contribution is evident in many cities: the streets of Amman and Damascus teem with customers for Iraqi restaurants or shops and the business district of Eastleigh, a suburb of Nairobi, is full of Somali enterprises. There is also evidence that women have been able to gain better income and more financial independence in cities like Kabul, in Sudan (Metcalfe and Haysom, 2012; Pantuliano et al., 2011) and in Colombia (see Box 4.1). But likewise, in many cities the lack of reliable livelihoods has driven people into acute poverty or made it impossible for them to overcome it. The average income of IDPs in Bogotá, for instance, is 27 per cent lower than that of the poor resident population (Albuja and Ceballos, 2010). The major obstacles the displaced face relate to legal restrictions, the state of the local economy and, particularly for those coming from rural areas, their own skills.

People may also have skills but be barred from using them. Although their asylum policies may vary in severity, states that are not signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees have no responsibility to give refugees permission to work. Fears that displaced Iraqis living in large cities could become increasingly impoverished and dependent on assistance led to successful ‘training placement’ schemes, in which employers could apply for work permits for trainees they wish to hire (Crisp et al., 2009; RSC, 2012).
In the last five years distributing cash as a form of relief has become accepted by donors and aid agencies as a ‘normal’ form of assistance (Harvey, 2007; Harvey and Bailey, 2011; Box 6.4). Cash transfers can work when markets function and people can buy what they need – which is often the case in urban settings. While in-kind assistance is still vastly dominant in humanitarian response, cash transfers have been used increasingly, including in urban areas such as in response to election violence in Nairobi (2008), the 2010 Haiti earthquake and food insecurity in Mogadishu (2011–2012). After Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, the United States government distributed more than US$ 7 billion (Kutz and Ryan, 2006). The rationale for using cash assistance in urban settings is evident: urban economies are more cash-based than rural economies and disasters never destroy markets completely and permanently (Cross and Johnston, 2011).

Methods of delivering cash assistance in urban centres have made use of infrastructure that may not be – or less widely – available in rural areas. In Amman and Damascus, for example, needy displaced populations received cards for use in ATMs, thus delivering assistance efficiently and in a manner that respects the privacy and choice of recipients (Nyce, 2010). Similarly, WFP arranged for local vendors to receive mobile phone-based vouchers for food rations for Iraqi refugees in Damascus (Haysom and Pavanello, 2011).

While these examples of livelihood support have been successful, instances of successful enterprise development, job placement or vocational training programmes are rare. Livelihoods initiatives seldom take into account the actual demands of the labour market. Many small-scale enterprise development or vocational training programmes are unsuited to the local economy, creating products and services primarily aimed at the NGO or ex-pat community (Buscher and Heller, 2010). New technologies can provide innovative ways of delivering assistance, but they are unlikely to obviate the need for context-specific consideration of how international assistance can support livelihoods in urban areas for displaced populations facing citizenship and other restrictions. The Women’s Refugee Commission’s framework for encouraging urban refugees’ economic self-reliance provides a useful starting point for targeting different types of livelihoods programmes depending on poverty levels within displaced populations (WRC, 2011).

**Conclusions**

Aid responses to displacement have primarily been conducted in rural settings. This has shaped the way aid agencies have traditionally defined or understood needs and how they have attempted to address them. The emphasis now should be on finding appropriate systems, tools and ways of working adapted to urban areas. This requires proactive changes to help aid agencies avoid steep learning curves at times when
they can ill afford it, as was the case in Port-au-Prince in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

To meet the humanitarian challenges in urban areas and promote durable, sustainable interventions which minimize future urban vulnerabilities, humanitarians will need to identify and link up with the municipal and national actors – most of which are development oriented – and bridge the gap between development and humanitarian work (Zetter and Deikun, 2010).

Many positive things can be said about the humanitarian agenda on urban displacement. Both the need to adapt and the characteristics and challenges that urban displacement presents are widely recognized; significant examples exist of programmes tailored to respond to the specific urban economic, political and social context and to tackle the drivers of vulnerability for the displaced. However, these programmes are still fewer and more ad hoc than the scale of urban displacement calls for.

**Box 4.6 Time to recover from disaster-induced displacement**

Anyone, anywhere in the world, may one day be forced to leave their homes and communities. In high-income countries, this displacement is likely to be temporary and usually the result of a disaster. Whatever the reason and the duration, it takes time for people to come to terms with what happened.

Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies are active in disaster-affected communities across the world, providing emotional support to vulnerable people and supporting community activities. This is a key part of the long process of rebuilding lives and livelihoods.

Rob Gordon, consultant psychologist with the Australian Red Cross, works with populations affected by disasters. “Major community traumas, such as floods and cyclones, are generally talked about in tangible terms, like loved ones, possessions, money and infrastructure,” he says.

“We can easily forget that the impact of the loss of social life, shared experiences and history is also damaging and disorienting. For many, rebuilding a sense of community, friendship and shared routines will be the hardest part of recovery.”

North-eastern Australia had its fair share of disasters in early 2011. Heavy rains caused massive floods in Queensland, which were among the worst the state had ever seen and affected more than 200,000 people.

Just as communities began cleaning up after the floods, one of the biggest cyclones in Australia’s history hit the coast of Queensland. The Category 5 cyclone – the most severe on the Australian tropical cyclone intensity scale – caused havoc, damaging or destroying thousands of homes and buildings, and power and water supplies.

Ray Jenkins, an 86-year-old Second World War veteran, lost his home when Cyclone Yasi hit. He worked for many years as a merchant seaman and has lived through all manner of storms, including a few cyclones, in his time.
When he heard that Yasi was heading towards the coast, he didn’t think it would hit Cardwell, his hometown. But the storm changed course and it was not long before the roof was ripped from his house. “I got a little bag with some clothes and personal papers, and got on my scooter and went down to the community hall,” says Ray. “Yasi was really playing hell with everything, sheets of iron, trees and rain and wind.”

When Ray arrived the community hall’s doors were locked, so he spent the night alone, curled up in a corner of the back doorway. Unable to get inside and with little protection from the elements, he was soaked, but safe.

When he ventured out the next morning, Ray was confronted by the damage Yasi had inflicted on his community. His home had been wrecked. “I dared [not] go inside. The kitchen was like a bomb had been through it, everything was gone. It’s like stepping off a train in a town that you used to live in many years ago and you go to walk out and go the wrong way, it’s changed that much,” Ray says sadly, although he realizes just how lucky he was to survive the disaster. “It’s just one of those things that nature sends every now and then and you have to live with it.”

The Australian Red Cross was able to help Ray, who had nowhere to live, with his basic needs. He stayed in emergency accommodation in Cairns for a couple of weeks before securing more permanent housing in Atherton, a small town in the hills.

He misses his old home. But what he misses most is the opportunity to talk to his friends and neighbours in Cardwell, who understand how he feels, having also lived through Cyclone Yasi.

Ray is not alone. One year after the floods and Cyclone Yasi in Queensland, many people are still dealing with the emotional impact of the disasters. During this period, Red Cross staff and volunteers supported more than 16,600 people across the state, checking to see how people were coping and making sure their needs were being looked after.

Once a month Australian Red Cross volunteers visit Ray, providing personal support and letting him talk through his emotions. Ray says he is forever grateful to the Red Cross who have helped him through the past year: “They bent over backwards to help me and that was a wonderful thing.”

Ray misses Cardwell “badly” and is hoping to return home one day. In the meantime, he’s making the most of his new place in Atherton, getting to know the neighbours. He says he is also becoming a regular at local stores buying parts for his car, aiming to get it roadworthy for more regular trips to see his friends in Cardwell.

Recovery can be a long, tiring and complex process.

Recommendations

National actors

- Recognize the permanent or long-term nature of much migration to urban areas.
- Proactively manage urban growth by providing services before slums become entrenched and difficulties of providing services are compounded.
Allow displaced populations freedom of movement and access to employment to maintain links with their country of origin and be self-sufficient, to which they are entitled under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Donors and agencies

- Invest in developing appropriate systems, tools and approaches to respond to the specific challenges of displacement in urban areas.
- Ensure that programming in urban areas is underpinned by a robust analysis of each specific context, especially to identify the range of local and national actors operating in the urban space and develop meaningful partnerships.
- Invest time and will in devising better mechanisms for role-sharing between development and humanitarian actors in urban areas.

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Sources and further information


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Development and displacement: hidden losers from a forgotten agenda

While there is a well-developed international humanitarian system to respond to the people displaced by conflict and disasters, millions of people are displaced every year for other reasons. This chapter examines development-induced displacement, with a particular emphasis on displacement caused by large-scale development projects. It begins by looking at the question of why humanitarian actors should be concerned about this type of displacement and then gives an overview of the types and scope of displacement resulting from development projects. The chapter then turns to the lessons learned from the decades of experience of development actors with development-induced displacement and resettlement, briefly considers other types of development-induced displacement and pulls out observations and conclusions relevant to humanitarian actors.

Development is usually seen as a positive and desirable objective. People have a right to development, but they also have a right to be protected from its negative effects. One of these is that development is a major driver of displacement with several implications for the work of humanitarian actors. Construction of dams forces people to move from areas to be flooded. When governments set aside land for nature parks or undertake urban renewal projects to ‘clear the slums’, people who had previously lived there are forced to go elsewhere. People are displaced by industrial or technological accidents. Sometimes they are evicted from their homes because economically powerful interests want their land. In some cases, particularly large-scale internationally financed development projects, governments plan for the resettlement of affected populations, finding land for them and arranging the logistics of their relocation. But often people are left to fend for themselves. And even when governments plan comprehensive resettlement policies, affected communities are almost always worse off as a result of displacement.

Although the term ‘development-induced displacement’ is used here, it is not very accurate in capturing the diversity of reasons for which people are forced from their land and communities. People relocated from the river valleys of West Africa in the 1970s and 1980s as part of a (largely successful) campaign against river blindness (Bennett and McDowell, 2012) have different experiences than those forcibly relocated in Ethiopia because their land has been leased for commercial agriculture (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Bennett and McDowell argue that what these types of displacement have in common is the exercise of power by state authorities and their efforts to extend state control.
These diverse types of displacement are part of a much larger crisis of internal displacement, one in which it is increasingly difficult to isolate a single cause of displacement. For example, in Colombia, communities living on territories coveted by mining companies are often targeted by paramilitary groups linked to the army and displacement is increasingly caused by palm oil cultivation (see Box 5.1). Similarly, in the Philippines,

**Box 5.1 Agro-industrial development and displacement in Colombia**

Over the past two decades, a convergence of global crises – financial, climatic, energy and food – has contributed to a dramatic revaluation of, and rush to control, land in the global South, mainly for expanding food and fuel production for export. Products grown include soya, palm oil and cocoa. In a process sometimes referred to as ‘land-grabbing’, land is transferred from vulnerable rural communities to private companies and investors, often by illegal, coercive or even violent means, and leads to further impoverishment. This expanding form of displacement is now widespread, occurring in countries such as Colombia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Tanzania.

As well as its use as a biofuel, palm oil is also the world’s most consumed and internationally traded edible oil; its overall consumption doubled between 2000 and 2010 (Colchester, 2011). In response to expanding demand in Europe, the United States and low- and middle-income countries like China and India, large-scale oil palm plantations are expanding in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Much of the land suited for the cultivation of these crops is peripheral and previously held little or no interest for governments or the agro-export industry. These marginalized lands are usually occupied by smallholder (often subsistence) farmers, indigenous communities and other land-tied, ethnic minorities who have lived there for generations. Their often customary–traditional land-tenure arrangements are vulnerable to predation and displacement by local élites and multinational corporations keen to exploit profitable agro-export markets.

The debate about the cost–benefit of expanding biofuels production is highly polarized. Proponents argue that the land acquired is underutilized or ‘idle’. This narrative justifies the appropriation of land for new investment, transforming ‘wastelands’ into productive landscapes (Borras and Franco, 2010). Such a view inevitably heightens the vulnerability of subsistence peasant farmers under pressure to vacate their land or face eviction. The production of biofuels such as palm oil can also be highly lucrative for both foreign and domestic investors. Viewed as supporting rural economic development while combating climate change, it receives large amounts of support from governmental and intergovernmental funding agencies and financial institutions. Palm oil is also attractive to governments in the global South seeking new sources of foreign exchange and to enhance links to the global economy.

But others argue that this profitability argument is somewhat artificial, and that profitability would be much lower, if host governments respected national and international law – in the areas of human rights, labour, indigenous peoples, land and property – and implemented effective environmental controls. Moreover, the potential for palm oil cultivation
to displace rural populations has been criticized. In 2003, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights condemned illegal links between the palm oil industry, outlawed paramilitaries and the army in the Chocó region of Colombia (OAS, 2003). In December 2007, the Colombian Attorney General’s office opened investigations against an alliance of 23 palm oil companies, accusing them of having “commissioned forced displacements” to clear land for palm oil cultivation (IDMC, 2007). In other regions of Colombia, the links between the palm oil industry and illegal displacement are less clear. But, at a minimum, there is evidence to suggest that communities have involuntarily left their property or have been forcibly evicted following legal, financial and political pressure.

The Colombian government has backed palm oil expansion arguing that as well as profiting state finances and business interests, it also benefits wider society by contributing to the pacification of rural areas formerly controlled by illegal armed groups, modernizing and increasing the productivity of the rural economy and providing a viable alternative to illicit crops. Unlike many other countries, most of the palm oil companies in Colombia are not multinational but operated by national concerns and local elites. While some of the disputed lands are characterized by informal and insecure tenure arrangements – making them particularly vulnerable to acquisition – much of the disputed land in Chocó and the region of Nariño is legally recognized as collectively owned by the resident Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. However, these legal protections are comprehensively ignored or not sufficiently respected. Some non-governmental organizations claim that Colombia’s armed forces have colluded with paramilitaries, killing hundreds of Afro-Colombians and displacing thousands more, so as to facilitate the expansion of plantations of palm oil. As much as 70 per cent of the population of Nariño’s western mountain range in south-west Colombia has been forced off its land (WoW, 2008). In other regions, such as Magdalena Medio, peasants are resisting pressure to vacate land for which they have residency rights from palm oil companies that do not. Methods employed include intimidation from private security companies, legal pressure exerted by apparently corrupted local officials and offers of relocation provided that they grow palm oil.

Involuntary land transfers are nothing new in Colombia and need to be considered within a wider context: an agrarian history based upon exploitative, plantation-based agro-exports; suppression of peasant resistance and attempts at agrarian reform; protracted armed conflict; and massive human rights abuses and violent internal displacement committed with impunity. As a result, rural Colombia potentially provides fertile terrain for aggressive land acquisition, which is then difficult to isolate from complex arguments to determine where rights and laws have been violated and who was responsible. Violence and displacement continue to be employed for resolving disputes with resistant rural communities by actors with greater social, economic and political capital.

What is happening in Colombia typifies agro-industrial expansion in the global South to supply increasing demand for food and fuel in the North. These processes enflame unresolved conflicts over land and labour with the result that ever more rural communities are vulnerable to displacement. Customary rights of affected communities are not being adequately protected despite their widespread legal recognition. International action, including the introduction of guidelines on land governance, is necessary to secure the underlying rights of local populations to remain on their land.
indigenous areas have been subject to military operations to clear the way for future development projects, such as mining or plantations (ECOSOC, 2003). In these and many other cases, displacement is thus caused by both conflict and economic interests. Similarly, people are displaced by disasters which can also intersect with both conflict- and development-induced displacement, as illustrated in the example of displacement in India (see Box 5.2).

The reasons for development-induced displacement are varied, but they share certain characteristics which distinguish them from conflict-induced displacement:

- While conflicts often lead to both internal displacement and refugee movements, those displaced by development projects almost always remain within their countries. (Some people may move to other countries when their land has been taken, but unless they can demonstrate persecution and hence eligibility for refugee status determination, they are considered to be migrants and thus subject to national immigration policies.)
- State authorities are almost always responsible for the displacement – whether through appropriating land for an infrastructure project, setting aside land for a natural park, mandating people to leave an area because it is unsafe or failing to provide appropriate protection from evictions by private actors.
- Unlike displacement induced by conflicts or disasters, development-induced displacement is always planned in advance.
- While those displaced by both conflict and disasters usually hope that their displacement will be temporary, development-induced displacement is almost always assumed to be permanent.
- Development is usually seen as a positive and desirable objective. People have a right to development, but they also have a right to be protected from its negative effects.
- Humanitarian actors are rarely involved in responding to such displacement; rather, state authorities take the lead, sometimes assisted by international development actors. While state authorities are responsible for protecting and assisting all those displaced within their borders – whether their displacement is due to conflict or a development project – private actors often play much more significant roles in development-induced displacement.

As discussed below, the lack of statistics on those displaced by the range of development-induced displacement causes, means that often they are largely invisible. Those displaced by development projects are indeed hidden losers and their number is likely to increase in the future.
The development–humanitarian gap must be bridged

Approaches to development-induced and to disaster- or conflict-induced displacement have largely been developed by different actors working in isolation from one another (Ferris, 2011). While humanitarian actors have considerable experience in responding to displacement (indeed this has been central to the development of the international humanitarian system), they have very little experience and understanding of displacement and planned relocations resulting from development projects. This has been the domain of development actors. Planning for the resettlement of people to be relocated by the construction of a massive dam has seemed very distant from the work of humanitarian agencies setting up refugee camps for people fleeing civil conflict or constructing temporary shelters for those whose homes were destroyed by disasters.

Box 5.2 India: the saga of forced migration

India was born of one of the greatest forced migrations of the 20th century. The ‘partition’ of the subcontinent into two states, India and Pakistan, in 1947 led to the displacement of some 15 million people, called partition refugees. Since then, India has experienced multiple displacements of huge proportions – both internal and external. Although it is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, India has a history of humane treatment for the vast numbers of refugees that have crossed its borders.

Following the partition refugees, the next group of forced migrants to come to India were the 80,000 Tibetan refugees who fled their country in 1959. By 2007 their numbers had increased to 150,000. Since 1983, migrants from Sri Lanka have intermittently sought refuge in India. Their numbers have fluctuated over the years depending on the situation in Sri Lanka. In 1987, there were more than 134,000 refugees, 25,000 of whom were repatriated by 1989. Later that year, however, new flows of migrants arrived in India, a situation that continued until 2009 and the end of the 25-year conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE (or ‘Tamil Tigers’).

In 1988, some 3,000 refugees from Myanmar crossed India’s eastern border; unofficial estimates put their number now at about 40,000, although only 2,000 have official UN refugee status. India’s diverse refugee population also includes more than 1 million Bangladeshis, 9,000 Afghans and small numbers of Somali and Bhutanese (Lhotsampa) migrants.

The largest group of forced migrants in India, however, are internally displaced persons. IDPs in India belong, on the whole, to vulnerable sectors of the population: religious and ethnic minorities, indigenous people, dalits and the urban poor. These people are displaced for reasons that include conflict, controversial development projects, ecological problems, climate-related hazards and changes in laws. The development paradigm favoured by much of the post-colonial world has inevitably resulted in massive displacements and India
Development and humanitarian actors have different cultures, mandates, time frames and even language, which sometimes impedes communication; for example, the word ‘resettlement’ has very different meanings for UNHCR (the United Nations Refugee

The displacement costs of development are not borne equally by all sections of society. The poor largely bear the cost but the rich benefit more. The construction of more than 4,300 dams since 1947 has resulted in the estimated displacement of between 21 million and 40 million people (Taneja and Thakkar, 2000). Indigenous people are particularly vulnerable to displacement, mainly because more than 80 per cent of coal and 40 to 50 per cent of other minerals in India are found in the areas they inhabit.

The process of displacing people for development projects and then rehabilitating the IDPs has never worked well, as was shown by the results of the first of these huge projects. India’s first ‘mega’ dam, Hirakud, built in 1951, submerged about 74,000 hectares (183,000 acres) of land and affected 294 villages. The dam was completed 60 years ago, but as many as 10,000 people have still not been rehabilitated.

Conflict and disasters constitute other drivers of displacement. Approximately 265,000 people are displaced along the India–Pakistan border and more than 600,000 people are estimated to have been displaced due to conflict in north-eastern India (Banerjee, Raychowdhury and Das, 2005). In 2008 alone, violence between ethnic Bodos and Muslims in the north-eastern state of Assam created 128,000 IDPs and 148,000 people were displaced due to conflict with Maoist insurgents in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. India is prone to cyclones, earthquakes and annual floods, all of which have displaced thousands of people. The annual floods along the India–Bangladesh border cause large-scale displacement, as did the 2004 tsunami.

It is not always easy to classify IDPs into neat categories. After initial displacement due, for example, to conflict, they may then face further displacement for the same reason or caused by development or ecological or climate-related hazards. With every move, these IDPs become more and more vulnerable.

There are also many stateless people living in India, such as the 28,000 Indian Tamil plantation workers who were repatriated from Sri Lanka but never recuperated their citizenship or the 65,000 stateless Chakmas (an ethnic group living in north-east India).

Although India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has given refugee status to large groups of marginalized people. Its record on IDPs is not so good, partly because their numbers are so large. The country has a resettlement and rehabilitation policy but no Act of Parliament for IDPs. The promise of both land and jobs for IDPs can only be upheld if at least 200 families are affected in the hill areas and 400 families in the plains. But this is a large number in the hills, especially when added to the thousands of people already displaced by conflict in some areas (in particular in north-east India). The Indian government also acknowledges the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998) and its Constitution promises many rights to citizens and non-citizens alike.

Attitudes to India’s many forced migrants are changing, however, and some citizens now perceive IDPs as a threat. Meanwhile, it is extended family networks, rather than the state itself, that tend to care for displaced people.
World Disasters Report 2012 – Focus on forced migration and displacement

Agency) and for the World Bank. Yet, as Box 5.2 demonstrates, India is one of very many countries accommodating people forcibly displaced by development, conflict and disasters. Given their common needs and vulnerabilities, it makes little sense to distinguish development and humanitarian perspectives. By better understanding how development actors approach displacement resulting from development projects, it is hoped that humanitarians can see ways of working with – and learning from – the development community.

There are clear connections between displacement caused by development projects and conflict or disaster. Firstly, there are often clashes when people’s land and property are confiscated by the government for development projects. Taking away people’s land and forcibly relocating them is always resisted. Protests and governmental efforts to suppress these protests can lead to displacement which is similar to that caused by armed conflict and human rights violations. Secondly, people displaced by development projects often need assistance to survive and to begin new lives, but humanitarian actors are rarely called upon to provide that assistance. And yet people displaced by conflicts, human rights violations, disasters and development projects often have similar needs: a place to live, support to re-establish livelihoods and often assistance to access public services, such as health and education. Being forced to leave one’s home is a traumatic experience, whether the result of a conflict or a government decision. The necessity of adapting to a new environment, establishing new social networks and often relating to a new ‘host community’ pose similar challenges to affected populations. Thirdly, as is often the case in conflict situations, humanitarian actors may face challenges to their humanitarian principles in working with those displaced by development projects. Governments may restrict access by humanitarian agencies to people being forcibly resettled – even when those governments are unable or unwilling to fulfil their responsibilities to the internally displaced. If humanitarian agencies remain silent, are they condoning such actions? Or if they provide assistance to support government resettlement schemes, are they violating principles of neutrality and independence by siding with the governments?

Another intersection between humanitarian and development approaches to displacement is that people sometimes need to be permanently relocated due to sudden-onset disasters – either because return is not possible owing to the effects of a disaster or because they are at risk of future disasters. In 1995, the volcanic eruption at Montserrat destroyed almost two-thirds of the island and people had to be resettled elsewhere. Similarly technological disasters triggered by natural hazards – as occurred in Japan in 2011 – can lead to evacuation and resettlement of affected communities (see Box 5.3). In other words, part of the response to those affected by disasters in these and other cases includes permanent resettlement.

Resettlement is also used as a preventive measure by many governments as a way of protecting people from future disasters, such as flooding. In fact, the World Bank has
Teru Yamada and her daughter, Ayako, leaf slowly through a photograph album, showing the elder Mrs Yamada’s deceased husband and the verdant garden of their old home. “I am very disappointed, because I would love to go back, but I know I can’t,” says Mrs Yamada, fighting back tears.

“I grew up near the nuclear plant. The only safety instructions we got at school were that if something happened, we should go to the playground and we would be given pink pills,” says Ayako. “When we were evacuated,” she adds, “we followed the authorities’ instructions and ended up somewhere where the radioactivity was still high.”

These comments highlight the complex mix of anger, distress and uncertainty that have characterized the lives of those affected by the nuclear disaster since the 9-magnitude earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011.

The Yamadas are among more than 77,000 people who were forced to leave their homes within the exclusion zone that the Japanese government declared 20 kilometres around the disaster-stricken Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.

It was one of the largest evacuations of its kind since the 1984 Bhopal toxic chemical leak in India, when several hundred thousand people fled their homes.

The evacuees face difficult decisions about whether to try to stay in the area or take jobs further afield and whether they should accept the fixed-rate government compensation or argue for a different system of allocation. Many say they face discrimination from people in other parts of the country.

Health concerns are significant, with fears of cancer from radiation exposure uppermost. Complicating matters for Fukushima’s residents are the mixed messages from medical experts. While Masao Tomonaga, a physician from the Japanese Red Cross Society’s Atomic Bomb Hospital in Nagasaki, acknowledges, “The exposure doses in the residents of Fukushima Prefecture were far lower than 100 mSv [millisievert]” (in Chernobyl, the number of cancer patients increased significantly above this level), he also says: “It is difficult to reveal what potential health effects may occur long term stretching into the future.”

Cancer is not the only health concern. Akira Sugenoya, a Japanese doctor with extensive experience working in Belarus in the aftermath of Chernobyl, cites evidence of a range of health conditions similar to those associated with affected Belarusian areas such as compromised immune functions in children, decreased physical strength in school-age children, increased rates of premature birth and congenital anomalies.

As well as providing equipment to measure the radiation in food and water, the Japanese Red Cross has installed a whole-body scanner to measure internal exposure to radiation. Yukie Kanno took her 5-year-old daughter Nanami for a scan at the Red Cross hospital in Fukushima City. “Through this scan, I want to get reassurance that we are safe. If my child’s scan result shows negative, then I don’t need to worry about myself.”

The area around Nanami’s school has already been decontaminated by removing and replacing the topsoil, but not the area around the family’s home. “So I don’t let the children play outside and, since the nuclear accident, we don’t go to the playground either.”

**Box 5.3 Fukushima evacuees**

Teru Yamada and her daughter, Ayako, leaf slowly through a photograph album, showing the elder Mrs Yamada’s deceased husband and the verdant garden of their old home. “I am very disappointed, because I would love to go back, but I know I can’t,” says Mrs Yamada, fighting back tears.

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The area around Nanami’s school has already been decontaminated by removing and replacing the topsoil, but not the area around the family’s home. “So I don’t let the children play outside and, since the nuclear accident, we don’t go to the playground either.”
The Japanese Red Cross opened a temporary indoor playground, called Smile Park, in Fukushima City in 2012 and plans to set up six more in the coming months. However, it is clearly still not enough.

But if the situation is complex, it is not static. In April 2012, the government reclassified three communities, where it said the radiation levels are 20 mSv or less, allowing residents to return to their homes to live. One of those is the village of Kawauchi, which nestles in a river valley reached by narrow roads. Yet, local officials say only about 500 of the 3,000 residents have returned, with roughly an equal number saying they do not want to come back and more than 600 saying they are undecided. Older residents predictably form a large portion of returnees. Among other groups, local people say that men are keener to return, while women are more fearful and are also put off by the inconvenience of living in a place where most of the shops remain closed.

There are also unconfirmed anecdotal accounts of tensions between residents of Kawauchi and of Tomioka, which although only a few kilometres away, has far higher levels of radiation, making residents’ return a more distant prospect (see Figure 5.1).

From a practical perspective, the Red Cross has been able to make a difference to the lives of those evacuated, not just in Fukushima, but also to all those – more than 300,000 people – displaced by the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster combined.

Hundreds of medical teams provided emergency care and psychosocial support for survivors, while billions of dollars in donations from the public in Japan and abroad provided cash grants and new domestic appliances to those in temporary shelter and helped to rebuild hospitals and other shattered facilities.

But for Japanese Red Cross and IFRC President Tadateru Konoé, the situation both before and after the nuclear accident had highlighted additional needs which he feels the IFRC must fulfil, not just in Japan, but anywhere where nuclear power plants are in operation.

“People need to have more information and be better prepared in case the unthinkable happens,” he says. “They need grass-roots organizations like the Red Cross Red Crescent to play a role, because they cannot rely solely on governments or the nuclear industry.”

At a meeting convened by the Japanese Red Cross and the IFRC in Tokyo in May 2012, representatives from several National Societies gathered to share experience and map out the practical actions the Red Cross Red Crescent can take to prepare for, respond to and inform about future disasters – both nuclear and technological.

“We owe this to the Fukushima evacuees – but not just to them,” says President Konoé.

recently developed guidelines on the preventive resettlement of populations at risk of disaster (Correa, 2011).

Even when governments plan resettlement efforts carefully and the need for resettlement is acknowledged, these plans rarely accomplish all of their objectives. In Mozambique the floods in 2000 were the country’s worst in 150 years. More than 700 people died, more than 550,000 lost their homes and some 4.5 million were affected (Christie and Hanlon, 2001). In response, the government set up resettlement sites to move people out of the flood plains to higher ground where they would be safe. But
the land was more fertile in the flood plains and many Mozambicans moved back there from the safer resettlement villages (Stal, 2011; UNDP, 2009). Floods in 2001, 2007 and 2008 revealed that in spite of the government’s efforts to move people to the resettlement centres, many had returned to the low-lying areas and were again displaced.

Given the fact that climate change will likely increase the severity and frequency of sudden-onset disasters or make certain areas uninhabitable, governments will probably resort to preventative resettlement more often, especially for populations who can no longer sustain themselves in their traditional habitats. Planned relocations (together with displacement and migration) were identified as a form of adaptation in 2010 by the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2010). In several cases resettlement has already occurred, or is in process, as a result of the effects of climate change. The United Kingdom’s Foresight report names, for
example, the Carteret islands in Papua New Guinea, China, Ethiopia, the Maldives, Montserrat and Tuvalu as cases where resettlement has either been tried or is likely to be used in the future (Foresight, 2011).

Finally, the rich experience of development actors working with development-induced displacement has much to offer to humanitarians working in different contexts, particularly when it comes to the issue of durable solutions for those displaced by either conflicts or disasters. As will be discussed later, there are many similarities in factors contributing to successful durable solutions among those displaced due to conflict, disasters and development projects.

**Defining the issue: development-forced displacement and resettlement**

Those displaced by development projects are internally displaced persons (IDPs) according to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998). Formerly referred to as development-induced displacement, the term of choice today in the development community, development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR), refers to the involuntary displacement and resettlement of people and communities by large-scale infrastructure projects such as the capital-intensive, high-technology projects which convert farmlands, fishing grounds, forests and homes into dam-created reservoirs, irrigation schemes, mining operations, plantations, colonization projects, highways, urban renewal, industrial complexes and tourist resorts, all in the name of development, and aimed at generating economic growth (Oliver-Smith, 2009). DFDR is always applied to communities or groups of people rather than to individuals. Given the drive in most low- and middle-income countries for economic growth and development, this trend is likely to intensify.

The term ‘resettlement’, as used by those working on development-caused displacement, refers to a process to assist IDPs to replace their housing, assets, livelihoods, land, access to resources and services and to restore their socio-economic and cultural conditions (World Bank, 2007). In other words, the term as used by development actors is not just physical movement of people, but includes the process of restoring socio-economic conditions (or reconstruction as sometimes used by humanitarian, development and security actors alike).

The scale of DFDR is enormous. Estimates are that 280–300 million people were displaced by development projects, particularly dams, in the 1980s and 1990s and, since the mid-1990s, 15 million people have been displaced annually (Cernea and Mathur, 2008). However, these figures should be treated with caution: governments avoid collecting and reporting data on those displaced by development projects and much small- and medium-scale displacement resulting from development projects is probably never aggregated. Total figures could be even higher. Many of those displaced
by DFDR are from rural communities but, increasingly, there is substantial urban displacement as well.

Since many of these large-scale projects require international financing, the multilateral development banks have exercised considerable influence in ensuring that people affected by development projects which they fund are relocated in accord with recognized guidelines and standards. Since 1980, the World Bank has worked to make the issue of resettlement of relocated populations an integral (and not incidental) part of development project planning by issuing *Involuntary Resettlement: Operational Policy 4.12*. Since then this policy has been revised several times, most recently in 2001 (World Bank, 2007). The regional development banks – African Development Bank (2003), Asian Development Bank (1998) and InterAmerican Development Bank (1998) – as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1992) have all developed guidelines for involuntary resettlement.

The basic principles on which these guidelines are based can be summed up in a few sentences. Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible. Where this is not possible, the scale of displacement should be minimized and resettlement should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programmes based on meaningful consultation with displaced people. The displaced should be assisted to improve their livelihoods and living standards at least to the levels they enjoyed before the displacement (World Bank, 2007).

Unlike the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998), the multilateral development banks’ guidance on involuntary resettlement is not explicitly rooted in international human rights instruments, but rather on development experience and good practice. Interestingly, while humanitarian actors almost always speak of both protection and assistance needs, the literature on DFDR rarely mentions the protection needs of those displaced by development projects.

People who are displaced by development projects risk a sharp decline in their standards of living. Michael Cernea’s impoverishment and reconstruction model identifies the common risks of such displacement: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and social disintegration (Cernea, 1996; 2000). If left unaddressed, these embedded risks result in massive impoverishment.

The resettlement model of the multilateral development banks is intended to prevent the impoverishment of affected communities by requiring that resettlement plans be developed on the basis of careful studies of a range of relevant factors, from land-tenure systems to information on vulnerable groups. Before international financing is provided, governments must submit an acceptable resettlement plan and ensure that the full costs of resettlement activities necessary to achieve the project’s objectives are
included in the project’s total costs (World Bank, 2007). These resettlement plans must demonstrate that those to be resettled will have access to land, housing, livelihoods and services, that communities will participate in the process and that grievance procedures will be implemented. However, as Cernea (2010) points out, the Achilles’ heel of the system is that there is no requirement that funding be sufficient to ensure that all aspects of the resettlement plan are implemented.

The guidance provided by the multilateral development banks recognizes that particular groups may be especially affected by DFDR. For example, the World Bank’s operational manual notes: “Bank experience has shown that resettlement of indigenous people with traditional land-based modes of production is particularly complex and may have significant adverse impacts on their identity and cultural survival” (World Bank, 2007).

The multilateral development banks have also highlighted the gender dimension of resettlement, noting that the process may exacerbate existing gender inequities. In particular, women may not enjoy land and property rights, making compensation more difficult. They may be more likely to work in the informal sector, making re-establishment of livelihoods more difficult. In many countries, women have less mobility than men and are responsible for meeting the basic needs of their families and childcare. In recognition of these considerations, resettlement plans must address the particular concerns of women to be resettled, and a variety of tools have been developed to ensure that this takes place (ADB, 2003).

Although there are certainly wide variations in the way such plans are developed and implemented, the fact that comprehensive planning is mandated in the case of DFDR stands in stark contrast to the way in which both national authorities and international humanitarian actors respond to displacement resulting from conflict and disasters. While contingency planning does take place, rarely does it extend beyond planning for the initial emergency response.

In spite of the guidelines to ensure that, after displacement, the resettled populations are at least as well off as they were before, the record of DFDR is not a positive one (Cernea and Mathur, 2008; Scudder, 2005). However, comprehensive research studies evaluating DFDR outcomes are either non-existent or insufficient, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the number or types of resettlement projects that have been successful. The World Bank, for example, has not carried out and published a comprehensive evaluation of the displacement caused by its massive project portfolio for 18 years. The last such resettlement portfolio review was conducted in 1993–1994. Recently, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) undertook a broad review on how the policy on involuntary resettlement and all social safeguards policies have or have not been implemented. Reporting on its findings, the IEG publicly faulted World Bank management for not keeping basic statistics of the number of
people displaced and not making such statistics available for evaluation (IEG, 2010).
Similar analytical syntheses are missing from other multilateral development agencies.

In some cases, governments have chosen to finance the projects themselves and this avoids being subject to these restrictions. In the case of the Three Gorges dam, which displaced 1.3–1.4 million people over an eight-year period, the Chinese government chose to finance the US$ 25 billion project on its own (BBC News, 2006) and to carry out the resettlement of affected populations without being bound by international development bank guidelines, preferring to elaborate its own special resettlement policies for this huge resettlement programme.

Analysis of the Xiaolangdi dam project in China (detailed in Box 5.4) suggests that resettlement schemes do not always have to result in the impoverishment of resettled populations (World Bank, 2004).

### Box 5.4 Improving DFDR: lessons from Xiaolangdi dam, China

The resettlement of almost 185,000 people from 227 villages displaced by construction of the Xiaolangdi dam across the Yellow River in China can claim to be a relative success story. Largely completed by 2001, the all-too-frequent outcome of impoverishment of resettled populations did not occur here (World Bank, 2004; 2007a).

In this case, 70 per cent of the resettled population not only restored but improved their living standards, while most of the remainder were within 80 per cent of previous income levels. The host communities, meantime, exceeded pre-project incomes by at least 10 per cent. Housing was better, livelihoods were restored and access to public services was dramatically improved. The incidence of disease was reduced to 5 per cent of the pre-resettlement conditions. Village committees participated in the planning process and women were particularly active in the entire process of project planning and implementation. About 3 per cent of the total resettled population was identified as vulnerable (the elderly, people with disabilities, households without a labourer, the widowed and the extremely poor) and plans were made to ensure that their specific needs were taken into consideration. For example, 62 nursing homes were established. Monitoring and surveys indicated a high level of satisfaction with infrastructure and access to public services.

The project evaluation (World Bank, 2007a) records a number of reasons for the project’s success. Given the likely need for resettlement to increase, not least in relation to the impacts of environmental and climate change, these reasons provide a valuable template for development and humanitarian agencies.

**Restore livelihoods quickly:** Emphasis on early restoration of livelihoods for resettlers and hosts was the primary objective. Resettlement locations were generally favourable for future development, and households and communities were not moved until the resettlement sites were fully constructed and the means for livelihood recovery were in place. This was accomplished by a strong development approach through a
land- and agriculture-based strategy, although diversification plans to finance new industrial development to create non-farm jobs were abandoned due to adverse macroeconomic conditions.

Minimize social adjustment impacts: Comprehensive programmes for developing social infrastructure for the resettlers and hosts were essential and the impact minimization was substantially achieved as the indices above on income, improved housing, infrastructure and access to public services suggest. Typically, the evaluation found that it takes about four years after relocation for households to re-establish pre-project incomes. Some of these positive outcomes may be attributable to wider regional development programmes indicating the need to tie resettlement into wider strategic planning frameworks.

Ensure full community and host consultation and participation in the process: Information and transparency were critical for gaining trust and successful implementation. As a result public support was strong. This was the foundation for positive long-term relationships. Particular attention was given to the host community. Often the Achilles’ heel of resettlement projects because land owners or host communities are unwilling to relinquish their interests, in this project new village sites were acquired through full agreement between the resettlers and host communities.

Ensure effective management: Comprehensive technical studies, solid oversight and supervision from the World Bank and strong government commitment and capacity ensured the resettlement objectives were accomplished.

Undertake high-quality monitoring and evaluation: The resettlement process was independently supervised and monitored and covered economic as well as social and community impacts. Village-level progress and household income and expenditures were tracked. The attitudes and problems of resettlers and host community members during the implementation of the project were also monitored. Evidence suggests that the monitoring and evaluation period was not long enough. Ideally a ten-year period is required to capture and provide follow-up to the long-term social and economic readjustment and restoration processes. In addition, financial monitoring needs to ensure that the investment and development programme adjusts and adapts to the economic dynamism of communities so that adequate funding is available to meet the changing needs of affected people.

Finance resettlement independently: The experience of Xiaolangdi suggests that successful resettlement requires substantial and timely financial commitments which are independent of the construction budget. Independence ensures that the resettlement programme is not compromised by cost overruns ‘paid for’ from the resettlement budget. Of the total project cost of US$ 840 million, 35 per cent (US$ 295 million) was for infrastructure development, land acquisition and commercialization (World Bank, 2004). This represents a per capita cost of about US$ 1,600 for resettlement from a total project per capita cost of US$ 5,000.

Perhaps the most significant observation from the 2007 evaluation report is that “achieving successful resettlement with real development requires at least two different sets of skills and competencies, which an implementing agency should have available from the beginning” (World Bank; 2007a). In other words, development skills combined with humanitarian attention to the social and community impacts of forced displacement offer the best way forward.
While the Xiaolangdi case may be an exception rather than the norm in DFDR, some of the reasons for its success are also applicable to humanitarians’ quest for durable solutions for both refugees and conflict-induced IDPs. In particular, the emphasis on working with governmental authorities, using participatory approaches, focusing on livelihood restoration and extensive planning processes are all relevant for efforts to support long-term solutions for those displaced for other reasons.

**Other forms of development-induced displacement**

DFDR, particularly when carried out under the guidelines of the multilateral development banks, represents an important subset of displacement caused by development projects. But there are other, related types of displacement which are more ambiguous and much less well documented. Often many of the smaller-scale displacements are not captured in statistics. For example, evictions from urban areas (see Box 5.5), establishment of national parks and forest preserves, preparations for sporting events (such as the Olympics) and even projects to mitigate the effects of climate change as evidenced in displacement caused by palm oil cultivation (IDMC, 2007) all produce displacement. And in many cases, people are displaced because it is in the economic interests of individuals, companies or governments simply to acquire the land (Erickson, 2012).
Rehabilitation of the commuter train service of the Philippine National Railway (PNR) in Metro Manila – the region comprising Manila and surrounding areas – was long overdue. It became one of the priority infrastructure projects during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010). The first phase of the north rail–south rail linkage covers the section between Caloocan in the north and Alabang in the south, passing through the most populated area in the Philippines. Now, railway tracks that were once buried in muddy soil are elevated and new, air-conditioned trains run at 60 kilometres per hour, a remarkable improvement on the old trains.

However, the most dramatic change brought about by the project was the demolition of large informal settlements along the railway and the subsequent eviction and resettlement of more than 35,000 families. Although a relocation programme was implemented by the National Housing Authority (NHA), it did not prevent the impoverishment of those displaced.

Most relocation sites are outside Metro Manila and isolated from the local economy which, compounded by poor transportation links, make it extremely difficult for those resettled to reconstruct their livelihoods. In addition to lacking basic services such as water and electricity, houses in the relocation sites are expensive. Relocation for informal settlers without legal title along the railway means the high cost of long-term repayment of loans and interest to the NHA.

Like other communities resettled as a result of development projects, their shelter needs received far more attention than their increased socio-economic vulnerabilities. Resettlement often translates into a housing replacement project without much concern for livelihood and community reconstruction (Koenig, 2009). Faced with myriad challenges of forced resettlement, many face either impoverishment or a return to their place of origin. Unfortunately, these outcomes typify the widely documented problems of involuntary resettlement.

But those resettled involuntarily were not the only losers. Paradoxically, the remaining population, although saved from displacement by living beyond the project’s scope, faced significant socio-economic changes following the mass displacement. They provided petty goods and services, but their livelihoods were undermined by losing the resettled households who used to be their customers, suppliers, middlemen and salespeople. They too have been impoverished. Nonetheless, because they were only indirectly affected, they are the ‘hidden losers’ outside the programme’s purview, which is concerned with displaced people and their resettlement.

These hidden losers, then, are people adversely affected by a development project but whose material and non-material losses go unrecognized by governments and humanitarian or development agencies. They fall through the gaps in current programmes that provide compensation, protection and other assistance only to people whose livelihoods are directly undermined and whose human rights are violated by being physically evicted and resettled. Such gaps appear where a complex problem is simplified and intervention focuses on the more visible and immediate effects of displacement.

Non-displaced populations are more invisible since they do not ‘move’ physically. Their
experiences are easily overshadowed by the spotlight on those who are involuntarily displaced. Downstream communities of river basin development are another example of hidden losers whose livelihoods are seriously transformed by dam construction (Scudder, 1996; World Commission on Dams, 2000). In urban displacement contexts, people indirectly affected are more difficult to spot and remain undetected in many interventions.

That people are differentially affected in a development displacement context is also easily forgotten. Sub-groups of displaced people – class or caste, gender and race or ethnicity – can be marginalized and may lose out further in resettlement programmes. In the infamous case of India’s Narmada hydropower project, Mehta (2008) found that women can experience a double bind – disadvantaged in compensation and resettlement due to existing gender norms that do not legitimize women’s property ownership.

The presence of hidden losers presents four major challenges to development and humanitarian actors.

Firstly, unlike some forcibly displaced people whose rights are – in principle – recognized and protected (for example, by national and international legal and normative provisions), concern for hidden losers is largely absent in existing development policies. It is, of course, debatable to what extent a project’s secondary or tertiary effects can and should be addressed and, if so, who bears the responsibility. But there is a strong case for international and non-governmental organizations (both humanitarian and developmental) to recognize indirectly affected people alongside their main target groups.

Secondly, identifying vulnerable hidden losers and targeting those requiring assistance and protection is a challenge in any intervention.

Thirdly, it is imperative to work closely with the communities living in and beyond the target locality and to provide channels for these diverse groups to address their specific needs. Given the limitation of top-down development to grapple with ‘hidden’ displacement’s effects, it is important for hidden losers themselves to publicize their case and claim their rights. To enable people affected by DFDR’s hidden impacts to be seen and heard by international and national agencies, civil society organizations, advocacy groups and community associations can play a vital role based on their long-term engagement with development and poverty issues on the ground. These organizations can strengthen their advocacy work in protecting rights. For example, in the Metro Manila case, non-governmental organizations could have demonstrated more convincingly that development impacts are much broader and more complex than just displacement by publicizing the case of the hidden losers.

Lastly, given the spread and diversity of hidden losers, improving the scope of national and local government social protection measures can contribute to strengthening the overall resilience of people who are likely to be affected by displacement but not eligible for compensation. Here case-specific protection, for example, might include microfinance initiatives for those working in the informal economy to develop new markets and products if their income declines due to displacement.

Although challenging, these losers should no longer remain hidden. This is not a new challenge: rather, it is a call for more refined, comprehensive and creative intervention, which will eventually contribute to improving the overall protection and economic well-being of the affected population.
The issue of land acquisitions, often referred to as ‘land-grabbing’, has generated considerable interest in recent years (Box 5.1). While this takes different forms, it generally involves acquiring land for agricultural production, often by foreign investors. A World Bank 2010 study found that 46 million hectares were acquired through land acquisitions in a one-year period from 2008–2009 (Deininger and Byerlee, 2010). About 70 per cent of such land acquisitions take place in Africa. For governments of low- and middle-income countries, the terms of such land deals from foreign investors are attractive, not only as a source of revenue but also as support for their development efforts, as foreign companies may promise to provide infrastructure and services to the communities in which they acquire land. But for the people living on that land, the consequence is displacement rarely accompanied by the type of resettlement planning characteristic of DFDR.

Displacement and human rights

The international human rights community has long been aware that forced evictions constitute a grave violation of human rights. Forced evictions are defined as “permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection” (UN-Habitat, 2011). In the most recent effort to compile data on the number of forcible evictions, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions found that some 4.3 million people were affected by evictions in 2007–2008, including both threatened and actual evictions (COHRE, 2009). There is clearly overlap between the issue of forced evictions and development-induced displacement. In fact, in 1997, the UN Commission on Human Rights requested the Secretary-General to convene an expert group on development-induced displacement. The group produced a set of comprehensive guidelines, based on international human rights law, on development-induced displacement which served as the basis for the development of the UN’s guidelines on forced evictions (ECOSOC, 1997). A recent study identifies the five most common causes of forced evictions as urban development, large-scale development projects, disasters and climate change, mega-events and evictions related to economic forces, and the global financial crisis (UN-Habitat, 2011).

One of the characteristics of those evicted or otherwise forced to move due to development-related causes is that they tend to come from communities which are already marginalized in societies. Indigenous communities seem to be disproportionately affected. Governments rarely expropriate the land of the wealthy and powerful.

Moreover, it is also difficult to determine whether people are forcibly displaced in an effort to protect them or to implement a project which is genuinely in the public interest, or because powerful élites simply want their land or have a political agenda. Perhaps one of the most criticized uses of resettlement incurred in the mid-1980s in Ethiopia in the midst of major food insecurity in which some 300,000 people died,
7.7 million were affected and more than 400,000 people fled to neighbouring countries (CRED, 2012; Ofcansky and Berry, 1991). The Ethiopian government, then led by the Derg, a Marxist junta, claimed the north was drought-prone and overpopulated and that people needed to be moved. The resettlement programme was portrayed as a relief measure, which would shift large segments of the population to agriculturally rich and sparsely populated regions of the country (de Waal, 1991). The reasons given by the Ethiopian government were heavily contested and the resettlement operation was viewed as an attempt by the government and military to weaken the insurgency (de Waal, 1997; Grada, 2009). The programme relocated approximately 600,000 people from northern Ethiopia to resettlement sites in the north-western, western and south-western parts of the country (Gebre, 2005). An estimated 50,000 people died during the process as a result of food shortages and lack of infrastructure at resettlement sites (de Waal, 1991; Clay and Holcomb, 1986).

The Ethiopian case stands out due to its high human cost and the fact that it has been widely documented. There are, however, many other cases where people have been relocated to other areas, ostensibly for their own well-being but where economic and political interests have been important considerations (see, for example, Edwards, 2011; Campbell, 2010). Government policies of relocating populations have taken different forms, ranging from the forced resettlement of millions of people in the Soviet Union under Stalin’s rule, to the Ujamaa villages programme of Tanzania’s President Nyerere in the early 1970s and the relocation of up to a third of the population of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic between 1980 and 2000, justified as a poverty reduction measure. In some cases, particularly in southern Africa, so-called ‘peace parks’ have been established to promote peace and development in countries that had formerly been in conflict.

The impact of climate change

In some cases, communities need to be relocated due to the effects of climate change (Bronen, 2011) and it is likely that further relocations will be necessary as areas become uninhabitable as a result of climate change (Ferris, forthcoming). For example, in addition to its extensive experience in relocating people for development projects, the Chinese government is also relocating populations out of ‘vulnerable environments’ mainly in western areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. This has been going on in stages since 1983 with the expressed objectives of reducing poverty and relieving environmental pressure. This type of resettlement now involves millions of people with predictions that 10 million people will need to be moved by 2050 (Tan, 2011). Similarly the Vietnamese government is undertaking large-scale resettlement in the Mekong Delta as a development initiative to respond to climate change (see also Box 7.5). With an increasing global population and the consequent pressure on available land, together with environmental degradation and global warming, it is likely that governments will use resettlement as a way of dealing with these pressures in the future.
Conclusions

While virtually all humanitarian actors have at least some experience in working with people displaced by conflict or disasters, they are generally not familiar with the practices and policies that have evolved over decades to respond to populations displaced by large-scale development projects. Given the scale and the variety of development-induced displacement, it is not suggested here that humanitarian organizations should develop programmes to respond to the needs of this large population. However, there may be cases where humanitarian organizations can provide immediate assistance to those who are destitute and homeless after being displaced, particularly when the organizations are active in the same area. The role of local civil society organizations in responding to the needs of people displaced by development projects needs to be highlighted and affirmed. For example, humanitarian organizations, including Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies, have an important role to play in drawing attention to less visible groups of IDPs. They can learn much from development counterparts’ work with populations displaced by development projects.

Indeed, there are signs of increasing convergence between those working on DFDR and those working with people affected by conflict or disasters. For example, humanitarian organizations working with populations affected by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti soon realized that evictions and land titles were among the major protection challenges facing Haitian IDPs and turned to organizations such as the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) for expertise in this area (see Box 4.3). More humanitarian organizations are developing competence in broad issues around housing, land and property. While humanitarians have always been involved in providing shelter, they are increasingly seeing shelter in terms of settlement planning and broader land issues. The expertise acquired by the development community’s long-standing work on issues of compensation in a variety of land-tenure systems and legal frameworks could be beneficial to efforts by humanitarian agencies to find solutions to urban displacement (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, more humanitarian organizations are recognizing that a major challenge (perhaps the major challenge) of working in protracted IDP and refugee situations is the restoration of livelihoods – an issue which has been key to resettlement of communities displaced by a variety of development projects and is explored further in the next chapter. Some of the innovative ways of ensuring participation by affected communities in planning for resettlement could similarly be useful to humanitarian actors working to develop participatory processes.

There appears to be a greater openness to learning from development actors in several forums. For example, UN-Habitat has participated in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) since 2008 and played a leadership role in IASC’s understanding of humanitarian challenges in urban response and has been actively involved as the lead agency for shelter in several emergency situations. UN-Habitat has also supported resettlement efforts following infrastructure projects (UN-Habitat, 2009) and could serve as a bridge between humanitarian and development communities.
another example, humanitarian agencies, including the IFRC, are paying more attention to upholding the role of the affected state in disaster response and in increasing accountability to disaster-affected populations. Development actors have considerable experience in both of these areas through their work with resettlement. For years, humanitarian agencies have tried to ensure that their programmes addressed the needs of the most vulnerable, including children, women heads of households, people with disabilities, the elderly and other traditionally marginalized groups. Development actors working on DFDR have also tried to ensure that resettlement programmes recognize the specific needs of such groups.

As humanitarian organizations develop policies and programmes to respond to the effects of climate change on mobility, it would serve them well to learn more about the experiences of development actors in resettling communities. In fact, the challenges posed by climate change may offer unprecedented opportunities for collaboration between the humanitarian and development worlds.

**Recommendations**

**Governments**

- State authorities are responsible for preventing arbitrary displacement wherever possible and for minimizing its effects when displacement cannot be avoided. The development and implementation of laws and policies, which uphold the rights of those displaced and which set out transparent processes for consultation with affected groups, should be pursued. A number of governments, particularly in Asia – such as China, India, Laos, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam – have adopted resettlement policies.

- Given the importance of the private sector in acquiring and developing land which may result in displacement, governments should ensure that their oversight and monitoring of private sector activities protect the rights of people displaced as a result of those transactions.

**Humanitarian organizations**

- Humanitarian organizations should familiarize themselves with relevant resources produced by development agencies and multilateral development banks to support communities resettled following large-scale development projects and to develop guidance for preventive resettlement.

- They should invite development actors to share their experiences and good practices with resettlement in developing policies to resolve protracted displacement resulting from conflict and disasters.

**Multilateral development banks and bilateral donors**

- These banks and donors should review their vast collection of reports and assessments in order to publish reliable estimates of the number of people displaced
and resettled with their financial support; synthesize their experiences with resettlement, with a particular emphasis on evaluation of their compensation policies; and consider incorporating a protection or human rights lens in the next revision of relevant operational guidelines.

IASC

The IASC should set up a task force to examine the possibilities for enhancing mutual learning from humanitarian and development actors in planning for displacement, migration and planned relocations, given the likely displacement effects of climate change, including the compilation of a collection of best practices in resettlement for the use of development actors. This task force should also review existing operational guidance from the multilateral development banks to determine the extent to which some of its provisions should be included in guidelines developed for use with other displaced populations.

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Sources and further information


Who pays?  
Who profits?  
The costs and impacts of forced migration

International humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) exceeded US$ 8 billion in 2010 – a figure which includes neither host country expenditure nor non-governmental organization (NGO) expenditure from private sources. Yet, despite the enormous global budget, economic analysis and financial evaluation of the outcomes of this ‘investment’ are among the most neglected elements of humanitarian intervention and support. No other business would escape this scrutiny. Mainstream humanitarian concern focuses on the social consequences of forced migration rather than on the very significant negative and positive economic costs and impacts of forced migration on the migrants themselves, their hosts and for humanitarian actors and international donors.

What are the costs and impacts of forced migration and humanitarian assistance? How can we measure them? Who pays? Who benefits? Should we put a price on humanitarianism? This chapter tackles these questions which fit uncomfortably with humanitarian agencies’ culture and precepts, and raises other, deep-seated, operational controversies. For example, refugees and IDPs, it is said, impose important (often exaggerated) burdens on their hosts, while the positive benefits they bring are usually ignored. What are the economic advantages, and the political implications, in promoting longer-term developmental programmes for refugees and their hosts? Humanitarian actors would benefit from a political–economy analysis of these pertinent questions which go to the core of durable solutions to forced displacement crises.

The chapter frames these issues and profiles progress from three related perspectives: a macro-level perspective of the humanitarian funding regime; the micro-level perspective of the impacts on forced migrants themselves; and the wider, political–economy analysis of the humanitarian–development nexus.

The humanitarian funding regime for forced migration

There is a mass of data on refugee and IDP numbers, but a dearth of readily available data and analysis of the funding regime of humanitarian programmes for forced migrants. This section attempts to provide a coherent analysis of this regime and reviews key changes and challenges.
Using the methodology and assumptions described in Box 6.2 and focusing mainly on humanitarian funding for which data are more readily available, it considers four main questions. How do donors fund responses to forced migration? Where do donors disburse funds for forced migration? How has the funding regime changed in recent years? What are the key challenges for funding in response to forced migration?

**How do donors fund responses to forced migration?**

Based on analysis of available data, between 2006 and 2010, US$ 33 billion or 5 per cent of total official development assistance (ODA) (excluding debt relief) from official donors that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was allocated to programmes clearly identifiable as addressing the needs of forced migrants and host communities (see Figure 6.1). This share grew from 4.0 per cent of total ODA in 2006, to a high of 6.4 per cent in 2009, falling slightly to 6.0 per cent in 2010.

![Figure 6.1 ODA for forcibly displaced people, 2006-2010](image)

Humanitarian aid accounted for 43 per cent of the total (US$ 14.2 billion) ODA funding for displaced populations between 2006 and 2010. In the same period, 13 per cent (US$ 4.3 billion) was spent on development activities in recipient countries, including support for basic service provision, strengthening governance and security, and support to productive sectors.

Perhaps surprisingly, the second largest share of ODA dedicated to supporting displaced populations does not leave donor countries: in 2006–2010, US$ 13.8 billion (41.8 per cent) supported refugees within donor countries.
Where does the money come from?
The top ten donors of ODA financing for displaced populations (see Figure 6.2) provided 86.6 per cent of the total in 2010, with the United States alone accounting for over one-third. The nature of donor support for displaced populations varies widely; for example, the Czech Republic, France, Greece and Turkey each spent more than 95 per cent of their designated funding for displaced people on support for refugees at home.

Official donors fund their responses to forced migration through regular, planned commitments to multilateral organizations working with affected populations. These amounts are complemented by bilateral programme funding for particular crises, often via fund-raising appeals. For example, donors respond to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) Global Needs Assessment, Consolidated Inter-agency Appeals (CAPs) and others such as IFRC and NGO appeals. Three categories of actors receive funding: United Nations (UN) agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM); international and national NGOs and, to a limited degree, governments of countries hosting refugees and supporting IDPs.

As Figure 6.2 shows, some donors allocate significant proportions of funding as multilateral or core unearmarked ODA contributions to UN agencies whose mandate is to support displaced populations such as UNHCR and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). Ten DAC members and the European
Union (EU) each spent more than 20 per cent of their total support for IDPs and refugees as unearmarked contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA.

Bilateral support accounts for the balance of donor funding. Australia, the EU, Luxembourg, Japan and the United States each dedicated 70 per cent or more of their total support for displaced populations in 2010 to bilateral funding for humanitarian and development projects in low- and middle-income countries. Organizations receiving bilateral donor funding may pass all or part of it to another organization to implement.

From 2006 to 2010, multilateral organizations were the largest recipients of humanitarian funding for displaced populations, receiving on average 68 per cent. But 80 per cent of this multilateral share in 2010 went to three organizations: UNHCR, UNRWA and IOM (see Figure 6.3). Humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement received an average of 11 per cent and 9 per cent respectively between 2006 and 2010. The public sector institutions of donor and recipient countries represented a modest 2 per cent.

**Figure 6.3** Distribution of humanitarian assistance for displaced populations by type of organization

Disbursing humanitarian funds for forced migration

Where does the funding go? Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South and Central Asia collectively received 87 per cent of total ODA funding designated for displaced populations between 2006 and 2010 with two-thirds allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (see Figure 6.4).
In 2006–2010, the top five recipient countries received almost half of the humanitarian and development funding for forced migrants. Palestine received 18 per cent, Sudan 12 per cent and Pakistan 8 per cent of the total (see Table 6.1). The leading recipients are among the low- and middle-income countries with the largest displaced populations.

### Table 6.1 Recipient countries for humanitarian and development funding for forced migrants, 2006-2010

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/OPT</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The share of assistance per displaced person varies: Sudan received an average of US$ 152 per person/year each year between 2006 and 2010, and Palestine US$ 87. In contrast, Iran received just US$ 7 per person/year and Colombia US$ 9.

Upper-middle income countries with large displaced populations receive lower per capita assistance for these populations than lower-income countries (see Figure 6.5), reflecting their theoretical greater financial capacity. However, two low-income countries, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), receive the
lowest levels of assistance per displaced person. In these countries, forced migration is symptomatic of wider crisis and much humanitarian funding could be described as supporting people affected by displacement.

Data on the types of programme funded reveal valuable insights. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has 13 standard sectors used for reporting humanitarian funding. Five of these sectors are detailed in Figure 6.6, which shows that in 2006–2011 three sectors received more than 25 per cent of total displacement funding. ‘Multi-sector’ received 39 per cent on average; protection/human rights/rule of law, 30 per cent and shelter and non-food items, 25 per cent.

![Figure 6.6 Humanitarian funding to IASC sectors supporting displaced populations, 2006-2011](image)

Disbursement can be set in the wider context of overall international humanitarian aid, of which support for displaced populations forms a core component. Figure 6.1 shows that ODA forced migration funding peaked in 2009, but total humanitarian funding for all categories of activity peaked a year later, with record levels at US$ 18.8 billion (Figure 6.7). The global food crisis largely accounts for the 30 per cent increase in 2008, while in 2010 the 23 per cent increase was largely in response to the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods.

Many countries receiving most humanitarian aid and hosting large displaced populations are also affected by multiple social and economic disadvantages (see Figure 6.8). In 2001–2010 Pakistan, for example, received just over 5 per cent (US$ 4.6 billion)
Figure 6.7 Total international financing response to humanitarian crisis, 2006-2011

Note: All figures for 2011 are preliminary estimates. Private contribution figures for 2006–2010 are based on Development Initiatives’ own research of a study set of NGOs, UN agencies and Red Cross Red Crescent organizations; the figure for 2011 is a preliminary projection based on shares of private funding reported to UN OCHA FTS.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data, annual reports and Development Initiatives’ own research.

Figure 6.8 Humanitarian funding – poverty, crisis vulnerability and forced displacement, 2001-2010

Note: The number of people living on less than US$ 1.25/day is expressed in the latest available year.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, OCHA FTS, World Bank, CRED EM DAT, UNHCR, UNRWA, Uppsala Conflict Data and SIPRI multilateral peacekeeping operations data.
of total humanitarian aid; it is also host to some 4 million refugees, has a fifth of its population living on less than US$ 1.5/day and counts 38 million disaster-affected inhabitants.

Record funding levels still fall short of assessed need. UNHCR’s largest ever volume of voluntary contributions of US$ 2 billion in 2011 covered only 55 per cent of needs identified by its Global Needs Assessment (UNHCR, 2012). Despite multi-billion dollars in aid for forced migrants, the international humanitarian system is overstretched and economic conditions mean some DAC donors are reducing aid budgets and facing increased pressure to justify them (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011).

**Funding trends and innovations**

Total ODA channelled via UNHCR, UNRWA and IOM has increased by 76.4 per cent in the last five years (see Figure 6.9). However, this is mainly due to bilateral ODA contributions more than doubling for each agency. Multilateral ODA to UNHCR has grown in real terms by a more modest 15 per cent and to UNRWA by 18 per cent.

To counter continued aid shortfalls despite rising levels of funding, donors have focused not just on greater quantities but on better targeted funding through ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ (GHD) and pooled funds. Since its launch in 2003, GHD has been endorsed by 37 donors and is closely linked to the UN-led humanitarian reform processes and the current Transformative Agenda (see Chapter 7). GHD does not specifically focus on displacement issues. However, its four interlocking elements – financing (increased quantity, quality, predictability and timeliness), strengthening leadership, coordination (through clusters) and needs-based decision-making – are applicable to situations of forced migration.
Pooled funds are increasingly used to finance humanitarian activities. These combine donors’ contributions in mechanisms such as the global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-based Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). These are often managed by the UN or World Bank, which then make disbursements according to agreed criteria. Agencies such as UNHCR also receive contributions from multi-partner trusts such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund and One UN funds (UNDP, 2012).

Evaluations have shown that pooled funds can increase funding speed and appropriateness by greater prioritization and country-level decision-making (via clusters and the humanitarian country team) and speeding up the transfer of funds (OCHA, 2011).

Pooled funds received contributions totalling more than US$ 1 billion in 2011, of which CERF received almost half. One-fifth of 2011 contributions went to IOM, UNHCR or UNRWA. Contributions to other UN agencies and NGOs are not reported in a way that makes disaggregation of funding for displaced people straightforward, but pooled funds clearly make a significant and increasing contribution to forced displacement situations.

CERF, the largest humanitarian pooled fund, was launched in December 2005 as one of the IASC’s Humanitarian Reform Process’ three pillars (the other two were the Cluster Approach and the Humanitarian Coordinators System, discussed in Chapter 7). Now supported by 126 of the UN’s 193 members, it exceeded its annual fundraising target (US$ 450 million) and disbursed nearly US$ 0.5 billion in 2011. It aims explicitly to fund neglected or underfunded crises and situations requiring a rapid response. One-third of CERF 2011 funding went to the Horn of Africa drought and one-third (US$ 144 million) to support refugees and IDPs, with more than 20 per cent for UNHCR, IOM and UNRWA together (CERF, 2011).

Smaller pooled funds have been launched at country level for major crises. Five CHFs have been established in Central African Republic, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Smaller ERFs are found in 12 countries. CHFs and ERFs are important funding channels for international and national NGOs as key implementers.

DAC constitutes the principal funding source for displaced populations’ humanitarian assistance. However, funding streams are increasingly diverse, including non-DAC donors and private funding sources, corporate donors, trusts, foundations and private individuals (ALNAP, 2010). UNHCR’s record 2011 budget reflects this, with more than US$ 2 billion in voluntary contributions, including increasing amounts from corporate partnerships. The World Bank is now a significant player and by 2009 had undertaken 94 activities addressing forced displacement, 50 per cent of which dealt with restoring or enhancing livelihoods (World Bank, 2009). How some newly emerging donors are changing humanitarian funding is explored in Box 6.1.
Humanitarian assistance has long been considered an enterprise dominated by Western nations, particularly by OECD DAC members. That picture is changing, as aid from countries not part of this ‘traditional’ donor community and from private sources has been increasing in recent years. A major source of such funding comes from governments in Islamic countries. In 2010, Saudi Arabia was the largest donor, providing US$ 433 million, and the United Arab Emirates the second largest with US$ 272 million (Al-Yahya and Fustier, 2011; UAE, 2011). These countries are not new donor nations – they have been giving significant levels of aid since at least the 1970s – but historically their assistance has been directed almost exclusively at countries with which they have regional, religious or cultural ties. Major recipients have included Pakistan, Palestine and Yemen. Recently they have begun contributing more to countries and agencies with which they have fewer direct ties. In 2009 Saudi Arabia gave US$ 50 million to the Haiti earthquake response, nearly US$ 60 million to the Somalia famine appeal in 2011 and, in 2008, US$ 500 million – the largest bilateral donation ever – to the World Food Programme. Other important bilateral donors of humanitarian relief include China, India, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey (FTS, 2012).

With some important exceptions, most funding from non-DAC donors is channelled through NGOs rather than UN agencies. National Red Cross Red Crescent Societies are often enlisted to deliver relief aid, in partnership with the IFRC, particularly where the donor country does not have an operational presence. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, formerly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), the world’s second largest international organization, coordinates many of these donors’ efforts. In 2011, contributions to the Somalia food insecurity response channelled through the OIC totalled US$ 350 million (FTS, 2012).

Humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors is welcomed by many recipient countries which see it as coming from more sympathetic sources or with fewer strings attached. However, some operational agencies have expressed concern about the need for better coordination and technical capacity to maximize the effectiveness of the aid given.

Funding from private sources is also growing in significance. In response to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, an estimated US$ 3.9 billion in private funds was raised. As a share of global humanitarian response, private funding has increased from 17 per cent in 2006 to 32 per cent, or at least US$ 5.8 billion, in 2010 (Stoianova, 2012). Private funding has been sustained even in the face of the current global economic downturn. Like the non-DAC donors, private sources tend to channel their funds through NGOs more than through UN agencies. These funds include small monthly contributions from members of the public as well as large endowments from philanthropic organizations which can total more than US$ 1 billion a year (as with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Credit Suisse Group). Private funds are an important source of income for Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies, with 68 per cent of their total income deriving from private sources (Stoianova, 2012).
Funding challenges
While these innovations have contributed to improving humanitarian financing for displaced populations in general, a number of challenges remain.

Firstly, funding for displaced people is still in many cases below levels appealed for by UNHCR and other organizations. While this may reflect overly ambitious targets, gaps in response are clearly observed in most displacement situations, in part due to funding shortages or delays. For example, the poor funding response to the 2010 Iraq appeal...
had a profound effect on the ability to support the displaced. Funding levels between different crises also vary widely – in contrast to Iraq, the Libya appeal (in which most of the needs related to displacement) was the second best-funded appeal in 2011.

Secondly, an important focus of humanitarian reform has been to improve the evidence base for resource allocation through better and coordinated needs assessments such as IASC’s Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) multi-cluster rapid assessment approach (IASC, 2012) and related initiatives. Developing appropriate tools has significant funding implications because correctly assessing and measuring the numbers of displaced people has a clear impact on the financial resources required and received. This challenges the practice of allocating resources according to needs assessments rather than other priorities. For example camps, where numbers of people are easier to count, tend to be better funded than non-camp situations.

Thirdly, the cluster system has led to strengthening sectoral coordination in emergencies (GPPI/Groupe URD, 2009). But weaknesses in overall coordination and the problematic division of responsibility for refugees and IDPs (see Chapter 7) make it difficult to assess actual funding and how best to fund integrated, area-based programmes for the displaced. This is also a weakness of pooled humanitarian funds, which tend to take a strongly sectoral basis for allocating funding (see Figure 6.6) (OCHA, 2011).

Fourthly, this chapter has provided an innovative account of humanitarian funding for forced migration. But there is a need to improve data collection, enhance financial tracking related to specific codes for displacement, and develop more rigorous methodologies that will improve programming and funding decisions. For example, the analysis in this chapter only relates to DAC funding, not to domestic expenditure by countries hosting refugees and IDPs nor non-DAC expenditure by NGOs. These expenditures would add significantly to the total.

**Box 6.2 Notes on terminology and methodology**

*Humanitarian aid* is the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid are that it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and to be ‘short term’ in nature and provide for activities in the ‘immediate aftermath’ of a disaster. In practice it is often difficult to say where ‘during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies’ ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability.
Caveats: The methodology depends on analysing funding data that are not consistent or comprehensive. Because they are not tracked to a similar degree as population data, it is hard to highlight gaps and identify trends.

Official development assistance (ODA): ODA is a grant or loan from an ‘official’ source to a developing country (defined by the OECD) or multilateral agency (defined by the OECD) for the promotion of economic development and welfare. It is reported by members of the DAC, along with several other government donors and institutions, according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty-reducing development assistance (for sectors such as governance and security, growth, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation).

Methodology to calculate funding to support displaced populations: There is no specific category within OECD DAC statistics which identifies activities supporting displaced populations. We have relied, therefore, on a forensic method to distinguish funding which is clearly identifiable, either by the mandate of the organization programming assistance or by the description of project activities, as benefiting displaced populations. Clearly, this will underrepresent the total ODA expenditure for displaced people as it discounts organizations and activities which do not directly refer to support for displaced people. The building blocks of this analysis are:

- Funding channelled through multilateral agencies which have a specific mandate to provide assistance and protection to displaced people, namely UNHCR, UNRWA and IOM.
- Support channelled via other organizations which report activities with clearly identifiable support for displaced populations. To extract this data, a macro was applied to project descriptions in the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) to pull out projects listing key search terms relating to displacement (including refugees, displacement, IDPs).

Note that as per the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme methodology for calculating total official humanitarian aid, we assume that all expenditure by UNHCR and UNRWA is humanitarian. All of our OECD DAC analysis is presented in constant 2010 prices.

The methods for calculating ODA support from donors and to recipient countries are slightly different, as described below.

ODA funds from government donors: Governments fund multilateral organizations both bilaterally and through core unearmarked ODA contributions for those agencies to spend at their discretion. The total outflows of a donor are, therefore, the sum of their unearmarked contributions to multilateral agencies plus their bilateral disbursements to all other first-level recipients of ODA.

In order to calculate each donor’s total outflows we add the sum of:
- Multilateral ODA to UNHCR and UNRWA reported to DAC Table 1
- Support to refugees in donor countries reported to DAC Table 1
- Bilateral support to displaced populations reported to the CRS and identified as supporting displaced populations either by channel of delivery (bilateral support to UNHCR, UNRWA and IOM) or where the project description clearly describes activities supporting displaced people.

ODA funds to recipient countries: ODA funds to recipient countries are the sum of bilateral disbursements from donors and multilateral agencies (which disburse and programme core unearmarked funds received...
Finally, displacement due to conflict or disaster is a regular occurrence and symptomatic of underlying development and governance challenges in affected and neighbouring countries. Here, humanitarian funding remains the primary tool, despite humanitarian programming’s short timescale and inability to address underlying drivers. This raises two fundamental questions. How to ensure a focus on the specific needs of the forcibly displaced without privileging them over others? How to mobilize solutions such as longer-term development funding and integrated development approaches addressing the needs of displaced people and local communities? These questions are addressed in third section.

**Livelihood impacts for forced migrants**

This section analyses economic and funding issues at the micro level – the local economy and livelihoods of forcibly displaced people.

Migration is often a response to disruptions or threats to livelihoods. If, due to conflict, lack of security, disaster, the impacts of development projects or an oppressive political system, farmers cannot access their land or workers earn an income at their jobs, they may well move to where they will find work and physical and legal protection.

Livelihoods may be defined as access to assets that allow individuals or communities to meet their basic short- and longer-term needs. Livelihoods activities include earning a living, but also access to property and natural resources, systems of savings, social networks and education, which help people respond to shocks. Displacement-inducing conflict and disasters are basically assaults on livelihood systems which make staying in place untenable. Vulnerability and the imperative to move are not caused only by direct attacks on people, but by the deprivation caused by war and the destruction of social networks, so crucial for survival. Conversely, the livelihoods of ‘forcibly immobile’ people are often most threatened; they are already so vulnerable that they...
cannot move but if they remain behind, their vulnerability – in an increasingly insecure environment – is accentuated (Lubkemann, 2008).

Responding to migration as a ‘crisis’ often restricts the migrants’ movement, employment and access to basic services and rights, ultimately constraining their ability to pursue livelihood options. It is not sufficient to focus solely on saving lives and consider livelihood support only when the situation has stabilized, especially in protracted displacement. Even in emergencies, the displaced continue striving to protect and recover their livelihood activities and adapting to new circumstances.

Once displaced, people must quickly find ways to access enough food, shelter, water and health care to survive. International assistance tends to focus on these kinds of needs. However, no assistance package ever provides everything that people need, so they require cash for other items and services, such as providing support to relatives who have remained behind to safeguard property, schooling for their children and locating separated family members.

Men are frequently absent in many displaced communities, and women, particularly female-headed households, are disproportionately represented. Women become their household’s main breadwinners but this does not necessarily enhance their economic power (Zetter et al., forthcoming; see also Box 4.1). Lacking social, political and
economic power, they are often vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, not least in their own households. For their own and their family’s short-term benefit, they may have to engage in livelihood activities that are dangerous (e.g. commercial sex work or forced and exploitative labour) or unsustainable (excessive charcoal production, harvesting of scarce timber products, etc.). Smugglers and traffickers also prey on women and children in such situations, luring them with promises of employment or assistance only to dump them into exceedingly dangerous living and working conditions.

Yet displacement situations can be liberating for women. They often receive assistance rather than men, and deliberate efforts are made to enhance their status and include them in consultation processes. But it also can have negative impacts. Men may become idle and resentful about their undermined authority, which can lead to increased domestic or other gender-based violence. On return, women sometimes lose the power they gained as gender roles revert to more traditional norms.

Unable to move and work freely, many forced migrants have found ways of surviving in the informal sectors. In some cases, this has been very successful, such as some (but not all) of the Somali traders in Nairobi, who have created a ‘mini Mogadishu’ in the Eastleigh neighbourhood (Abdulsamed, 2011). For some observers, such situations prove that urban self-settlement works and they use them to advocate for a relaxation of movement and labour restrictions.

While these achievements are impressive, they should not obscure the migrants’ undocumented and often illegal status. They may be arrested, detained or expelled without notice; their businesses raided or closed down. Others may extort or blackmail them, threatening to denounce them to the authorities unless they comply. Informal-sector work is often unprotected, underpaid and exploitative. The displaced may become stateless, legally existing nowhere and having no recourse when they are in need. Urban refugees and IDPs need protection to help them pursue livelihood opportunities without harassment (see Chapter 4).

Settling displaced populations in rural areas where they can support themselves through agriculture can be successful. Zambia allowed Angolan refugees to settle on farms during the 1980s and 1990s such that they no longer required international assistance (Bakewell, 2000). However, in many cases, self-settled displaced have been unable to access adequate water, firewood and agricultural land, and are not authorized to work or travel. As a result their livelihoods have remained precarious.

Certain assumptions by those providing protection and assistance make delivering effective livelihood support difficult. They often assume that the displaced population’s systems have broken down, that people are helpless or that the situation closely resembles that of pre-displacement. They often cannot see what people did or are doing to help themselves before, during and after migration and upon return, if that is
ever possible. Aid programmed without considering the potential impacts on the local economy may disrupt local markets or labour dynamics.

The displaced try to maximize whatever work opportunities may arise. Skilled migrants may bring their tools with them in order to work wherever they settle; others may learn new trades. Some aid agencies and governments interpret as system abuse the creative survival strategies (registering for multiple ration cards, selling a portion of food rations, moving between camps and urban settings or areas of origin) used by migrants to overcome badly targeted, irregular or inadequate assistance. However, if the displaced did not pursue these strategies, they might be even more at risk (Kibreab, 2004; Hammond, Bush and Harvey, 2005). In low-income countries hosting large displaced populations, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, hosts may seek to register as refugees. These governments, with UNHCR and IOM, are developing programmes to improve the working conditions of both refugee and host populations (ILO, 2012).

In some cases a diaspora exists to whom the displaced can appeal for assistance. Somali and Liberian refugees in camps, for example, call on relatives living abroad, many of whom were themselves once camp residents, to provide remittance support (Horst, 2007; Omata, 2011). This support can help to fill a gap when the displaced are unable to make ends meet either with or without assistance. But relying on diaspora support may undermine resilience by making recipients dependent on a resource over which they have little if any control. Many diaspora relatives feel compelled to help, but their own situation may oblige them to reduce or suspend payments (Zimmermann and Zetter, 2011). Diasporas may also exert political influence – positive or negative – in the country of origin, helping or hindering a political solution that might facilitate return (Mandaville and Lyons, 2012). Sahrawi refugees also use transnational links to improve their livelihoods by seeking sponsors abroad to facilitate their ‘educational migration’ to Spain and Cuba (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011).

Host countries are often reluctant to relax restrictions on the displaced, despite evidence of its beneficial effect, and may fear their increased economic power. In Nairobi and Peshawar (Pakistan), there is considerable public resentment against refugees who are seen to be ‘stealing’ jobs, driving up rents and draining public service budgets (World Bank, 2010). Host countries may also fear internal destabilization if the conflict causing the displacement spills over into their own country. They therefore prefer to keep refugees in remote camps far from urban centres where interaction with the local population is limited, they can be strongly policed and they can exert minimal political and/or economic influence. Despite this, refugee camps still provide fertile ground for recruitment and militarization (Milner, 2011; Zolberg et al., 1989).

Despite host country resistance, refugees usually find ways of integrating into the host economy, especially when they have ethnic ties to the local community and when they
are in protracted displacement. That they contribute to the host economy is often recognized only after they have left. In Pakistan, Afghan refugees ran the local transport sector and their repatriation in the early 2000s led to its collapse. Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camps make a substantial positive contribution to the local host economy (see Box 6.3). Enhancing these outcomes requires humanitarian actors to move beyond a

Box 6.3 Host community impacts from the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya

For more than 20 years, the Dadaab refugee camp complex in north-eastern Kenya has been the main refugee operation in the Horn of Africa and one of the biggest in the world. In June 2012 it officially accommodated some 420,000, predominantly Somali, refugees (RMMS, 2012).

Knowledge of the social, economic and environmental impacts of the camp complex on surrounding areas for long remained scanty and largely anecdotal. To facilitate more informed decision-making in addressing host community issues, the Kenya government’s Department of Refugee Affairs commissioned a study of the camps’ impacts. The study took place from January to May 2010 with support from the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Nairobi (Government of Kenya, 2010). Although much has changed in the last two years, the study is significant because it is one of the few that tries to analyse the economic impacts of a refugee camp.

Some study results ran counter to established views on the situation in the area. Overall, the findings painted a picture of significant economic opportunities created by the camp and of the intricate linkages developed between host and displaced communities.

The study first identified a 50-kilometre radius (9,600 square kilometres) of routine interaction between the camps and host communities for in-depth impact analysis. This arid area spans three districts and is inhabited by Somali pastoralists. It is considered, by many standards, remote, isolated and sparsely populated. However, the study found that the area’s population had grown from 10,000 people in 1989 to at least 148,000 people in 2010. Since 1999, the annual growth rate has been 11.7 per cent, driven mainly by in-migration from other ethnic Somali areas of Kenya. The area around the camps has proved to be a significant magnet. At least 40,500 host community members (27 per cent) are estimated to hold refugee ration cards including people originally from the host area and others who are not refugees but have migrated in from elsewhere in Kenya, primarily to seek a better livelihood.

The study assessed the total economic benefits of the camps and related operations for the host community in 2010 to be around US$ 14 million. On a per-capita basis this equates to around 25 per cent of the average annual per capita income in North Eastern Province, indicating the camps’ positive impact on the standard of living of the host communities.

Host community livelihoods are overwhelmingly pastoral. Many households sell livestock products to the camps. The number of livestock owned by the host community is very high compared to other pastoral areas and was, contrary to previous reports, many times more than the refugee-owned livestock. The study estimated an annual income of US$ 3 million
accruing to the host community from livestock and milk sales to the camps. The price of basic commodities such as maize, rice, wheat, sugar and cooking oil is at least 20 per cent lower in the camps than in other towns in arid and semi-arid parts of Kenya. The main reasons are the resale of food aid, access to free food by locals registered as refugees and illegal imports via Somalia. The lower food prices result in a total annual saving on food purchase in the host area estimated at US$ 1.7 million while the estimated annual value of refugee food rations received by the host community is US$ 4.9 million.

Wholesalers inside the refugee camps import commodities such as sugar, powdered milk, pasta, fruit drinks and upmarket consumer goods via Somalia. Prices of smuggled goods are cheaper in Dadaab than elsewhere in Kenya. There are around 5,000 businesses in the camps ranging from petty traders to large shops trading in all kinds of goods. Annual turnover of camp-based businesses is estimated to be around US$ 25 million. Between 600 and 750 local people have fixed employment related to the refugee operation and an additional 500 trade-related jobs have been created in host communities. Local wages for unskilled labour are 50 to 75 per cent higher in Dadaab than in other comparable parts of Kenya. The Dadaab camps have become a major trading hub and the economic activity of the area can easily compare to other big Kenyan towns.

Most funds flowing into the Dadaab area come from donor agencies supporting the refugee operation, the cost of which was some US$ 100 million in 2010. Direct support for host community initiatives such as water, schools and clinics rose to US$ 5.5 million in 2010, and most host community members report improved access to education facilities, transport services and water since the camps were established.

Among negative impacts, the study found that within the area studied there has been a general trend of environmental degradation since the early 1990s, visible through decreasing tree cover and spread of unpalatable grasses. Reduced access to wood resources and increased competition for grazing lands negatively affect livelihoods among the host community.

On balance, impacts from the camps are creating opportunities in the area, which, for the host community, far outweigh the camps’ negative environmental impacts. Looking ahead, the study recommended that support to host communities should focus more on developing pastoral production and should be better tailored to the presence of refugees and the associated humanitarian operations. The refugee camp will not close down tomorrow, and this needs to be reflected in the support to the host communities. Humanitarian agencies should develop longer-term planning and financing horizons for this kind of protracted crisis. An overall area development strategy is required, focusing on encouraging viable livelihoods among the host community with better coordination of support from government, and development and humanitarian agencies. In light of the major development opportunities in the area offered by the camps’ presence, efforts should be made to direct support to host communities through an agency specifically mandated to develop the host area.
Good livelihood programming builds on displaced people’s resilience and complements the efforts they are making to adapt to their situation. It may include providing cash support so that people can access local markets or start small businesses (see Box 6.4 and IFRC, 2007). It may also involve protection so that women can travel outside their camp or settlement to find water, firewood or other resources to sell, or adapting the assistance they receive so that they no longer need to take such risks. In Darfur, for example, ICRC shifted from providing beans to lentils, which can

**Box 6.4 Aid is dead: long live the market?**

There are many drivers behind the exponential growth in the use of cash and vouchers in emergency relief in the past decade. Cash offers choice, accepting that people have different needs. Cash and vouchers may support local markets, which in-kind aid is feared to undermine, and they are usually a more cost-effective way of delivering people assistance, especially with recent technological advances for data collection, management and money transfer. These advances also made it possible to use cash widely for emergency relief in Somalia in 2011, where access issues made food aid impossible. The IFRC has been funded by ECHO in the Cash Learning Project, which aims to enhance partners’ capacity and learning on cash support.

Though in-kind aid still dominates international assistance (Development Initiatives, 2012), cash is more widely used for supporting IDPs than refugees. This is not for technical reasons. Refugee camps perhaps encourage outdated paternalistic preconceptions about aid (e.g., that there are no markets in camps). Aid in-kind (‘meeting people’s needs’) is often perceived differently from offering cash (‘giving a hand-out’); however irrational, this may make host governments more uneasy about offering cash to refugees than to IDPs, and NGOs may have less freedom working with refugees. These perceptions also have a positive side.

Widespread use of cash for long-term social protection, including for the displaced (e.g., by UNRWA in Palestine), has blurred the distinction with emergency relief. In protracted displacement, this may encourage perceiving a development challenge as well as a humanitarian case-load. When used, cash has enabled refugees to be treated more like others (e.g., in the United Kingdom). In contrast to refugee assistance, support to IDPs has sometimes been able to downplay their political status, targeting them due to their requirements for material assistance. In Somalia, IDPs were among the millions of recipients of emergency cash relief in response to the food security crisis. In eastern DRC, a UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)-supported voucher programme reaches both IDPs and their hosts. Large cash-grant programmes have been used for IDPs in countries where existing social welfare mechanisms offer similar support for the poor, e.g., in the United States after Hurricane Katrina and in post-tsunami Sri Lanka.

Residual scepticism, even hostility, to ‘free cash’ has meant that cash interventions have been very widely evaluated. Evidence for these common fears are rare: control mechanisms have worked, significant inflation is not caused and people use the money like everyone who has little, i.e., wisely enough to meet a variety of needs and plans (Harvey and Bailey,
Recipients usually prefer cash to in-kind assistance for the expected reasons – they can choose what to buy.

Cash has proved an excellent replacement for in-kind assistance to displaced households. It may also help support the development of markets and local economies among displaced and returning communities, but more economic impact studies are still needed (as in non-displacement contexts). Household-level evidence shows cash and vouchers have successfully addressed a range of problems, including some market failures. Where essential items were not available in markets, cash and vouchers created a sizeable and predictable demand, to which markets responded. The UNICEF programme in DRC gave vouchers to IDPs, which they exchanged at specially organized fairs for many different combinations of goods, from household items to fishing nets and bicycle parts. In Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camps, Save the Children found that a lack of fresh vegetables in diets, due to a limited and expensive supply, caused malnutrition. They helped reduce this by transforming diets – and the supply of vegetables – with vouchers redeemable only for fresh foods (Bailey and Hedlund, 2012). Where market supply can increase to meet a predictable demand, cash and near-cash interventions are successfully, if slowly, displacing other assistance modalities.

Reconstruction following displacement is increasingly being supported through quasi-community cash grants, e.g., in World Bank-funded community-based reconstruction. In many countries, money is made available to communities, which choose their preferred investment and manage its implementation. This extension of cash grants is problematic. Household grants rely on individuals making rational choices and on markets as a vehicle for meeting the resulting demand. Community grants rely on institutional processes for choosing ‘projects’: the mechanisms by which choices are made cannot be equated to household decision-making. There is a dearth of evidence on how displaced or returning populations make ‘community’ decisions, how power relations and authority are (re)constituted or how aid resources affect conflicts of interest and competition for authority. If social reconstruction in displacement is as important as economic rehabilitation, this is a serious gap in understanding. Such projects often claim successes with no evidence beyond output completion (Levine, forthcoming).

Caution is thus needed before declaring the end of aid for the displaced. Cash and vouchers have usually proved better than in-kind aid for meeting household needs, and the growth in their use should accelerate. However, the displaced also face non-economic limitations. Even livelihood constraints may be caused not by lack of material resources but by restrictions, for example, to freedom of movement, discrimination, protection threats and lack of social networks, papers and appropriate skills (Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2010).

The ubiquitous language of ‘needs assessment’, and an assumption that aid is about filling ‘needs gaps’, distracts attention from the importance of fully analysing problems in their context. Only then may cash appear a panacea – rather than as one of a range of tools to be used after analysis and within a coherent strategy. The use of cash, particularly community grants, may encourage the justification that problem analysis is not needed, since if people have cash, they can be made responsible for their own analysis and solutions.

This would be a dereliction of duty. Cash may soon kill off in-kind aid, but the need for more sophisticated forms of assistance remains alive and well.
be cooked faster and with less water, so as to reduce the number of trips displaced women needed to make to gather these resources. In DRC, the Danish Refugee Council helps women who are at risk and survivors of gender-based violence to start small businesses.

Livelihood support for forced migrants must start from the basic premise that they are always, even in extreme circumstances, striving to protect or strengthen their livelihoods. To improve people’s livelihood options and strengthen their resilience requires examining how displacement (including the factors that caused it) has affected livelihoods and how people respond without any assistance, and then generally taking a longer-term approach to supporting the displaced. Overall, development plans must integrate livelihood support for forced migrants (IDMC, 2012), including, for example, helping people to return to their area of origin if safe and move safely in the host country, finding new forms of employment, accessing educational, health and social services, and finding ways to protect and enhance community cohesion. The Women’s Refugee Commission (2009) and ICRC (2009) have developed practical guides for developing livelihood support for the displaced. The British Red Cross’ Household Economic Security teams have been providing livelihoods assistance to IDPs and disaster-affected people in countries including Angola, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

**Box 6.5 Managing risks in relation to migration**

Risk financing – proactively anticipating risks and developing tools for reducing financial exposure to disaster and forced migration risks – can significantly strengthen coping mechanisms and reduce the environmental stresses to which individuals and communities are exposed. This may not reduce the longer-term drivers of forced migration, but may enable more effective migration strategies and more effective solutions for the individuals and communities involved.

The Asian Development Bank (2012) outlined a variety of factors influencing the cost of migration, including: permanency of relocation; cause or purpose of relocation; resources available to migrants; infrastructure; governmental and organizational structures; special requirements (medical, children, orphans, widows, etc.); number of people migrating together; and local economic conditions.

Displaced populations, the communities they leave and those to which they move bear these costs, which may be direct or indirect (ADB, 2012). Migration exposes individuals, households, and communities to new risks which must be effectively managed to avoid recreating vulnerability. The extent to which migration outcomes are successful from an economic standpoint depends largely on the abilities of migrants to maintain livelihood opportunities, of host communities to absorb migrants productively into their economies, and of source communities to adjust constructively to the outflow of migrants.

Risk financing can smooth transitions and increase predictability in the face of changing
conditions by helping individuals, households and communities to ‘buy down’ and manage risk in combination with other risk reduction strategies.

Local governments are increasingly using risk financing to insure public assets and provide access to disaster relief and response funds. The government of Mexico has long been an innovator in this area, using a mix of reserves, reinsurance and catastrophe bonds to cover national disaster risk financing needs and is increasingly extending them to state and local governments. Local governments in other parts of the world are also establishing disaster risk financing solutions (World Bank, 2011a). By increasing local government access to post-disaster funding, risk financing can help both source and host communities to increase resilience, maintain services and better respond to the needs of the displaced.

Risk financing can also strengthen the performance of safety nets and social protection services. In 2006, the World Food Programme and the Ethiopian government developed an insurance cover against drought risk for 6.7 million people taking part of the
government’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Drought insurance was purchased from AXA Re to enable drought-affected families to receive increased assistance under the PSNP. No event triggered the insurance under the policy term (one season) and coverage was not renewed, due to staff turnover and changes in institutional priorities. However, a number of organizations have explored the potential use of this type of insurance to reduce funding uncertainty and strengthen coping strategies.

Efforts are also under way to improve the capacities of countries to access disaster risk financing. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility is a risk-pooling initiative developed with World Bank and donor support, but now owned and operated by Caribbean governments. It permits access to affordable insurance coverage against earthquake, hurricane and flood risk, and to funding to address the needs of disaster-affected people. Third-party insurance programmes have also been proposed to indemnify low- and middle-income countries against climate change impacts including migration, with premiums paid by greenhouse gas emitters as a form of climate change compensation.

For individuals and households, current risk financing for migration operates principally through existing insurance policies covering damage from extreme events to household assets and livelihoods (ADB, 2012). Access to formal insurance in many poor communities is quite low, but a growing number of programmes aim at providing them with insurance cover, particularly against weather-related crop risk. These so-called ‘microinsurance’ programmes use innovative data collection, event verification and payment schemes to reduce costs and increase access by the poor. Microinsurance can offer effective risk protection to poor families: post-disaster insurance payouts can provide households with enough money to cushion them against adversity and facilitate their rebuilding and recovery, at home or elsewhere. This helps protect asset accumulation and development gains (Rockefeller Foundation and FSD Kenya, 2010). Pre-disaster disaster risk financing can help households hedge risks as they test new livelihood strategies. A classic example is the use of crop insurance to reduce the risks to farmers trying new seed varieties to adjust to climate variations in Malawi (Micro Insurance Agency, 2006).

Refugee health insurance is another example of innovations in risk management where UNHCR is working with governments and partners such as ECHO (UNHCR, 2012a). In Iran more than 250,000 Afghan refugees are now receiving health insurance.

Demand for risk financing is significantly affected by limited levels of trust or understanding of the insurance product, household liquidity constraints and pricing inefficiencies (Cole et al., 2009). So there is still significant opportunity for innovation to enhance understanding of risk financing and strengthen its effectiveness and relevance for vulnerable individuals and households.

Risk financing offers a range of potential interventions to improve resilience, coping strategies and transitions for vulnerable communities. As a financial service, it can provide a unique layer of protection – at household, community and national levels – to complement physical and social preparedness. Yet while access to some types of insurance, crop insurance in particular, continues to grow, greater research and innovation are needed to catalyse wider use of risk financing to strengthen migration outcomes and enhance resilience.
The criterion that makes a displacement solution ‘durable’ is often the degree to which the livelihoods of the forced migrants are made sustainable. Where displacement is permanent, as with development- or environment-induced displacement, people should be compensated for the property and resources to which they have lost access. However, the cost of adequate compensation is rarely considered when populations are resettled. In cases of return, particularly after periods of protracted displacement, significant investment in infrastructure and human resources may be needed to help people recover their productivity. Again, however, reintegration costs are rarely adequately calculated in planning for return. The IFRC and Sri Lanka Red Cross Society are providing support to help people formerly displaced by conflict to reconstitute sustainable livelihoods following return (IFRC, 2012). Where such support is missing, people remain vulnerable to further displacement, food insecurity and continued destitution.

Displacement crises as development opportunities – a political-economy approach

Over many decades, displacement triggered by violence, conflict and disasters has been framed as a humanitarian crisis underscored by a funding regime whose vocabulary – ‘emergency funds’, ‘consolidated’ and ‘flash appeals’ – echoes this approach. But forced displacement is also a development challenge.

The negative impacts of refugees and IDPs are well documented: underutilized human and social capital of the displaced and their hosts; diminished economic growth; environmental degradation where the displaced are present; and political strains on already fragile and conflict-affected countries (see Jacobsen, 2002; Horn, 2010; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2009; Schmeidl, 2002). The public expenditure costs of Mozambican refugees in Malawi were estimated at US$ 9.4 million for 1988 and US$ 8.4 million for 1989 (Government of Malawi et al., 1990; Zetter, 1995). For the six countries most affected by the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis, the direct host country cost of humanitarian assistance ranged between US$ 52 and US$ 188 million (World Bank, 2011).

Conversely, displacement may also generate positive development (Alix-Garcia and Saah, 2008; Horst and Van Hear, 2002; Jacobsen, 2002, 2006; UNHCR, 2004, 2004a; Whitaker, 2002; Zetter, 1992). The economic activity of self-settled refugees and IDPs in urban areas is well recognized (see Box 4.1), but there is also potential in rural areas, such as Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp (see Box 6.3). Effects like these are often ignored and rarely promoted by current practice. After safeguarding their lives, refugees and IDPs’ main priority is to restore livelihoods (with or without humanitarian support) for their economic well-being, self-reliance, dignity and integrity.

While the gap between humanitarian and development action has long been acknowledged (Chapter 5; Crisp, 2003; Barnett and Weiss, 2008), finding economically
sustainable solutions and promoting longer-term development programmes for refu-
gees and their hosts constitute a significant challenge for three reasons.

Firstly, numerous initiatives have tried to overcome this gap, notably the Humanitarian Response Review’s early recovery cluster (see Chapter 7), reinforced by emphasis on post-crisis livelihood and economic recovery in IASC’s urban strategy (IASC, 2010). But the concept and practice of early recovery as a bridge to post-crisis development remain problematic, even in disaster contexts where displacement impacts are less complex than in situations of violence and conflict (CWGER, 2010; ERICAP, 2010).

Secondly, the developmental approach questions the humanitarian model’s primacy and the sustainability of funding predicated on short-term emergency response and early recovery, especially when the majority of the world’s forced migrants remain in protracted exile.

Thirdly, host countries and communities frequently view development strategies to increase the displaced populations’ economic power and well-being as a threat. Strategies that appear to protract displacement or lead to long-term settlement challenge their economic interests, domestic security and social stability, and immigration and citizenship regimes. Not surprisingly, economic discrimination against refugees is widespread. By contrast, the Tanzanian government’s granting of citizenship to long-settled Burundian refugees, albeit conditional, is a notable landmark.

**Promoting developmental responses**

Reframing humanitarian crises as developmental opportunities, with development programmes for displaced people and local communities, would contribute to economic recovery and growth from which both the displaced and their hosts would benefit. With the Transitional Solutions Initiative, the UN Development Programme and UNHCR are currently attempting to address livelihood and development concerns in areas hosting displaced people in ways that benefit both displaced and local communities (UNDP, UNHCR and World Bank, 2010).

Next, development strategies are needed that maximize use of the displaced populations’ skills, entrepreneurship and human and economic capital, by integrating them into the wider economy. Urban economies offer greater opportunities than rural areas to absorb displaced populations. This is why the displaced migrate to cities, despite poor environmental conditions and lack of access to humanitarian support. Their access to livelihoods should be promoted, or at least not prevented, by easing access to work permits and licences, and improving protection against threats of removal, refoulement, detention and harassment.

Direct programming and investment strategies are needed to stimulate the local economy. These include adopting multi-year operational programmes; supporting self-build
construction; promoting urban and peri-urban agriculture and making food supply chains and distribution systems sustainable, thus reducing food insecurity; promoting social protection and safety net approaches; developing resilience and disaster risk reduction strategies; and building on local capacities by leveraging local suppliers and contractors not corporate enterprises (IASC, 2010; ALNAP, 2009).

These development strategies must, of course, ensure gender and age sensitivity; use participatory approaches systematically; work with or through organizations that already understand the local situation; and design assistance programmes that support household initiatives to build ownership (IASC, 2010; ALNAP, 2009). These proposals also require much better data, gathered via poverty assessment and household and livelihood surveys of both displaced and host populations.

Many of these proposals are not new; rather, their combination emphasizes a comprehensive approach that has been insufficiently developed to date. What is new is the political–economy lens that focuses on both the economic tools and policies, and the profound political challenges that confront host governments, international actors and donors.

For host governments, the political challenge is perhaps the greater. It means recognizing the legitimate needs, legal rights and aspirations of displaced people. It means more flexible policies towards refugee and IDP settlement; relaxing attitudes to refugee mobility (internal and cross-border); and innovative approaches to refugee citizenship (see Chapter 7). And it means enhancing the government’s planning and operational capacity to address humanitarian and development dimensions of forced displacement.

**Box 6.6 Measuring economic impacts and costs of forced migration**

Forced displacement is a humanitarian crisis. As noted in this chapter, it also produces significant negative and positive developmental impacts and costs. But how can we measure these economic outcomes? Whereas sociologists and anthropologists have conducted hundreds of qualitative studies on refugee livelihoods, economists have been surprisingly reticent in analysing the impacts (Kuhlman, 1991, 2002; Czaika, 2009). Quantitative methods and hard empirical data are noticeable by their absence. Few studies look at the impacts on the host community. And donors rarely analyse the macro- and micro-economic and financial outcomes of their programme and project ‘investment’. With so little attention to appropriate methodologies and indicators, detailed assessment of the impacts and costs of forced displacement is a major gap in the humanitarian toolkit.

The World Bank (2012) has confronted this challenge. Its *Guidelines for Assessing*
The main task is then to operationalize the methodology in order to construct an overall socio-economic profile for each of the populations (the displaced, the hosts and from the country of origin) and the impacts of displacement on these profiles. Measurement of the changing levels of economic well-being over time, assessment of social change and household dynamics, and self-reliance and coping strategies are also important components of the profile. Various survey methods (such as random sample questionnaire surveys, key informant surveys and focus groups) and statistical tools are recommended to conduct the analysis.

A key feature of the Guidelines is a mixed methodology of quantitative and qualitative tools. It utilizes quantifiable indicators that can be ‘costed’, such as income and assets; but not all the impacts can be expressed in monetary terms. Thus qualitative indicators are used to determine the impacts of variables such as the reduction (or increase) in human security, the adoption of coping mechanisms and changing gender roles. This mixed methodology approach facilitates a holistic analysis of the different dimensions of impacts and costs, and their policy and programme implications.

The methodological tools are then used to assess the costs and impacts of humanitarian and development assistance and interventions by international agencies, donors and other actors. Evaluation of this kind is valuable because it provides the basis for assessing the potential success and opportunity costs of different ‘funding’ strategies adopted by these actors.

The Guidelines are not a decision-making tool: they do not indicate how the choice of policies and programmes should be made. Nevertheless, they address important policy
and operational demands of donors, humanitarian agencies and governments.

Their value is threefold. Firstly, as a programming and policy tool, they can enhance interventions that respond to the economic and livelihood needs of forced migrants and other populations affected by their presence. Secondly, they bridge the humanitarian-development ‘divide’, enabling policy-makers to link development programmes with more conventional humanitarian and emergency interventions to produce positive social and economic impacts that improve the longer-term situation of both the displaced and the host population. Finally, if time-series profiles can be developed, they have the potential to be an effective monitoring and evaluation tool.

For donors and international actors, overcoming the divisive impact of separate humanitarian and development funding streams would go a long way to harmonizing their operational and policy tools. This is essential if the well-being of forced migrants and their hosts are to be more effectively supported in the future. Moreover, since the international humanitarian and development funding regime is so instrumental to the response of countries hosting refuges and IDPs, removing this funding dichotomy might also go a long way to removing the understandable resistance they have to displaced populations. Establishing more rigorous ways of assessing the costs and impacts of forced migration would actively promote this synergy (Box 6.6).

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Forced migration and the humanitarian challenge: tackling the agenda

The complex nature of contemporary disasters and conflicts creates an enormous potential to uproot large numbers of people. Forced migration is now a global phenomenon presenting vast and costly challenges to governments, donors, international institutions and humanitarian actors. The number of forcibly displaced people and those at risk is increasing but so too is resistance by governments and their citizens, and this threatens the fundamental rights and protection needs of those forced to leave their homes.

What action is needed to tackle these challenges, strengthen responses and prepare for future forms of forced migration? This chapter reviews four dimensions: architecture of the humanitarian response; enhancing community-based responses; solving protracted displacement; and climate change and displacement.

Architecture of the humanitarian response

The consequences of forced migration and displacement pose unique challenges for managing humanitarian operations. The humanitarian system’s inability to address adequately the needs of displaced people in emergencies prompted the coordination reforms in 2005. Despite undeniable progress, the international response still fails to keep pace with the changing character of forced migration caused by conflict and disasters. The Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010 and, over a longer period, conflict and displacement in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, demonstrate that reform and adaptation remain necessary to reduce the risks of displacement and, where this occurs, to provide timely responses that meet the needs and aspirations of those affected.

Part of the problem is that no United Nations (UN) agency or programme is mandated to coordinate assistance for forced migrants (except for refugees). It is therefore harder to identify, monitor and target support. The humanitarian crises in the 1990s drew attention to IDPs’ special circumstances, revealing institutional deficits in the humanitarian system that left their needs unmet. The international agencies’ so-called ‘collaborative approach’ had consistently failed to coordinate humanitarian efforts for IDPs, resulting in dissatisfaction at the disparity between the assistance provided to refugees, handled by UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), and the ad hoc assistance afforded to IDPs (UNHCR, 2006).
But no single intergovernmental agency can handle the complex, diverse and interconnected needs and vulnerabilities of affected people, the mounting humanitarian challenges in urban settings or, often, the scale of forced displacement. These circumstances increasingly demand a multi-agency response.

Commissioned by the UN Emergency Response Coordinator and undertaken by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2005, the Humanitarian Response Review and in particular the design of the ‘Cluster Approach’ to coordination aimed to address these issues. Poor inter-agency performance in Darfur and other emergencies at the time propelled this reform.

The Cluster Approach attempted to ensure comprehensive, accountable coverage and coordination of the needs of all individuals affected by emergencies – an ambitious endeavour for an essentially anarchic system of independent agencies. It recognized key specialist sectors of humanitarian assistance, including camp coordination and camp management (CCCM), food security, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, water and sanitation/hygiene, and four other clusters. To ensure effective coordination, the reform process assigned an agency leadership responsibility over each cluster. Focal points in each cluster provide further specialist support. The problematic IDP mandate gap was not addressed satisfactorily. UNHCR was allocated cluster lead responsibility for protection, a responsibility disputed by many governments when it comes to protection in the case of disasters. Confusingly, CCCM was divided between UNHCR for conflict IDPs and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for disaster IDPs.

Seven years on, how has the system fared? Two formal evaluations found that, despite initial difficulties with the roll-out and continuing inconsistencies with its activation and implementation across different emergencies, the mechanism has had largely positive results. Specifically, it identified and subsequently reduced gaps in coverage and increased cohesion and effectiveness in service delivery by humanitarian actors (Steets et al., 2010; Stoddard et al., 2007).

Some criticisms persist, however. The system is seen as too process-oriented and not focused on achieving concrete outcomes (IASC, 2012), a conclusion evident after the Haiti earthquake where insufficient attention was given to coherent area-based responses as opposed to sector delivery. The cluster lead agencies have an uneven track record in deploying appropriate staff for leadership and facilitation roles, and the system has difficulty replicating the coordination mechanisms at all the necessary levels in-country, notably in urban areas and with local authorities (IASC, 2010; Taylor et al., forthcoming). The protection cluster, especially relevant to forced migrants, is consistently singled out as one of the least effective and least well-resourced. Indeed, UNHCR (2012) notes, the ICRC may be better placed to afford protection to civilians in conflict.
Although evaluations commend improvement of the protection cluster over the past few years, they also point to gaps in leadership and capacity, and the lack of joint advocacy strategies (Taylor et al., forthcoming). Another concern is that a reform largely designed to improve UN agencies’ performance insufficiently takes into account the capacities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), usually the operational partners for intergovernmental agencies in emergencies. However, NGO participation has been generally beneficial (e.g., Health Exchange, 2011).

Conversely, there has been good progress in needs assessment where the IASC’s Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) has developed *Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments in Humanitarian Crises* (IASC, 2012a) and is rolling out a multi-cluster rapid assessment approach, which is particularly relevant to situations of displacement due to their multi-sectoral nature. This reflects more concerted efforts across the NGO and UN communities to improve the quality of assessment, through the NATF and related initiatives such as the Assessment Capacities Project and the Joint IDP Profiling Service.

As the humanitarian system works to improve its response, the needs and numbers of forced migrants continue to grow with changing global conditions, such as climate change and population displacement. Moreover, the speed and effectiveness of response have lagged in proportion to the scale of the displaced. The three major emergencies of the past three years – the Haiti earthquake, Pakistan floods, and drought and conflict in the Horn of Africa – were all displacement crises to varying degrees. Each one strained the humanitarian system’s capacity to respond in a timely and well-coordinated manner. Criticism of slow and poorly coordinated response was most acute in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. In the Horn of Africa crisis, response was late, despite clear early warning forecasts in 2010 (ALNAP, 2011). In Pakistan, the response was marred by a slow ramp-up to emergency capacity and by continued coordination problems (Polastro et al., 2011).

The poor showing in these emergencies prompted the UN Emergency Response Coordinator and agency heads to reinvigorate and refine the reform process with a plan dubbed the ‘Transformative Agenda’. This aims to strengthen rapid deployment of effective operational leadership in major emergencies and streamline the cluster mechanisms for a lighter, more outcome-oriented structure (IASC, 2012). Yet, it makes little reference to the evolving role of governments in the system. The proliferation of national emergency legislation and newly established or strengthened coordinating structures for receiving and managing humanitarian assistance, such as National Disaster Management Authorities, has seen recipient governments engage much more meaningfully with the international aid system. In Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, clusters are predominantly led by national government authorities and, in the Philippines, they have been incorporated into national legislation. Some national authorities, however, have become frustrated with international actors’ perceived
failure to acknowledge their sovereign authority and capacities, resulting in a growing reluctance for some governments, particularly in the Asia–Pacific region, to officially request international aid through the system’s regular (Consolidated Appeal Process and Flash Appeal) channels.

If the international humanitarian system’s ‘transformation’ is being outstripped by developments in national ownership of disaster response, it is also at risk of being overtaken by the rising ‘resilience’ agenda as a potential solution to fill the relief-to-development gap discussed in Chapter 6.

At the same time as it seeks to address its shortcomings through the Transformative Agenda, the inter-agency community also recognizes the particular challenge of responding to emergencies in urban settings. This has led to the design of a strategy focusing on operational capacities to enhance multi-stakeholder coordination of humanitarian assistance in urban areas and to develop and apply humanitarian tools to address vulnerability and protection needs of urban populations including refugees and IDPs (IASC, 2010). Evidence from Haiti and Somalia indicates continuing shortcomings; for example, the complexity of Somalia’s urban warfare challenged the strategy’s scope and adaptability (Grünewald, 2012). But progress in training initiatives (IFRC and UNICEF, forthcoming) and coordination of responses to urban vulnerability (OCHA and UN-Habitat, 2012), in which the Kenya Red Cross Society is active, indicate ways in which IASC is addressing the urban agenda.

These current trends in international humanitarian action seem to point to three priority areas in assisting forced migrants and displaced populations.

The first is to ensure that the Transformative Agenda does not become too inward-looking, but rather incorporates the principle of close consultation and active partnership with regional, national and local authorities and NGOs. Partnership with recipient governments and their capacities for response delivery is critical for enabling migrants’ protection and care, particularly in urban emergency contexts where these populations and their needs are often obscured.

Secondly, partnerships, community engagement and consultation with the affected populations must all be strengthened in order to improve vulnerability assessment, better align humanitarian responses with existing resilience mechanisms and build on them for sustained life-saving interventions. The IASC urban strategy (2010) gave particular emphasis to this requirement.

Thirdly, international agencies individually must make the internal changes needed for effective governance of humanitarian assistance. Leadership, accountability and capacity for effective rapid response will require more than improved coordination mechanisms. It demands that agencies commit the internal resources, human and
financial, to fulfil their governance roles. Poor past performance in the protection and shelter clusters – both vital for displaced populations – should be seen as admonitory; the relevant agencies must be held accountable, for example, for dedicating appropriately skilled personnel to perform the cluster coordination functions at all levels. Prior experience with how displaced populations can fall through the cracks of the international aid system should serve to remind today’s aid providers that no agency can responsibly go it alone. Meeting the needs of forced migrants demands looking beyond agency interests to a broader and more encompassing governance of aid.

Much still needs to be done regarding comprehensive disaster risk reduction (DRR) work where population displacement is an issue. The need for adequate training is even more striking in countries where perceived low occurrence of hazards tends to be a justification for low awareness and preparedness.

“Use knowledge innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels,” advises Priority Action 3 of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), while Priority Action 5 recommends “Strengthen[ing] disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels” (UNISDR, 2005).

While significant efforts have been made to include DRR issues in formal school curricula in many disaster-prone countries, specific training concerning the impact of sudden and slow-onset disasters on population movements, including forced migration, for those involved in DRR still lags behind and often remains a blind spot.

DRR training workshops and activities are an important bridge between HFA’s Priority Actions 3 and 5. To be effective, training needs to be implemented on a systematic basis and should include a toolkit for all relevant stakeholders in charge of researching, planning, implementing and coordinating policies and projects to avoid or limit forced migration linked to disasters.

Such training needs to target not only affected populations but all concerned actors, identified according to their specific role. To obtain the greatest possible multiplier effect – a key element when dealing with disaster-induced forced migration – ‘secondary targets’ should be well defined at the outset. Local and national authorities, universities, faith-based organizations, associations (youth clubs, women’s groups, councils of elderly people), private companies and the media are at the heart of any ‘people-owned’ DRR training strategy – a terminology which might be more accurate than ‘community-based’. Successful DRR training would allow every individual and group participating to know on which risks to concentrate and how to promote prioritization of activities at their own level.

Over the last few years, discussions in international forums, including in the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations, have identified ‘missing links’ which should be at the top of the DRR training agenda:

- Local and national authorities should be involved regularly in training activities to get fully acquainted with relevant tools, including early warning systems and systematic use of World Meteorological Organization and national meteorological information.
There is a clearly identified gap with respect to reliable and compatible primary data on population movements related to disasters and climate change. Existing case studies, such as EACH-FOR (2007), are limited in scope and need to be scaled up to at least country, if not regional, level. Governments should make resources available to better understand the magnitude, directions and impacts of forced migration linked to disasters, particularly in ‘hotspots’.

A common repository of appropriate DRR, migration and displacement training activities and tools should be in place under the auspices of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and other partner agencies and NGOs.

Training sessions for policy-makers and parliamentarians should provide information and advice on existing legal instruments and regulations at national, bilateral or regional level. Although these legal texts were not designed specifically to deal with DRR and population movements, they could eventually be used or modified (expansion of their scope, increase in authorized numbers and duration) so that appropriate action could be undertaken without having to go through long and complex international negotiation processes (Burson and Boncour, 2010).

In any DRR, migration and displacement training strategies, better linkages between preparedness, emergency response, post-disaster assistance and sustainable development should be promoted and presented as a ‘mandatory continuum’. In this way, communities can remain in the localities where they belong and avoid as far as possible the forced displacement that usually accompanies disasters. A rights-based approach should be an overarching preoccupation. Some potential avenues for the implementation of successful and targeted trainings include:

- The involvement of a wide range of trainers with different but complementary skills and experience (disaster risk management, DRR, climate-change adaptation, ecosystems, environmental management, and migration and displacement, to name but a few).
- Careful selection of participants with an aim to gather policy-makers at local and national levels, academics and researchers, civil society representatives, community leaders, private companies with a strong corporate social responsibility focus and any other relevant group. This would allow for a real multiplier effect, in addition to training directly provided to affected populations and individuals.
- Pilot training sessions to validate the contents of practitioner–trainer handbooks with different modules based on available international expertise and inter-agency partnerships whenever relevant (such as IOM, 2012).
- Training to discuss key challenges and opportunities, including an overview of DRR and forced migration; better understanding of common terminology to set the ground for concerted action; specific activities to be conducted in a given context at local, regional and international levels; how to reach a mainstreamed approach of DRR in migration management; funding opportunities; channels and how to tackle them; and concrete examples of past activities to examine what works and what does not on a lessons-learned basis.
Enhancing community-based responses

The stereotype of displaced populations as victims passively dependent on humanitarian aid has been extensively challenged by academics, policy-makers and practitioners (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993; Crisp, 2006). As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 6, displaced people use their capabilities and resources to reduce vulnerability, strengthen community-level livelihoods and protect their families and communities. Humanitarian actors often fail to recognize and support these resources and aspirations, instead providing assistance which may undermine, rather than bolster, local capacity or run counter to real needs. It is essential to repeat and reinforce the message that partnership, participation and, above all, empowerment should come from within the displaced communities and not be imposed from above or outside.

Communities are often the first to respond in crisis situations, particularly – but not exclusively – in remote locations that are difficult to access. Affected communities use their local knowledge, skills and resources to mitigate the impacts of displacement and maintain their community’s resilience (IIED, 2011). The IFRC has identified six ‘building blocks’ for enhancing community resilience (IFRC, forthcoming):

- Being knowledgeable and able to learn new skills and build on past experiences.
- Being organized and capable of identifying problems, prioritizing and acting accordingly.
- Being connected with people outside the community (external actors, diaspora) who can provide assistance and goods when needed.
- Being able to manage, protect and maintain the community’s natural assets.
- Having strong infrastructure and service systems which the community can maintain and renovate.
- Having economic opportunities and the capacity to respond proactively to change.

That refugees and IDPs provide significant support to other forced migrants during their flight, in refugee and IDP camps or urban contexts, and during return and resettlement has been recognized in numerous studies (Dick, 2002, 2003; Jacobsen, 2005, 2006; Horst, 2006, 2008). Although social bonds and ties often change during displacement, the importance of social networks and collective solidarity does not diminish (Horst, 2006): indeed, pre-existing networks and support structures may be strengthened during and after displacement. This may include sharing knowledge, experience and skills when interacting with national and international actors in order to obtain humanitarian assistance.

Displaced people might share food and shelter with relatives and friends, engage in unpaid labour, enable purchases on credit or offer job opportunities (Kibreab, 1993; Horst, 2006). After Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, local communities worked together to rebuild destroyed houses in 18 villages, buying materials and building...
collectively so efficiently that reconstructing all of the houses cost one-seventh of the amount paid by external agencies (Archer and Boonyabancha, 2011).

Diasporas – individuals and groups resettled in other areas or in another country – frequently send remittances (Gale, 2006; Horst, 2007; Jansen, 2008). At least 10 to 15 per cent of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camp, for example, benefited directly from remittances sent by the diaspora (Horst, 2004). Up to 60 per cent of households in Kashmir and North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) relied on international remittances before the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. After the earthquake, these households appeared less vulnerable and their livelihoods more resilient as remittances were re-established (QaiyumSuleri and Savage, 2006).

Remittances may reinforce socio-economic differences and inequality during crises or displacement (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2012; Crivello and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010), but they can also strengthen and diversify livelihood strategies in camps and urban contexts following displacement (Horst, 2006) and within communities of origin following disasters. Since such crises often disrupt formal and informal remittance mechanisms, two main implications arise for emergency relief planning and implementation: firstly, affected people who rely on remittances may not necessarily be in less immediate need of assistance than others but secondly, restoring the flow of remittances may be effective in supporting livelihoods recovery (QaiyumSuleri and Savage, 2006).

Displaced households often survive by placing members inside and outside camps, in villages and cities, and across the global South and North. Families may decide that young children and the elderly should remain inside refugee or IDP camps, while youth and adults move elsewhere, in order to minimize risks and maximize access to food and non-food rations (Jacobsen, 2005, 2006; Horst, 2006). The advantages of mobility and the development of transnational networks have been extensively documented (Monsutti, 2008). In cases of climate-induced displacement, many African communities have developed knowledge and practices to adapt to prolonged periods of drought, including fragmenting and reuniting families and adjusting their livelihood strategies. Such decisions are based on information transmitted via existing social networks, and community- and experience-based social learning derived from earlier crisis episodes (World Bank, 2009).

Displaced communities may also develop protection strategies against violence. For instance, many communities displaced by Kenya’s post-election violence in 2007–2008 drew on faith-based networks to mobilize resources and provide practical and emotional support, sanctuary from the violence in towns and protection from abuse in IDP camps (Parsitau, 2011). The IFRC Safe Spaces methodology (see Box 2.2), developed after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, illustrates how international agencies are working with community-led protection approaches to enhance resilience.
Some coping and survival strategies may have negative outcomes, such as withdrawing children from schooling, engaging in transactional sex or enrolling in non-state armed groups. In some instances, community-led protection mechanisms result in behaviour which external observers may not consider positive. For example, displaced populations in south-east Myanmar have developed group-based practices which range from “paying off power-holders or acquiescing in their demands, including providing labour (or recruits) to armed groups” to instances in which “the rights of particular individuals are sometimes ‘sacrificed’ by their families or communities in order to safeguard the larger unit’s well-being” (South, Perhult and Carstensen, 2010). As Box 2.3 argues, local communities develop various protection models and their priorities may be very different from perceptions held by international humanitarian actors. The potential advantages and disadvantages of community-based responses must be considered, so that support maximizes positive impacts while minimizing risks.

IFRC’s work following the 2010 Haitian earthquake highlighted that, as in many displacement contexts, humanitarian actors often direct their questions towards ‘representatives’ of a household, a community or its social groups. The risk here is that the voices of those vulnerable to violence are left unheard. Community-based responses must therefore be grounded in representative systems for consultation and collective decision-making. Survivors of the 2004 tsunami managed the Bang Muang camp in Thailand. They set up working groups and organized tents into groups of ten “within three zones, each with a representative, and every evening, meetings were held that anyone could attend” (IIED, 2011). Such examples illustrate that, although displacement may undermine migrants’ sense of identity, they may also provide these populations with a space to develop new or stronger identities and communities.

The potential to ‘build back better’ gives survivors the means to strengthen their collective capacity, challenge unequal power relations within the community and enable formerly excluded social groups to become involved in decision-making and implementing community-led projects (Lyons, 2009). UNHCR, for example, has supported programmes to empower and enhance the “productive capacities and self-reliance of refugees, particularly of women” (UNHCR, 2003). Displacement and crises may enable participation of women, girls, boys and men, challenging the pre-emergency marginalization of certain social groups and promoting gender equality (UNHCR, 2001; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010).

Governments and international organizations can also encourage community-led initiatives through funding that is independently managed by communities; help balance the positive roles played by established community leaders (given their socio-economic and political power and networks) with strategies to challenge pre-existing conditions of marginalization and exclusion; and establish separate accounts managed by diverse community groups, thereby “balancing out power within the community and improving the transparency of contributions to the fund” (Archer and Boonyabancha, 2011).
Reliable, timely and well-used information and communication can impact on the patterns, processes and psychological stresses of forced migration. Those fleeing may lack basic information about how to locate missing family members and access health, shelter or other assistance. Recent surveys of refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab camps report large-scale information gaps that are almost certainly putting lives at risk. The vast majority of refugees interviewed in Dadaab said they considered access to information important in connecting them to aid organizations and humanitarian assistance (CDAC Network, 2011). Where access to the internet or mobile phones is available, newer technologies can give migrants the opportunity to notify one another of real-time crisis or early warning information and connect people in flight. Open-sourced technologies, such as Ushahdi or OpenStreetMap, or the use of location-aware mobile-sourcing technologies (e.g., Intafeen, used to track humanitarian convoys between Egypt and Libya) to trace or connect those fleeing, demonstrate the potential of new technology to reduce protection issues or the loss of identity and dignity migrants sometimes experience.

As a result, the humanitarian sector has begun to reshape its response to displacement with the use of new crowd-sourced and mobile technologies. The sector recognizes the technologies’ multiplier effect and their importance in tracking the communities’ narratives of crisis situations or enabling solutions such as cash delivery via mobile phones. Mobile technology can connect displaced people with aid organizations, enabling them to ask questions and share concerns about their current situation. One such example is the IFRC’s SMS communication platform, Trilogy Emergency Response Application. The platform, first trialled in Haiti, allowed the IFRC to send 56 million SMS after...
the 2010 earthquake with information ranging from cholera prevention to first-aid tips, and giving the displaced an opportunity to communicate with the Red Cross Red Crescent.

However, further analysis is necessary to gauge the full potential of these technologies to support access and movement of timely, relevant and clear information between affected populations and humanitarian organizations in order to achieve durable outcomes for these communities. While newer technologies can help to connect communities quickly, more traditional forms of communication also promote feelings of safety and hope after disasters. The Indonesia Red Cross (PMI) has successfully used a mixture of these traditional and technological methods since the 2004 tsunami to provide life-saving information and ensure an ongoing dialogue with affected communities in Aceh. This was again put to the test in April 2012 following a large earthquake measuring 8.7, whose epicentre was off the Sumatra coast, triggering fears of a repeat of the 2004 tsunami. An Indian Ocean-wide tsunami alert was issued and staff of the PMI radio station Rumoh PMI in Banda Aceh were quick to get on the airwaves.

Although electricity and mobile phone network outages made it difficult to communicate or receive important information, the team was able to contact numerous sources and piece together crucial information which was broadcast through various channels such as radio and internet to local communities. With disaster preparedness programmes well established in many hazard-prone coastal areas, the production team tapped into the PMI’s large volunteer network, and various government and official sources of information. The team developed a key tool – a map with details of the mediums available to communicate information to the people of Aceh. These preparedness measures, built on the PMI’s human network, ensured that information and communication was quickly provided in response to this event.

This underlines that the usefulness of technology to humanitarian responders will depend on context (Coyle and Meier, 2009). Communication in certain environments may be more effective if many different actors, channels and approaches are used to develop practical solutions to these communities’ needs. In some cases, humanitarians need to be present to drive this engagement and communicate with affected populations where access to technology is itself restricted to certain groups due to gender or social barriers. Examples in many of Pakistan’s rural communities show that the mobility of women and girls is restricted, making access via technology difficult. In these contexts, information and communication exchanges require a combination of creativity, sensitivity and strategic community engagement. This model of strategic community engagement is central to the Red Cross Red Crescent approach in its communication programmes for affected people, i.e., building on existing networks within communities and the Red Cross Red Crescent to link all actors and bring about tangible outcomes for displaced populations.

The challenges of accuracy, verification and security of information are also difficult with new technologies. The risk of endorsing, and therefore legitimizing, low-quality or manipulated information exists (ICRC, 2009). This was highlighted during protests after the 2009 Iranian elections when hoax information was posted leading to its amplification after it was re-posted and re-tweeted through social media. Similarly new technologies with their inherent potential of traceability might also put the information provider or concerned population at risk (Coyle and Meier, 2009). If the integrity, reliability and accuracy of Twitter,
The politics of the possible? Solving protracted displacement

When faced with mass flight in the wake of disasters, the international community’s immediate priority is to protect those forced to migrate from further harm and deliver basic humanitarian assistance. However, as the acute phase of emergencies comes to an end and displacement is protracted, a new challenge emerges. How do we end exile and solve such long-term displacement?

Today, more than 20 million refugees and IDPs are trapped in protracted exile (UNHCR, 2011; IDMC, 2011) and the three traditional approaches to ‘solving’ displacement – repatriation, local integration in a country of first asylum or resettlement to a third state – are clearly inadequate in these circumstances.

Repatriation is not simple. The absolute lines drawn between conflict and non-conflict settings are frequently arbitrary distinctions. Both post-conflict and post-disaster states are often weak, with little capacity for providing their citizens with real rights and services. This means that even when the drivers underlying forced migration are removed, rebuilding peace – and with it repairing social relations within communities – is a complex and uncertain process.

Similarly, host states have proven reluctant to offer formal local integration or to expand resettlement, in part because allowing poor foreigners to access rights attached to citizenship is often seen as politically toxic. New approaches are needed that can overcome the double challenge of political prejudice and continuing insecurity that makes a swift return impossible. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General has recently given renewed impetus to the search for durable solutions with a Draft Framework for Ending Displacement in the Aftermath of Conflict (UNSG, 2011; UNDG and ERC, 2012).
In contrast to the emergency phase, solving protracted displacement is not primarily a humanitarian or a protection challenge. Conflict and disaster destroy infrastructure and economic capacity, often creating acute development crises and making it impossible for large numbers of citizens to secure a livelihood in their own country. The international community therefore needs to consider developing creative alternatives to the traditional solutions and new ways of viewing citizenship. This is because, in the long term, solving displacement is actually likely to involve facilitating continued migration.

Migration is a normal human response to development needs. It can also help to make peace processes more sustainable by providing additional remittance flows and increasing human capital. The US decision in January 2012 to allow Haitians to apply for temporary work visas as a means of encouraging remittance flows for post-earthquake reconstruction is an example of how migration policies may be used to help solve displacement (Clemens, 2012). The Brazilian policy of granting five-year residency visas to Haitians has similar aims.

More incremental approaches to local integration may help to overcome states’ resistance to mass naturalization. In all protracted displacement crises, local integration becomes a reality over time, even where such contact is officially proscribed. Marriages, education and employment can all help to build informal links between displaced and host communities, but a lack of official status means these gains are precarious. A huge gulf may open up between the everyday lives of those displaced and the rhetoric of government restriction.

States should accept the inevitability of a degree of local integration and consider what forms of formal status might be granted to some displaced groups. Permanent residency, for instance, might be granted to refugees who own businesses, hold a high school diploma or can fill recognized labour shortages. Advocating such a piecemeal approach leaves some uneasy because it could exacerbate social and economic inequalities within displaced communities by favouring the educated or those capable of filling an employment gap. Yet in most circumstances, say the pragmatists, the alternative – no solution at all – is worse.

More flexible approaches to migration and integration could also involve encouraging the development of regional citizenship or freedom of movement accords. For instance, as civil war ended, some Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in West Africa were reissued with national passports, signalling a kind of ‘political’ repatriation, but were then able to remain in their host communities by taking advantage of existing agreements that provide West African citizens with regional employment and residency rights (Long, 2011). This type of arrangement may prove particularly important for second- and third-generation refugees, who have never seen their ‘homeland’.
More attention also needs to be focused on preventing protracted displacement. This involves incorporating displacement into resilience-based programming and disaster risk reduction strategies, but it should also involve developing a closer understanding of the dynamics of micro-level displacement. Evidence from Iraq and Somalia (Long, 2011) suggests that helping to facilitate early small movements to safety – across streets or neighbourhoods – may help to avoid the need for longer and more traumatic flights, and increase the possibility of future return when conditions allow. Such approaches are arguably coping strategies rather than solutions, but ensuring humanitarian

Box 7.3 Timor-Leste: forced migration, transitional justice and reconciliation

The 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste saw up to 150,000 people – almost 15 per cent of the country’s total population – displaced from their homes as a result of widespread intimidation, violence and destruction. At one point, the civil–political crisis looked ready to turn the country – seen as an example of a successful UN-led transition – into a state of protracted instability and institutional collapse. Furthermore, the pattern of displacement, inside primarily urban areas, brought to the surface seemingly intractable land and property conflicts and unearthed countless obstacles to developing durable solutions. Remarkably, a mere six years later, the country appears back on track, with the government and the international community focusing on how to achieve inclusive social and economic development rather than on preventing an all-out civil war. While many factors contributed to resolution of the 2006 crisis, the way in which internal displacement was addressed serves as an interesting case study for policy-makers struggling to find durable solutions for displacement elsewhere (Van der Auweraert, 2012). It also contributes to debates about transitional justice’s values and processes, as in Timor-Leste the emphasis on a ‘forward-thinking’ rather than ‘backward-looking’ approach can be credited for having set the conditions for the displaced’s mass return (Duthie, 2012; RSC, 2012).

That the vast majority of IDPs eventually chose to return home, despite their neighbours’ role in chasing them out, is testimony to the effectiveness of practical top–down and bottom–up measures to settle past grievances and pave the way for reconciliation. The transitional justice measures employed to respond to the crisis included public truth-telling and an established mechanism for reparations – actions aimed specifically at helping people to move out of the numerous IDP camps spread throughout the capital, Dili, and the urban area of Baucau. The role played by the government, and especially the Minister of Social Solidarity, was crucial. In dialogues and statements, senior government officials repeatedly acknowledged the fact that IDPs had been victims of human rights violations and that the Timorese state had failed to protect them. During public dialogue sessions in the camps, IDPs were encouraged – and many did take the opportunity – to tell the government what had happened to them, often not mincing their words about how the government had failed them. The eventual focus of the national recovery policy – the provision of cash

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grants to the IDPs as a remedy for damaged and destroyed houses and looting of property – emerged out of dialogues as the IDPs’ preference for redress, reconciliation and restoration. Importantly, non-displaced community members affected by the destruction also received cash grants, which given the blurred lines of culpability in the crisis again reinforced a restorative rather than retributive method of conflict resolution. While further empirical research is needed to validate such conclusions, providing cash grants alongside the government’s strong public discourse about state responsibility and victimization of IDPs and affected community members is seen to have endowed them with a symbolic meaning that contributed to the reconciliation necessary for return of the displaced. 

The element that stands out in the Timor case is the deep concern for community peace and reconciliation over stricter notions of retributive justice and accountability of individual abuses – and the acceptance and legitimacy of this preference by the Timorese. The extensive use of dialogue and mediation to promote and facilitate the IDPs’ social integration, involving the authorities, the IDPs and the affected communities, was a necessary component, as was the use of cash grants.

Government and international dialogue teams played a key role in creating a space for competing voices and facilitating balanced participation. They also employed a problem-solving approach towards restoring relationships and social problems that would otherwise have undermined return. The high deliberative quality of these inclusive and participatory public dialogues was influential in securing the agreed conditions for return, even though their outcomes ranked low on the barometer of ‘justice’ for individual wrongdoing. Undeniably, the end result of the combined measures has been solid enough for the different sides to accept living together again without, so far, any notable violence.

Timor-Leste is not the perfect example of how transitional justice can help to durably end displacement. The government was not sufficiently explicit in framing its response as a transitional justice effort or, indeed, binding all the different elements together into one integrated policy. This inability or reluctance was in part the legacy of unfilled expectations concerning reparations for human rights violations committed under the Indonesian occupation, a file the government was loath to reopen when it was struggling to resolve the 2006 crisis. Nevertheless, what happened in practice to address that crisis reveals certain transitional justice measures and value-process configurations that may be used to legitimately and durably resolve displacement. Inclusive and participatory dialogue and trust-building initiatives, anchored by a national reparative outcome, made return possible in Timor-Leste even amid fresh, deep-seated internal community conflict. While the government’s strategy of not investigating and prosecuting low-level perpetrators at the community level can be justified in this way, its lack of action regarding accountability at the leadership level may prolong the long legacy of impunity within the Timorese justice system.

There are a number of benefits from reflecting on the end of this crisis. It may help policy-makers to weigh a transitional justice approach towards displacement, which by definition includes some form of accountability and criminal prosecutions of the individuals most responsible for the violations that occurred, against the priority for reconciliation as a precondition to durably resolving displacement and allowing the displaced to resume normal social, economic and political life.
support for such efforts gives displaced people far greater choice to choose when and how far to move.

More nuanced resilience-based approaches to protracted displacement crises may in fact require a fundamental reassessment of how we identify displacement itself. Research from Iraq and from Darfur (Chatelard, 2010; de Waal, 2009) document practices of commuter or dormitory displacement, where the border or camp provides a measure of security (especially at night), but the displaced continue to return home on a regular (even a daily) basis to access their fields, collect rents or visit family. Such practices underline how the reality departs from the lines drawn between official categories of refugees, IDPs and other civilians caught in conflict.

Responding to this reality requires more institutional flexibility, particularly from IOM and UNHCR. Rather than separating the identity of migrants from refugees, they should seek to facilitate hybrid refugee migration. International organizations should recognize and protect these links, ensuring that asylum offers protection and not segregation. This speaks once again to the need to connect displacement with broader development, peace-building and human security agendas. Here, the UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme might offer one forum through which more comprehensive strategies for solving protracted displacement could be implemented.

No one should be forced to move, but the realities of poverty and conflict mean that securing a future often depends upon being free to move. Above all, new approaches to ending forced displacement must place displaced people themselves at the centre of the process, enabling them to identify solutions that best solve their problems. Refugees should participate in repatriation commissions, helping to shape the timing and nature of their return or other movement if return remains impossible. More often what is needed is for the international community to work to remove obstacles that prevent refugees being able to exercise choice: restrictions on movement, employment and education.

There is no shortage of innovative approaches that could help to alleviate the trauma of extended exile. However the difficulty lies not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones. Solving protracted displacement is not impossible, but it requires political will. The misery of prolonged displacement has become ‘normal’, because many states have effectively decided that the misery of excluded forced migrants is an unfortunate price worth paying to avoid having to confront the difficult political questions raised by the injustices and inequalities of a bordered world. We must first work to break this pattern of toleration. Only then can we start to counter the involuntary immobility suffered by those trapped in protracted displacement, and instead build new paths that secure citizenship rights through free movement.
Over the last ten years, disaster managers and early responders have increasingly adopted the use of satellite image-derived maps and analyses to respond better to humanitarian crises. While 20 years ago or so when in its early days, this technology was oversold as to what it could do in terms of support to decision-making during disasters, today’s reality is that detailed assessments and maps can be received within hours after the satellite has flown over a disaster area. Specific solutions have been gradually developed together with agencies such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IFRC, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme, UNHCR, ICRC and NGOs, and these now have a major impact on the way modern disaster management is carried out.

The level of details possible to detect in commercially available satellite images has increased 400-fold during the last 15 years. Although it is not possible to identify individuals in this imagery, small shelters, vehicles, pathways and groups of people can be easily mapped. When comparing post-disaster images to imagery taken before a disaster, detailed damage assessments are carried out, giving disaster managers much more accurate and timely information than ever before on where assistance is needed. With this information easily available in ready-to-print format or as GIS (geographic information system) data, operational agencies have now integrated the use of satellite imagery into their decision-making processes. The technology thus helps towards taking more informed, better and more timely decisions.

The main advantages of using satellite imagery to support response to humanitarian crises and for human security are:

- Information derived from imagery is available for areas where there is no or limited field access.
- The image is a snapshot in time of the situation on the ground. It provides objective information as to what was going on at a specific time.
- With almost real-time delivery, information can be provided within hours of the satellite’s passage and within the strict timelines required by early responders.
- The same information, e.g., maps of earthquake-damaged villages, can reach multiple levels, from field to headquarters, at the same time, thus improving vertical coordination.
- Core disaster-specific information is distributed to various clusters or sectors at the same time, facilitating horizontal coordination. For example, knowledge of the actual extent of a flood is important for logistics planning, to know which health facilities and schools are flooded and which agricultural areas are affected.
- Information can be provided in great detail for tactical use in the field or aggregated for awareness-raising and fact-based requests for donor support.

Recently, the UN Institute for Training and Research’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNITAR–UNOSAT) provided updated analyses of the IDP situation in Mogadishu, Somalia, following population movements due to both drought and internal conflicts. As the international community gradually returns to Mogadishu, humanitarian assistance can be delivered to affected communities across the city. The situation is highly dynamic in terms of where IDPs move from and settle within the city.
city, so up-to-date information showing exactly where IDPs are located becomes fundamental for efficient assistance. The image below shows a small part of Mogadishu in May 2012 – large areas of dense IDP settlements and smaller areas of shelters set up in between more permanent structures are visible.

The Arab uprisings have seen many examples of forced displacement for which UNITAR–UNOSAT has provided extensive analyses, for example in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. During the Libyan crisis, large numbers of people crossed the borders into Egypt and Tunisia. An example of a satellite image of such a border crossing can be seen in the image below which shows thousands of people awaiting humanitarian assistance and transport away from the Tunisian border.

After people fled the ongoing violence in Syria, the Turkish Red Crescent set up several refugee camps. The image below illustrates one of these camps, Reyhanli, in March 2012. The image displays a highly structured camp indicating a well-managed operation.

While applying satellite imagery during humanitarian crises has come a long way, work is still needed to make even better use of the technology. Individual organizations should ensure proper routines exist internally for automatic distribution of information, as for example UNICEF does with UNOSAT maps and assessment reports. In some cases, the extent of an event, such as a large flood, does not allow for the collection of detailed imagery covering all of the area of interest at the same time. However, medium-resolution satellites can cover the full area at a lesser level of detail. In addition, clouds can hamper clear views from space, even if detailed cloud-penetrating radar images are proving increasingly useful.

Although it is difficult to predict how satellite image technologies and GIS applications will evolve over time, solutions will likely be more integrated, with field data and remote sensing data, including assessments and reports, merged into efficient web-based geographic
Climate change and displacement – what must humanitarians do?

Finally, of all the emerging challenges, perhaps the largest and the most problematic is the impact of climate and environmental change on population mobility.

In a warmer, wetter world, millions of people living near sea level, in drought-affected regions and where extreme weather events become the norm, are increasingly vulnerable and at risk of displacement. Humanitarians are familiar dealing with the rapid-onset disasters attributed to these changes. But climate change also precipitates slow-onset disasters, which present new and unfamiliar challenges, compounded by great uncertainty on the scale, distribution and timing of potential displacement and even the links between climate change and people having to leave their homes.

Growing evidence links environmental change, and climate change in particular, and migration. However, these changes are rarely unique drivers of population displacement. They are one – significant – determinant, operating in conjunction with economic, social and political factors, and linked to existing vulnerabilities. This means that direct causal links can only be proved in exceptional cases. It is conceptually difficult to establish a precise category of environmental or climate migrant, the extent to which migration is ‘forced’ is open to debate and prudence is needed on estimating the likely numbers who will be displaced (RSC, 2008; Black, 2001; Castles, 2002; Bates, 2002; Zetter, 2010). Certainly, doomsday predictions of hundreds of millions forced to migrate (Myers, 2005; Christian Aid, 2007; NRC, 2008) are wide of the mark, and the populist term of ‘climate refugees’ is profoundly misleading.

Nevertheless, the numbers and consequences will be very significant, posing humanitarian policy-makers many challenges in developing coherent responses.
Firstly, protecting and enhancing rights lie at the core of humanitarian precepts and practice. But what rights should those susceptible to environmental or climate-related displacement enjoy? And who are the duty bearers?

For those crossing international borders due to adverse environmental conditions, there are significant legal and normative ‘protection gaps’ in international human rights and humanitarian law (UNHCR, 2010); but extending the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is not the answer. Widening its remit will dilute the claims of those fleeing persecution – further hardening worldwide resistance to refugees – while calls for a new convention on environmental displacement are no more than an academic pastime.

Providing temporary protection for those fleeing disasters was pioneered by the United States for the people affected by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Humanitarian actors should encourage states to renew efforts to extend this practice to those affected by rapid- and slow-onset climate and environmental disasters. At the same time regional approaches – for example, measures by the Economic Community of West African States to remove international migration barriers in West Africa – may also offer a way of protecting some basic rights for populations affected by environmental change across borders.
However, most people susceptible to climate-induced displacement will remain in their own countries, and it is now accepted that the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide satisfactory measures for protection. But here, too, there are significant protection gaps (Kälin and Schrepfer, 2012; McAdam, 2010, 2011). Few countries have fully operationalized the Guiding Principles and, as a recent study shows, this means that they do not adequately protect those affected, or displaced, within their own countries by climate change (Zetter, 2011). Yet the Great Lakes Pact (IDMC, 2008) and the pioneering Kampala Convention 2009 (see Box 1.4) (IDMC, 2009; AU, 2009) are promising developments, affording protection for both disaster- and conflict-affected populations.

Irrespective of whether displacement is internal or across borders, it is the impacts of slow-onset climate change – especially for those who can never return – where rights protection remains a profound challenge.

To tackle this lack of progress, humanitarian actors must adopt a higher profile and provide concerted and coordinated action. For example they should give much stronger support to the innovative ‘Nansen process’, initiated by the Norwegian government in 2011 (Nansen Conference, 2011), now partnered by the Swiss government and UNHCR, with the aim of developing policies and capacities to manage climate change-induced displacement, appropriate protection for those already displaced and enhancing preparedness and response capacities.

Humanitarian organizations can do much to encourage national governments to embed rights-based initiatives by:

- encouraging and aiding national governments to adopt and mainstream protection policies and norms, as well as international and regional agreements for temporary and complementary protection
- facilitating the production of more detailed operational and practical guidance on rights protection, for example in plans for resettlement (IOM, 2010)
- supporting civil society actors in their rights-based advocacy and community empowerment on behalf of populations vulnerable to environmental displacement.

Secondly, international coordination must be strengthened. UNHCR and IOM have taken the lead in developing policy and operational responses (UNHCR, 2009, 2010, 2010a, 2011; IOM, 2009, 2010), but this has been problematic. On the one hand at the 2011 UNHCR Executive Committee (UNHCR, 2011), governments were unwilling to support the extension of UNHCR’s responsibility to protect those displaced by environmental or climate disasters. Given the protection gaps, humanitarian actors must provide stronger advocacy for states to support UNHCR’s protection role.
On the other hand, the reluctance of IOM and UNHCR to provide coordinated strategy and action echoes the same lack of institutional flexibility observed in relation to the challenge of protracted displacement. As their operational partners, humanitarian organizations are in a powerful position to lever these agencies to improve collaboration on strategies, mandates, programming and operational engagement in affected countries.

Thirdly, advocacy must be improved. Climate change and migration adversely affect the world’s poorest countries, compounding their struggle for development. Yet, high-income countries are the principal carbon emitters and thus have the duty to provide the necessary resources to support national governments and their civil society organizations in developing effective long-term strategies for adaptation, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resettlement in response to climate-induced displacement.

Humanitarian organizations can again play a vital role in advocacy – ensuring that rich countries fulfil their commitment and adequately finance the measures to address climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation agreed in the breakthrough Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Framework for Adaptation (UNFCCC, 2010). At the same time, they are best placed to support capacity building and to operationalize responses in the most affected countries, for example vulnerability analysis tools, adaptation and mitigation strategies and resettlement planning.

Fourthly, while no one denies the need to reinforce and enhance the response capacity of climate-stressed countries, how can international humanitarian organizations support this? What should be their priorities?

Preparedness and DRR, of course, are taken as given and the IFRC provides a strong lead (IFRC, 2009). Humanitarian actors must support the lead role of governments working in partnership with affected communities and supported by local and international NGOs (RSC, 2008). It need not be the case that national and local actors be overwhelmed – for example, the Pakistan floods in 2010 (20 million affected), Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh in 2009 (more than 500,000 temporarily homeless) and the current drought in East and West Africa – and that slow-onset disasters overstretch response capacities in the future. The response to Typhoon Ketsana in the Philippines in 2009 demonstrated that effective national- and local-level DRR strategies and well-managed post-disaster relief and recovery, including a major role by the Philippine Red Cross, did much to mitigate the worst effects of the disaster. Fewer than 800 people died.

Supporting the development of local technical know-how (such as vulnerability tools and indicators), promoting the use of new social networking media, developing resilience strategies, mainstreaming tools and strategies for predicting how slow-onset
disasters unfold and identifying vulnerabilities, and above all facilitating South-South learning, are among the actions which humanitarians can promote.

Next, we must recognize that migration is not a development failure. It is a viable, often proactive, adaptation strategy, particularly where environmental change threatens household livelihoods (Morrissey, forthcoming). But it must be strategically planned and locally owned, given the inevitable growth of state-driven resettlement programmes to counter the deepening severity of climate-change impacts. As the Foresight report emphasizes (2011), without planning, large-scale spontaneous migration in the face of climate change risks making people more vulnerable. Humanitarian actors must ensure that migration strategies are mainstreamed into their adaptation, mitigation

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**Box 7.5 Flooding in the Mekong Delta**

Viet Nam is one of the countries most vulnerable to sea-level rise – a phenomenon that will alter the landscape and exert enormous pressure on areas vital to the country’s economic and human development. Ranking sixth in the world in terms of the proportion of population living in low-elevation coastal zones, Viet Nam has a coastline of 3,260 kilometres and is home to the Mekong Delta. This low-lying plain, only 3 metres above sea level at its highest point, is considered to be among the world’s top three hotspots as regards potential displacement due to rising sea levels.

However, flooding is also a regular and essential part of life in the Mekong Delta. ‘Nice floods’ (ngâp nông) – between 0.5 and 3 metres – enrich the soil with sediment from upstream of the Mekong River, which makes for a more plentiful harvest during the dry season. The floods also bring fish to these areas, which can be caught and sold as part of people’s livelihoods and for household consumption. In fact, many of the dykes built in the delta to protect houses and land from excessive flooding are semi-dykes – lower barriers to allow some of the flood waters onto the land.

The Mekong Delta accounts for more than 50 per cent of Viet Nam’s rice production (making it the second largest rice exporter in the world), 60 per cent of its fish and shrimp and 80 per cent of all cultivated fruit. However, severe floods (ngâp vùa) have been occurring in greater frequency and intensity in the past few decades, posing risks for the delta’s residents and challenging their ability to maintain their livelihoods.

More and recurrent severe floods might appear to be a strong factor in pushing people to migrate out of such areas. However, the link between flooding and migration in the Mekong Delta is complicated. The delta’s inhabitants are accustomed to annual floods and wait for them to enrich the earth and bring an abundance of fish. Therefore, it is not unusual to find seasonal migration during the flood season. For example, some people migrate temporarily to work elsewhere and return during the dry season, while others seek greater opportunities for fishing in other Mekong Delta provinces.

However, severe floods (such as those of 2011), when water levels are higher than expected and floods come sooner and last...
longer than usual, have an impact on livelihoods and safety in the home. In some areas, floods and storms come together. Storms may damage or destroy houses entirely and sink boats docked by the shore.

Two factors may cause migration: ‘push’ factors induce people to leave an area; ‘pull’ factors attract them. Urban centres such as Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and industrial zones like Binh Duong are pull factors in this rapidly industrializing country. They offer full-time employment in factories and industries that are not affected by seasonal changes and, in many cases, a higher income. This, combined with lack of employment and low wages in rural areas, makes out-migration for economic reasons common in the Mekong Delta. With rising sea levels, increasing numbers of people may have no option other than to move to higher ground in the delta or to other parts of the country.

“I used to work on rice paddy farms in the Mekong Delta as a hired labourer, but moved to HCMC because when the crop was harvested, there were no other jobs. Here I can find more regular work all year round and I’m paid more,” said a migrant in HCMC.

Another hired farm labourer in the delta province of Long An said, “People who don’t own land and work for other people need to go elsewhere to find jobs. There are too many people and too few jobs. It’s not possible to earn enough only working on rice paddy fields to make ends meet.”

In response to the Mekong River’s catastrophic floods in 2000, the government of Viet Nam introduced the concept of ‘living with floods’ into its disaster mitigation and management policies. Floods should be mitigated, it reasoned, but they are also essential to livelihoods and the country’s economic development. As such, developing resettlement sites in the delta is a core component of this strategy to improve living conditions and provide stable livelihoods for flood-affected communities. This involves relocating delta communities living in conditions deemed unsafe to safer and permanent residential clusters nearby on higher ground, with access to basic infrastructure such as clean water, schools and health clinics.

To date, Long An province, for example, has built roughly 70 per cent of its planned 165 resettlement clusters and dykes, targeting 32,786 households for resettlement. Most of the households are poor and live in areas vulnerable to severe flooding. While housing plots and houses are not free, poor households are eligible to buy them at prices below market value and take out low-interest loans repayable over ten years to purchase the plot and construct housing.

While more systematic assessments are needed, available findings show that people tend to feel much safer in their new housing and location. But their livelihoods suffer due to a combination of factors including greater distances from old places of work, competition for jobs around new resettlement sites and lack of social networks and support systems. In some areas, basic infrastructure such as water and electricity is not developed when people move into the clusters. Because they have taken out loans to build their houses, most households also end up with large amounts of debt. However, resettlement programmes are often the only safe option for poor households living in precarious conditions in areas at risk.

With lessons learned from past resettlement experiences, these programmes offer safe housing to people vulnerable to severe flooding, while enabling them to maintain a decent livelihood and way of life, safe from environmental hazards.
and development programmes. And they must ensure that government-led resettlement projects are inclusive and do not compromise people’s rights and entitlements.

Nevertheless, most people will not want, or will not be able, to migrate in the face of climate-change impacts (Foresight, 2011). Humanitarian actors must do much more to advocate for their needs and, more importantly, to design adaptation and resilience programmes and projects that mitigate slow-onset change.

Finally, new thinking is needed to respond to slow-onset disasters and new policies and tools must be designed. This is where most needs to be done, but where the scope to innovate and confront existing norms and practices is greatest. Rethinking DRR in terms of slow-onset disaster is a remarkable challenge. Chapter 6 shows how the economics of humanitarianism pose critical questions about the humanitarian–development nexus. Similarly, how governments and international actors deal with the population displacement impacts of climate change pose profound policy challenges.

In many countries, response to climate-change impacts has been appropriated by the humanitarian–disaster discourse of governments and international agencies, including NGOs. Globally, we have applied a well-developed and familiar template to deal with the problem, largely rejecting a developmental approach being adopted in Viet Nam for example. Moreover, as a recent study argues (Zetter, 2011), this allows these actors to acknowledge the material rights and needs of disaster-affected populations, while subverting the greater challenge of affording political rights – empowerment, decision-making and participation in, for example, resettlement schemes – that would arise if climate change were framed as developmental challenge. This perspective demands radical new thinking and humanitarian actors are perhaps best placed to break out of the rapid-onset disaster straitjacket. Without this, the risk is that millions more ‘forced migrants’ will make achieving the Millennium Development Goals even more remote.

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A Somali pastoralist waters his camels near Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camps, benefiting from water supplied to both host and refugee communities and from the increase in camel trading due to the presence of meat markets in the camps.

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Disaster data

According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 336 natural disasters and 234 technological disasters were reported worldwide in 2011.

The number of natural disasters is the lowest of the decade and is 15 per cent below its decade’s average.

The number of technological disasters (234) is the second lowest of the decade, after 2009, far below the numbers reported during the first five years of the decade.

The number of deaths caused by natural disasters (31,105) is the fourth lowest of the decade, much lower than the peaks of 2004 (242,010 deaths), 2008 (235,272) and 2010 (297,730). The deadliest natural disaster was the earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan in March, which killed 19,846 people. The number of deaths is much lower than those caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 (226,408 deaths) and the earthquake of January 2010 in Haiti (222,570 deaths).

Tropical Storm Washi (Sendong), which killed 1,439 people in December in the Philippines, is the second deadliest natural disaster of 2011.

The technological disaster that resulted in the highest number of deaths (203) was the sinking of a ferry in September in Tanzania. A total of 2,085 people died in 45 shipwrecks in 2011, accounting for 50 per cent of all deaths from transport accidents and almost one-third of all technological disasters. Among industrial accidents, an oil pipeline explosion caused 120 deaths in Kenya and the explosion of a fuel reserve led to the deaths of 100 people in Libya.

The number of people reported affected by natural disasters (209 million) is the fourth lowest of the decade, but is much higher than the minimum of 2006 (147 million). In 2011, almost 70 per cent of people reported affected were victims of floods. The most severe occurred in June and September in China (68 and 20 million, respectively). Fifteen other floods affected 1 to 9 million people for a total of 45 million. One hailstorm affected 22 million people in April in China and eight other storms, all in Asia, affected 1 to 3 million people for a total of 14 million. Seven droughts, of which five were in Africa, affected 1 to 4 million people for a total of 14 million. By comparison, the total number of people affected by earthquakes and tsunami (1.5 million) is the second lowest of the decade. The earthquake which affected the highest number of people (575,000) occurred in India in September. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan, in March, affected 369,000 people and the February earthquake in New Zealand affected 300,000 people.
Technological disasters affect, proportionally, very few people. Among the five technological disasters affecting the most people were four fires in slums. The two most severe occurred in the Philippines, affecting 20,000 and 10,000 people, and the two others in Kenya affecting 9,000 and 6,000 people. The explosion of an ammunition depot in Tanzania affected 1,500 people.

In 2011, natural disaster costs (US$ 365.6 billion) were the highest of the decade, accounting for almost 1.5 times the direct losses reported in 2005 (US$ 248 billion, 2011 prices).

The earthquake and tsunami in Japan cost US$ 210 billion and accounted for 57 per cent of all reported damages. Twenty-six other disasters accounted for another 48 per cent of all reported damages. Next to the gigantic damages caused by the tsunami, two earthquakes in New Zealand, in Christchurch and in South Island, cost US$ 15 billion and US$ 3 billion, respectively. An earthquake in Turkey in October cost US$ 1.5 billion.

Damages from floods accounted for more than US$ 72 billion and were the highest reported for this type of disaster in the decade. The floods in Thailand cost US$ 40 billion. Ten other floods cost more than US$ 1 billion with a total of US$ 25 billion. These 11 disasters accounted for 87 per cent of damages reported for floods.

Damages from storms accounted for almost US$ 51 billion, slightly lower than the decade’s average of US$ 58 billion. Tornadoes in April and May in the United States cost US$ 11 billion and US$ 14 billion. Seven other storms, of which five occurred in the United States, each cost between US$ 1 to 7 billion, for a total of US$ 22 billion. These nine disasters accounted for 82 per cent of damages reported for storms.

For three other natural disasters, reported costs exceeded US$ 1 billion: a drought in the United States (US$ 8 billion) and two forest fires, one in Canada in May (US$ 1.5 billion) and one in the United States in September (US$ 1 billion).

For technological disasters, in 2011, the only damages reported were caused by two slum fires in the Philippines, which cost US$ 467,000 and US$ 234,000.

**EM-DAT: a specialized disaster database**

Tables 1–13 on natural and technological disasters and their human impact over the last decade were drawn and documented from CRED’s EM-DAT. Established in 1973 as a non-profit institution, CRED is based at the School of Public Health of the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium and became a World Health Organization collaborating centre in 1980. Although CRED’s main focus is on public health, the centre also studies the socio-economic and long-term effects of large-scale disasters.
Since 1988, with the sponsorship of the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), CRED has maintained EM-DAT, a worldwide database on disasters. It contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects of almost 20,000 disasters in the world from 1900 to the present. The database is compiled from various sources, including United Nations (UN) agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies.

Priority is given to data from UN agencies, followed by OFDA, governments and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This prioritization is not a reflection of the quality or value of the data but the recognition that most reporting sources do not cover all disasters or may have political limitations that could affect the figures. The entries are constantly reviewed for redundancies, inconsistencies and the completion of missing data. CRED consolidates and updates data on a daily basis. A further check is made at monthly intervals. Revisions are made annually at the end of the calendar year.

The database’s main objectives are to assist humanitarian action at both national and international levels, to rationalize decision-making for disaster preparedness and to provide an objective basis for vulnerability assessment and priority setting.
Data definitions and methodology

CRED defines a disaster as “a situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external assistance (definition considered in EM-DAT); an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”.

For a disaster to be entered into the database, at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled:

- Ten or more people reported killed
- 100 people or more reported affected
- Declaration of a state of emergency
- Call for international assistance.

The number of people killed includes people confirmed as dead and people missing and presumed dead. People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency (i.e., requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance). People reported injured or homeless are aggregated with those reported affected to produce a ‘total number of people affected’.

The economic impact of a disaster usually consists of direct consequences on the local economy (e.g., damage to infrastructure, crops, housing) and indirect consequences (e.g., loss of revenues, unemployment, market destabilization). In EM-DAT, the registered figure corresponds to the damage value at the moment of the event and usually only to the direct damage, expressed in US dollars (2011 prices).

In 2007, a new natural disaster category classification was introduced in EM-DAT. This new classification was initiated by CRED and Munich Re and brought together CRED, Munich Re, Swiss Re, the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The goals were to create and agree on a common hierarchy and terminology for all global and regional databases on natural disasters and to establish a common and agreed definition of sub-events that is simple and self-explanatory.

This classification is a first step in the development of a standardized international classification of disasters. It distinguishes two generic categories for disasters (natural and technological). Natural disasters are divided into five sub-groups, which in turn cover 12 disaster types and more than 32 sub-types. The five sub-groups and 12 types are as follows:

- Biological disasters: Insect infestations, epidemics and animal attacks (the two last categories are not included in the World Disasters Report)
- **Geophysical disasters**: Earthquakes and tsunamis, volcanic eruptions and dry mass movements (avalanches, landslides, rockfalls and subsidence of geophysical origin)
- **Climatological disasters**: Droughts (with associated food insecurities), extreme temperatures and wildfires
- **Hydrological disasters**: Floods (including waves and surges) and wet mass movements (avalanches, landslides, rockfalls and subsidence of hydrological origin)
- **Meteorological disasters**: Storms (divided into nine sub-categories).

Technological disasters remained unchanged and comprise three groups:

- **Industrial accidents**: Chemical spills, collapse of industrial infrastructure, explosions, fires, gas leaks, poisoning and radiation
- **Transport accidents**: Transportation by air, rail, road or water
- **Miscellaneous accidents**: Collapse of domestic or non-industrial structures, explosions and fires.

In Tables 1–13, ‘disasters’ refer to disasters with a natural and technological trigger only, and do not include wars, conflict-related famines, diseases or epidemics.

The classification of countries as ‘very high’, ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low human development’ is based on UNDP’s 2011 Human Development Index (HDI). For a small number of countries, which do not appear in the HDI, the World Bank’s classification of economies by the countries’ level of income is used as reference (‘high’, ‘upper middle’, ‘lower middle’ and ‘low’).

In both EM-DAT and the tables in this annex, data are considered at country level for many reasons, including the fact that it is at this level that they are reported most of the time and also due to issues regarding possible aggregation and disaggregation of data. For droughts or food insecurities, which are often multi-year events, their impact over time is taken into account.

Bearing in mind that data on deaths and economic damage from drought are infrequently reported, CRED has adopted the following rules as regards data for droughts:

- The total number of deaths reported for a drought is divided by the number of years for which the drought persists. The resulting number is registered for each year of the drought duration.
- The same calculation is done for the reported economic damages.
- For the total number of people reported to be affected, CRED considers that the same number is affected each year that the disaster persists.
Some disasters begin at the end of a year and may last some weeks or months into the following year. In such case, CRED has adopted the following rules:

- With regard to the number of people reported affected, the total number is recorded for both the start year and the end year.
- For the number of people reported killed, CRED distinguishes between sudden-onset disasters (earthquakes, flash floods, landslides, etc.) and slow-onset disasters (wildfires, some floods, extreme temperatures, etc.) as follows:
  - Sudden-onset disasters – all those killed are registered according to start year of the disaster
  - Slow-onset disasters, the total of all those killed is divided by two, and a half is attributed to each year of persistence.
- Reported economic damages are always attributed to the end year of the disaster. This is because damage is related to both the strength of a disaster and its duration.

By using these rules, some data bias correction is attempted. However, they are far from perfect and CRED will try to improve them, as well as the database as a whole, in the future.

**Caveats**

Key problems with disaster data include the lack of standardized collection methodologies and definitions. The original information, collected from a variety of public sources, is not specifically gathered for statistical purposes. So, even when the compilation applies strict definitions for disaster events and parameters, the original suppliers of information may not. Moreover, data are not always complete for each disaster. The quality of completion may vary according to the type of disaster (for example, the number of people affected by transport accidents is rarely reported) or its country of occurrence.

Data on deaths are usually available because they are an immediate proxy for the severity of the disaster. However, the numbers put forward immediately after a disaster may sometimes be seriously revised, occasionally several months later.

Data on the numbers of people affected by a disaster can provide some of the most potentially useful figures, for planning both disaster preparedness and response, but they are sometimes poorly reported. Moreover, the definition of people affected remains open to interpretation, political or otherwise. Even in the absence of manipulation, data may be extrapolated from old census information, with assumptions being made about percentages of an area’s population affected.
Data can also be skewed because of the rationale behind data gathering. Reinsurance companies, for instance, systematically gather data on disaster occurrence in order to assess insurance risk, but with a priority in areas of the world where disaster insurance is widespread. Their data may therefore miss out poor, disaster-affected regions where insurance is unaffordable or unavailable.

For natural disasters over the last decade, data on deaths are missing for around one-fifth of reported disasters; data on people affected are missing for about one-quarter of disasters; and data on economic damages are missing for 80 per cent of disasters. The figures should therefore be regarded as indicative. Relative changes and trends are more useful to look at than absolute, isolated figures.

Dates can be a source of ambiguity. For example, a declared date for a famine is both necessary and meaningless – a famine does not occur on a single day. In such cases, the date the appropriate body declares an official emergency has been used. Changes in national boundaries cause ambiguities in the data and may make long-term trend analysis more complicated.

However, in some cases, available data may differ greatly according to sources, be more or less documented estimations and/or subject to controversies. In these cases, CRED always compiles all available data or analysis to try to make its own documented estimation, which can be revised when more accurate data are provided.

Information systems have improved vastly in the last 25 years and statistical data is now more easily available, intensified by an increasing sensitivity to disaster occurrence and consequences. Nevertheless there are still discrepancies. An analysis of quality and accuracy of disaster data, performed by CRED in 2002, showed that occasionally, for the same disaster, differences of more than 20 per cent may exist between the quantitative data reported by the three major databases – EM-DAT (CRED), NatCat (Munich Re) and Sigma (Swiss Re).

Despite efforts to verify and review data, the quality of disaster databases can only be as good as the reporting system. This, combined with the different aims of the major disaster databases (risk and economic risk analysis for reinsurance companies, development agenda for CRED), may explain differences between data provided for some disasters. However, in spite of these differences, the overall trends indicated by the three databases remain similar.

The lack of systematization and standardization of data collection is a major weakness when it comes to long-term planning. Fortunately, due to increased pressures for accountability from various sources, many donors and development agencies have started giving attention to data collection and its methodologies.
Part of the solution to this data problem lies in retrospective analysis. Data are most often publicly quoted and reported during a disaster event, but it is only long after the event, once the relief operation is over, that estimates of damage and death can be verified. Some data gatherers, like CRED, revisit the data; this accounts for retrospective annual disaster figures changing one, two and sometimes even three years after the event.

Please note that in the following tables, some totals may not correspond due to rounding.

Philippe Hoyois, senior research fellow with CRED, Regina Below, manager of CRED’s EM-DAT disaster database, and Debarati Guha-Sapir, director of CRED, prepared this annex. For further information, please contact: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, Institute of Health and Society, Catholic University of Louvain 30.94, Clos Chapelle-aux-Champs 1200 Brussels, Belgium, tel.: +32 2 764 3327, fax: +32 2 764 3441, e-mail: contact@emdat.be, web site: www.emdat.be.
## Table 1  Total number of reported disasters,\(^1\) by continent, level of human development\(^2\) and year (2002–2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>127</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>254</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>115</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high human development</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>94</td>
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<td>295</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>2,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low human development</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>799</strong></td>
<td><strong>706</strong></td>
<td><strong>743</strong></td>
<td><strong>810</strong></td>
<td><strong>731</strong></td>
<td><strong>694</strong></td>
<td><strong>628</strong></td>
<td><strong>598</strong></td>
<td><strong>646</strong></td>
<td><strong>570</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,925</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) In Tables 1–13, ‘disasters’ refer to those with a natural and/or technological trigger only, and do not include wars, conflict-related famines, diseases or epidemics.

\(^2\) See note on UNDP’s Human Development Index country status in the section on disaster definitions in the introduction to this annex.

\(^3\) Since slow-onset disasters can affect the same country for a number of years, it is best to use figures on total numbers to calculate annual averages over a decade rather than as absolute totals (see the methodology section in the introduction to this annex).

With 570 disasters reported, 2011 was the year with the lowest number of disasters of the decade, far below the peaks of 2002 and 2005. By continent, the number of disasters was the lowest of the decade in Europe; the second lowest of the decade in Africa and Asia; the third lowest in Oceania and the fourth lowest in the Americas. Over the decade, a trend for a decrease in the number of disasters appears clearly in Africa, Asia and Europe, while in the Americas and Oceania, the number of disasters has remained stable over the years.

Whatever the levels of development of countries, the number of disasters in 2011 was the lowest of the decade. With 42 per cent of all disasters, Asia remains the continent most frequently affected, very close to its decade’s average of 41 per cent. Inversely, in 2011, in Europe, disasters represented only 6.5 per cent of all disasters, half of the decade’s average of 13 per cent.
Table 2  Total number of people reported killed, by continent, level of human development 1 and year (2002–2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>7,639</td>
<td>6,160</td>
<td>4,246</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,027</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>3,464</td>
<td>43,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>5,434</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>2,921</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>2,245</td>
<td>226,458</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>257,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>89,336</td>
<td>39,030</td>
<td>238,360</td>
<td>90,841</td>
<td>20,648</td>
<td>15,827</td>
<td>235,622</td>
<td>9,995</td>
<td>17,749</td>
<td>28,751</td>
<td>786,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,821</td>
<td>73,373</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>5,837</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>57,073</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>145,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1,40</td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very high human development</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>73,795</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>3,226</td>
<td>4,575</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>21,738</td>
<td>113,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High human development</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>29,661</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>59,122</td>
<td>3,761</td>
<td>113,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>9,944</td>
<td>10,659</td>
<td>236,781</td>
<td>14,734</td>
<td>19,575</td>
<td>8,075</td>
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<td>8,360</td>
<td>14,319</td>
<td>7,481</td>
<td>425,988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low human development</td>
<td>85,868</td>
<td>6,592</td>
<td>11,067</td>
<td>79,762</td>
<td>6,152</td>
<td>11,949</td>
<td>143,258</td>
<td>3,812</td>
<td>229,010</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>581,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,995</td>
<td>120,707</td>
<td>252,339</td>
<td>100,539</td>
<td>33,852</td>
<td>24,507</td>
<td>242,218</td>
<td>17,660</td>
<td>304,474</td>
<td>37,333</td>
<td>1,234,624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium

1 See note on UNDP’s Human Development Index country status in the section on disaster definitions in the introduction to this annex.

In 2011 the number of people reported killed was the fourth lowest of the decade, at one-third of the decade’s average. In Africa, Asia and Europe the number of people reported killed was the fifth lowest of the decade. In the Americas, this number was the fourth highest of the decade and the third highest in Oceania. In all continents except Oceania, the number of people killed was below the decade’s average.

In very high human development countries, the number of people reported killed in 2011 was the second highest of the decade and the third highest in countries with high human development. But in medium human development countries, the number was the lowest of the decade and the second lowest in countries with low human development, with both far below their average for the decade.

In 2011, 77 per cent of people killed by disasters lived in Asia, 9 per cent in Africa and 0.6 per cent in Oceania, far above their decade’s average of 64, 4 and 0.15 per cent respectively. Inversely the proportions of people killed in the Americas (9 per cent) and Europe (4 per cent) were significantly lower than their decade’s average (21 and 12 per cent, respectively).
### Table 3: Total number of people reported affected, by continent, level of human development and year (2002–2011), in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>43,874</td>
<td>28,539</td>
<td>36,174</td>
<td>22,856</td>
<td>26,665</td>
<td>12,530</td>
<td>22,653</td>
<td>42,636</td>
<td>37,240</td>
<td>19,092</td>
<td>292,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>9,557</td>
<td>8,308</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>9,119</td>
<td>20,314</td>
<td>7,046</td>
<td>12,744</td>
<td>13,457</td>
<td>88,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>660,811</td>
<td>235,689</td>
<td>132,860</td>
<td>129,717</td>
<td>119,101</td>
<td>190,885</td>
<td>182,754</td>
<td>174,056</td>
<td>292,534</td>
<td>176,453</td>
<td>2,294,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1,657</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very high human development</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>5,588</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>13,728</td>
<td>2,554</td>
<td>3,881</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>32,006</td>
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<td>High human development</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>4,827</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>6,996</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>8,104</td>
<td>5,459</td>
<td>3,996</td>
<td>5,659</td>
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<td>60,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium human development</td>
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<td>116,117</td>
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<td>271,628</td>
<td>168,873</td>
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<td>27,039</td>
<td>47,316</td>
<td>62,733</td>
<td>22,976</td>
<td>414,601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium

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1. See note on UNDP’s Human Development Index country status in the section on disaster definitions in the introduction to this annex.

2. Since slow-onset disasters can affect the same country for a number of years, it is best to use figures on total numbers to calculate annual averages over a decade rather than as absolute totals (see the methodology section in the introduction to this annex).

In 2011, 209 million people were affected by disasters, the fourth lowest number of the decade. In Europe, the number of people affected was by far the lowest of the decade, almost ten times below its decade’s average. In Africa, the number of people affected was the second lowest of the decade and, in Asia, the fifth lowest. Inversely, in the Americas and in Oceania, the number of people reported affected was the second highest of the decade.

In 2011, while the number of people affected living in countries of high human development was the highest of the decade, it was the lowest of the decade in countries of low human development.
Table 4  Total amount of disaster estimated damage, by continent, level of human development \(^1\) and year (2002–2011) in millions of US dollars (2011 prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>6,768</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>12,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>16,131</td>
<td>26,113</td>
<td>78,457</td>
<td>198,240</td>
<td>7,964</td>
<td>17,165</td>
<td>67,287</td>
<td>15,551</td>
<td>80,626</td>
<td>68,350</td>
<td>575,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>16,610</td>
<td>28,959</td>
<td>78,969</td>
<td>31,837</td>
<td>26,233</td>
<td>37,492</td>
<td>123,670</td>
<td>18,543</td>
<td>39,335</td>
<td>271,970</td>
<td>673,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>42,233</td>
<td>22,452</td>
<td>2,172</td>
<td>18,106</td>
<td>2,711</td>
<td>23,908</td>
<td>4,871</td>
<td>12,691</td>
<td>18,564</td>
<td>2,937</td>
<td>150,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2,839</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>2,628</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>17,206</td>
<td>21,310</td>
<td>50,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high human development</td>
<td>63,756</td>
<td>55,563</td>
<td>128,420</td>
<td>201,731</td>
<td>12,950</td>
<td>48,989</td>
<td>67,381</td>
<td>27,533</td>
<td>94,382</td>
<td>296,781</td>
<td>997,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High human development</td>
<td>4,029</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>8,196</td>
<td>14,834</td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>13,283</td>
<td>7,718</td>
<td>3,801</td>
<td>14,756</td>
<td>7,643</td>
<td>77,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low human development</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>4,916</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,725</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>18,243</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>43,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,270</strong></td>
<td><strong>85,017</strong></td>
<td><strong>162,255</strong></td>
<td><strong>248,475</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,598</strong></td>
<td><strong>80,836</strong></td>
<td><strong>199,414</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,775</strong></td>
<td><strong>155,792</strong></td>
<td><strong>365,583</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,463,014</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) See note on UNDP’s Human Development Index country status in the section on disaster definitions in the introduction to this annex.

As mentioned in the introduction, damage assessment is frequently unreliable. Even for existing data, methodologies are not standardized and the financial coverage can vary significantly. Depending on where the disaster occurs and who reports it, estimations may vary from zero to billions of US dollars.

The total amount of damage reported in 2011 was the highest of the decade, far higher than the previous peak in 2005 (caused in large part by Hurricane Katrina). In Asia and Oceania, the amount of damages was the highest of the decade. It was the third highest in Africa and the fourth highest in the Americas, while in Europe, the amount of reported damages was the third lowest of the decade.

In 2011, Asia accounted for 74 per cent of damage, more than the continent’s 46 per cent average of the decade. Europe accounted for 0.8 per cent of damage, far below its decade average of 10 per cent.

The contribution of very high human development countries to the total amount of damages climbed to 81 per cent, higher than their average of 68 per cent for the decade.

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
Table 5  Total number of reported disasters, by type of phenomenon and year (2002–2011)

| Phenomenon                        | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Total
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droughts/food insecurity</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes/tsunamis</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme temperatures</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest/scrub fires</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect infestation</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: dry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: wet</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruptions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windstorms</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal climato-, hydro- and meteorological disasters</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal geophysical disasters</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total natural disasters</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>3,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous accidents</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total technological disasters</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>2,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>6,925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
Since slow-onset disasters can affect the same country for a number of years, it is best to use figures on total numbers to calculate annual averages over a decade rather than as absolute totals (see the methodology section in the introduction to this annex).

Includes waves and surges.

Landslides, rockfalls, subsidence, etc., of geophysical origin.

Landslides, avalanches, subsidence, etc., of hydrological origin.

Note: n.d.r. signifies 'no disaster reported'. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text to this annex.

In 2011, the number of natural disasters was the lowest of the decade and the number of technological disasters the second lowest, much lower than the peak in 2005.

The most frequent natural disasters were floods (47 per cent – a percentage similar to their 45 per cent average for the decade). The number of disasters caused by droughts and windstorms was the second lowest of the decade, while disasters caused by floods and wildfires were at their third lowest level of the decade and those caused by extreme temperatures at their fourth lowest. The number of disasters caused by earthquakes/tsunamis was the fourth highest of the decade and the number of disasters following volcanic eruptions was close to its decade’s average.

Transport accidents were the most frequent technological disasters, but their number was the third lowest of the decade. The number of industrial accidents was the lowest of the decade and the fourth lowest for miscellaneous accidents.
### Table 6  Total number of people reported killed, by type of phenomenon and year (2002–2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droughts/food insecurity</td>
<td>76,903</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>77,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes/tsunamis</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>29,617</td>
<td>227,290</td>
<td>76,241</td>
<td>6,692</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>87,918</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>226,735</td>
<td>20,946</td>
<td>679,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme temperatures</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>74,748</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>5,104</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>57,064</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>145,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods(^1)</td>
<td>4,236</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>7,102</td>
<td>5,754</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>8,565</td>
<td>4,029</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>8,571</td>
<td>5,923</td>
<td>57,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest/scrub fires</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect infestation</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: dry(^2)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>271</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: wet(^3)</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>3,402</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>9,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruptions</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windstorms</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>6,609</td>
<td>5,294</td>
<td>4,329</td>
<td>6,035</td>
<td>140,985</td>
<td>3,287</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>3,103</td>
<td>173,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal climato-, hydro- and</td>
<td>86,648</td>
<td>80,340</td>
<td>14,674</td>
<td>12,643</td>
<td>17,140</td>
<td>16,065</td>
<td>147,218</td>
<td>8,882</td>
<td>70,672</td>
<td>10,156</td>
<td>464,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meteorological disasters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal geophysical disasters</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>29,617</td>
<td>227,336</td>
<td>76,244</td>
<td>6,708</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>88,054</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>227,058</td>
<td>20,949</td>
<td>680,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total natural disasters</td>
<td>88,544</td>
<td>109,957</td>
<td>242,010</td>
<td>88,887</td>
<td>23,848</td>
<td>16,856</td>
<td>235,272</td>
<td>10,806</td>
<td>297,730</td>
<td>31,105</td>
<td>1,145,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>2,281</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>13,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous accidents</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>2,669</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>14,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>9,326</td>
<td>7,868</td>
<td>6,417</td>
<td>6,702</td>
<td>7,021</td>
<td>5,075</td>
<td>5,275</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>4,176</td>
<td>4,746</td>
<td>61,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total technological disasters</td>
<td>12,451</td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>10,329</td>
<td>11,652</td>
<td>10,004</td>
<td>7,651</td>
<td>6,946</td>
<td>6,854</td>
<td>6,744</td>
<td>6,228</td>
<td>89,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,995</td>
<td>120,707</td>
<td>252,339</td>
<td>100,539</td>
<td>33,852</td>
<td>24,507</td>
<td>242,218</td>
<td>17,660</td>
<td>304,474</td>
<td>37,333</td>
<td>1,234,624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
Deaths from industrial and miscellaneous accidents were at their lowest level of the decade and the number of people killed in transport accidents at their second lowest.

The earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011 killed 19,846 people.

Almost all reported deaths caused by droughts and food insecurity during the decade were attributable to the famine in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, although the estimates provided are disputed. The other major disasters of the decade were the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (226,408 deaths); the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 (222,570); Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 (138,375); the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008 (87,476); the Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan and India in 2005 (74,648); the heatwave in western Europe in 2003 (72,210), the heatwave in Russia in 2010 (55,736) and major earthquakes in Bam, Iran in 2003 (26,796) and in Gujarat, India in 2001 (20,017).

Note: n.a. signifies ‘no data available’; n.d.r. signifies ‘no disaster reported’. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text to this annex.

In 2011, deaths caused by natural disasters were at the fourth lowest level of the decade and deaths from technological disasters at their lowest level. Among natural disasters, the number of deaths from extreme temperatures, wildfires and volcanic eruptions was the second lowest of the decade; from mass movements of hydrological origin, the third lowest; from windstorms, the fourth lowest; and from earthquakes/tsunamis, the fifth lowest. Inversely, deaths caused by floods were at their fourth highest level of the decade.
## Table 7  Total number of people reported affected, by type of phenomenon and year (2002–2011), in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droughts/food insecurity</td>
<td>428,006</td>
<td>80,968</td>
<td>34,398</td>
<td>30,643</td>
<td>44,371</td>
<td>8,278</td>
<td>37,481</td>
<td>109,666</td>
<td>135,755</td>
<td>21,759</td>
<td>931,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes/tsunamis</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>3,147</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,529</td>
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Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
Since slow-onset disasters can affect the same country for a number of years, it is best to use figures on total numbers to calculate annual averages over a decade rather than as absolute totals (see the methodology section in the introduction to this annex).

2 Includes waves and surges.
3 Landslides, rockfalls, subsidence, etc., of geophysical origin.
4 Landslides, avalanches, subsidence, etc., of hydrological origin.

Note: n.a. signifies ‘no data available’; n.d.r. signifies ‘no disaster reported’. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text to this annex.

In 2011, the number of people reported affected by natural disasters was the fourth lowest of the decade; for technological disasters, it was the fifth lowest. Among natural disasters, floods affected the most people in 2011 (143 million) and amounted for 68 per cent of all people affected, higher than the decade’s average of 44 per cent. The proportions of people reported affected by all other natural disasters in 2011 are lower than their respective decade’s average. The number of people affected by industrial accidents (excluding those affected by the explosion in the nuclear plant of Fukushima, Japan, who are at present included in the number affected by the tsunami in March 2011) is the lowest of the decade. In China, two floods, in April 2011 and September 2011, affected almost 88 million people and a windstorm, in April, another 20 million people.
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<td>1,048</td>
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<td>1,588</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>2,937</td>
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<td>n.d.r.</td>
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<td>n.d.r.</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
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<td>6,350</td>
<td>48,794</td>
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<td>38,597</td>
<td>79,893</td>
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<td>48,775</td>
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Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
Among natural disasters, damage caused by earthquakes/tsunamis and floods are at their highest level for the decade; damage from droughts at their second highest level and direct losses caused by storms and fires at their fourth highest. Earthquakes/tsunamis accounted for 63 per cent of natural disaster damage in 2011, compared to an average of 32 per cent over the decade; earthquake/tsunami damage in 2011 was five times higher than their mean for the decade. Damages from floods were more than twice the average for the decade.

The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan was the costliest disaster of the year and the decade (US$ 210 billion worth of reported damage). Damage caused by the earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand cost and estimated US$ 15 billion. Floods in Thailand were estimated to cost US$ 40 billion and tornadoes in the United States in April and May cost an estimated US$ 25 billion.

In 2011, reported damages from natural disasters were at their highest level of the decade, being almost 1.5 times more important than those reported for 2005, the previous year with the highest amount of disaster-related damages (due mainly to Hurricane Katrina in the United States). Data concerning damages caused by technological disasters are almost non-existent.

Estimates of disaster damage must be treated with caution, as the financial value attached to infrastructure in high-income countries is much higher than in middle- and low-income countries. While reporting is better for large disasters, the low reporting rates of direct damage make analysis difficult.

Note: n.a. signifies ‘no data available’; n.d.r. signifies ‘no disaster reported’. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text to this annex.

1 Includes waves and surges.
2 Landslides, rockfalls, subsidence, etc., of geophysical origin.
3 Landslides, avalanches, subsidence, etc., of hydrological origin.
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<th>Europe</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>VHHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>HHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>MHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>LHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td><strong>1,702</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,327</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,821</strong></td>
<td><strong>904</strong></td>
<td><strong>171</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,154</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,336</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,550</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,885</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,925</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium*
1 See note on UNDP’s Human Development Index country status in the section on disaster definitions in the introduction to this annex. VHHD stands for very high human development; HHD for high human development, MHD for medium human development and LHD for low human development.

2 Includes waves and surges.

3 Landslides, rockfalls, subsidence, etc., of geophysical origin.

4 Landslides, avalanches, subsidence, etc., of hydrological origin.

Note: n.d.r. signifies ‘no disaster reported’. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text to this annex.

During the decade, Asia accounted for 41 per cent of the total number of disasters but for 75 per cent of industrial accidents, 64 per cent of mass movements of hydrological origin, 63 per cent of earthquakes/tsunamis, 49 per cent of miscellaneous accidents and 38 per cent of windstorms.

Africa accounted for 25 per cent of the total number of disasters but for 93 per cent of insect infestations, 53 per cent of droughts/food insecurities and 40 per cent of transport accidents.

Americas accounted for 19 per cent of the total number of disasters but for 43 per cent of mass movements of geological origin, 41 per cent of wildfires, 39 per cent of volcanic eruptions and 33 per cent of windstorms.

Europe accounted for 13 per cent of the total number of disasters but for 55 per cent of extreme temperatures and for 30 per cent of wildfires.

Oceania accounted for 2.5 per cent of the total number of disasters but for 16 per cent of volcanic eruptions, 8 per cent of wildfires and 6.4 per cent of windstorms.

In the decade, VHHD countries accounted for 17 per cent of all disasters but for 63 per cent of wildfires, 48 per cent of extreme temperatures and 37 per cent of windstorms.

HHD countries accounted for 19 per cent of all disasters but for 27 per cent of earthquakes/tsunamis and 24 per cent of volcanic eruptions.

MHD countries accounted for 37 per cent of all disasters but for 71 per cent of industrial accidents, more than 50 per cent of mass movements of geological and hydrological origin and 44 per cent of miscellaneous accidents.

LHD countries accounted for 27 per cent of all disasters, but for 78 per cent of insect infestation, 54 per cent of droughts/food insecurity and 38 per cent of transport accidents.

A majority (58 per cent) of natural disasters and of technological disasters (72 per cent) occurred in MHD and LHD countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>VHHD(^1)</th>
<th>HHD(^1)</th>
<th>MHD(^1)</th>
<th>LHD(^1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droughts/food insecurity</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76,454</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>77,174</td>
<td>77,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes/tsunamis</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>223,861</td>
<td>450,812</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>21,041</td>
<td>29,560</td>
<td>331,133</td>
<td>298,009</td>
<td>679,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme temperatures</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>8,864</td>
<td>134,910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78,536</td>
<td>58,695</td>
<td>5,331</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>145,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods(^2)</td>
<td>6,477</td>
<td>9,961</td>
<td>39,539</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>6,467</td>
<td>30,192</td>
<td>19,478</td>
<td>57,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest/scrub fires</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect infestation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: dry(^3)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: wet(^4)</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>7,474</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>6,172</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>9,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruptions</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windstorms</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>10,853</td>
<td>160,539</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>6,293</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>16,646</td>
<td>149,819</td>
<td>173,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal climato-, hydro- and meteorological disasters</td>
<td>9,582</td>
<td>23,815</td>
<td>292,937</td>
<td>137,047</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>86,622</td>
<td>67,133</td>
<td>58,597</td>
<td>252,086</td>
<td>464,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal geophysical disasters</td>
<td>3,640</td>
<td>223,992</td>
<td>451,201</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>21,041</td>
<td>29,653</td>
<td>331,652</td>
<td>298,231</td>
<td>680,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total natural disasters</strong></td>
<td>13,222</td>
<td>247,807</td>
<td>744,138</td>
<td>138,355</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>107,663</td>
<td>96,786</td>
<td>390,249</td>
<td>550,317</td>
<td>1,145,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>9,930</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>9,368</td>
<td>2,203</td>
<td>13,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous accidents</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>7,951</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>6,694</td>
<td>3,561</td>
<td>14,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>25,177</td>
<td>7,041</td>
<td>24,140</td>
<td>4,983</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>4,009</td>
<td>12,188</td>
<td>19,677</td>
<td>25,742</td>
<td>61,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total technological disasters</strong></td>
<td>30,341</td>
<td>9,518</td>
<td>42,021</td>
<td>7,415</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>5,754</td>
<td>16,610</td>
<td>35,739</td>
<td>31,506</td>
<td>89,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43,563</td>
<td>257,325</td>
<td>786,159</td>
<td>145,770</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>113,417</td>
<td>113,396</td>
<td>425,988</td>
<td>581,823</td>
<td>1,234,624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
During the decade, VHHD countries accounted for 9 per cent of the total number of reported deaths, but for 66 per cent of deaths from wildfires and for 54 per cent of deaths from extreme temperatures. HHD countries accounted for 9 per cent of the total number of reported deaths but for 40 per cent of deaths from extreme temperatures, 27 per cent of those from mass movements of geological origin and for almost 20 per cent of transport and miscellaneous accidents.

MHD countries accounted for 35 per cent of the total number of reported deaths but for almost 70 per cent of deaths from mass movements of both geological and hydrological origin and from industrial accidents, 59 per cent of deaths from volcanic eruptions, 53 per cent of deaths from floods and 49 per cent of deaths from earthquakes/tsunamis.

LHD countries accounted for 47 per cent of the total number of reported deaths but for 99 per cent of those caused by droughts/food insecurities and 86 per cent of deaths from windstorms.

MHD and LHD countries accounted for 82 per cent of deaths from both natural and technological disasters.
Table 11: Total number of people reported affected, by type of phenomenon, continent and level of human development (2002–2011), in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>VHHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>HHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>MHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>LHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droughts/food insecurity</td>
<td>265,966</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>656,753</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>657,741</td>
<td>264,420</td>
<td></td>
<td>931,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes/tsunamis</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>7,514</td>
<td>69,762</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>3,963</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>63,067</td>
<td>9,502</td>
<td>79,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme temperatures</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5,190</td>
<td>85,216</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5,235</td>
<td>84,578</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>90,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>20,942</td>
<td>44,151</td>
<td>1,107,301</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>14,083</td>
<td>29,764</td>
<td>1,016,569</td>
<td>115,433</td>
<td>1,175,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest/scrub fires</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect infestation</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: dry&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: wet&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3,818</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>3,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruptions</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>1,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windstorms</td>
<td>3,654</td>
<td>21,887</td>
<td>371,003</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>12,818</td>
<td>11,240</td>
<td>351,593</td>
<td>22,360</td>
<td>398,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal geophysical disasters</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>8,056</td>
<td>70,194</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>3,974</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>63,529</td>
<td>9,949</td>
<td>80,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total natural disasters</strong></td>
<td>291,897</td>
<td>87,637</td>
<td>2,294,310</td>
<td>7,299</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>31,971</td>
<td>59,476</td>
<td>2,177,161</td>
<td>414,192</td>
<td>2,682,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous accidents</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total technological disasters</strong></td>
<td>361</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>1,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>292,258</td>
<td>88,219</td>
<td>2,294,860</td>
<td>7,335</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>32,006</td>
<td>60,080</td>
<td>2,177,642</td>
<td>414,601</td>
<td>2,684,329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
During the decade, MHD countries accounted for 81 per cent of the total number of people reported affected by disasters but for 93 per cent of those affected by extreme temperatures and, respectively, 86 per cent and 88 per cent of those affected by windstorms and floods.

LHD countries accounted for 15 per cent of the total number of people reported affected by disasters but for 62 per cent of those affected by transport accidents, 54 per cent of those affected by miscellaneous accidents and, respectively, 28 per cent and 31 per cent of deaths from droughts/food insecurities and volcanic eruptions.

HHD countries accounted for 2.2 per cent of the total number of people reported affected by disasters but for 55 per cent of those affected by industrial accidents, 47 per cent of those affected by wildfires and 36 per cent of people affected by volcanic eruptions.

VHHD countries accounted for only 1.2 per cent of the total number of people reported affected by disasters but for 46 per cent of those affected by wildfires.

MHD and LHD countries accounted for 96 per cent of people reported affected by both natural and technological disasters.
## Table 12 Total amount of disaster estimated damage, by type of phenomenon, continent and level of human development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>VHHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>HHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>MHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>LHD&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droughts/food insecurity</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>15,397</td>
<td>10,987</td>
<td>4,401</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>17,895</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td>11,310</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>33,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes/tsunamis</td>
<td>6,892</td>
<td>42,043</td>
<td>379,812</td>
<td>7,912</td>
<td>24,872</td>
<td>322,285</td>
<td>7,125</td>
<td>116,428</td>
<td>15,694</td>
<td>461,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme temperatures</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>23,761</td>
<td>16,805</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16,429</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>23,761</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>42,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,322</td>
<td>42,084</td>
<td>164,247</td>
<td>55,520</td>
<td>12,871</td>
<td>91,583</td>
<td>21,985</td>
<td>146,712</td>
<td>17,763</td>
<td>278,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest/scrub fires</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>13,685</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>11,032</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>25,217</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>27,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insect infestation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: dry&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.d.r.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement: wet&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruptions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windstorms</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>439,339</td>
<td>92,205</td>
<td>39,746</td>
<td>8,066</td>
<td>490,269</td>
<td>38,259</td>
<td>42,012</td>
<td>9,636</td>
<td>580,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal climato-, hydro- and meteorological disasters</td>
<td>4,591</td>
<td>512,703</td>
<td>292,618</td>
<td>127,729</td>
<td>25,550</td>
<td>641,633</td>
<td>67,962</td>
<td>225,915</td>
<td>27,682</td>
<td>963,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal geophysical disasters</td>
<td>6,904</td>
<td>42,210</td>
<td>379,812</td>
<td>7,912</td>
<td>24,872</td>
<td>322,285</td>
<td>7,292</td>
<td>116,428</td>
<td>15,705</td>
<td>461,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total natural disasters</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,495</strong></td>
<td><strong>554,913</strong></td>
<td><strong>672,430</strong></td>
<td><strong>135,641</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,423</strong></td>
<td><strong>963,919</strong></td>
<td><strong>75,255</strong></td>
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Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium
1 See note on UNDP’s Human Development Index country status in the section on disaster definitions in the introduction to this annex. VHHD stands for very high human development; HHD for high human development; MHD for medium human development and LHD for low human development.

2 Includes waves and surges.

3 Landslides, rockfalls, subsidence, etc., of geophysical origin.

4 Landslides, avalanches, subsidence, etc., of hydrological origin.

Note: n.a. signifies ‘no data available’; n.d.r. signifies ‘no disaster reported’. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text to this annex.

Estimates of disaster damage must be treated with caution, as the financial value attached to infrastructure in high-income countries is much higher than in middle- and low-income countries. While reporting is better for large disasters, the low reporting rates of direct damage make analysis difficult.

During the decade, Asia accounted for 46 per cent of the reported damages but for 82 per cent of costs caused by earthquakes/tsunamis, 59 per cent of those related to floods and mass movements of hydrological origin, and 56 per cent of those caused by extreme temperatures.

Americas accounted for 39 per cent of the reported damages but for 94 per cent of costs related to volcanic eruptions, 76 per cent of those related to windstorms, 55 per cent of those caused by industrial accidents, 50 per cent of those caused by wildfires and 46 per cent of those related to droughts.

Europe accounted for 10 per cent of the reported damages but for 40 per cent of those caused by industrial accidents, wildfires and extreme temperatures, and 20 per cent of those caused by floods.

Oceania accounted for 3.4 per cent of reported damages but for 7.5 per cent of those caused by droughts and wildfires.

Africa accounted for 0.9 per cent of the reported damages but for 6 per cent of those caused by volcanic eruptions.

Almost 60 per cent of costs were reported from VHHD countries.
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1 Prior to 1993, Ethiopia was considered one country, after this date separate countries: Eritrea and Ethiopia.
2 Since July 1997, Hong Kong has been included in China as Special Administrative Region (SAR).
3 Since December 1999, Macau has been included in China as Special Administrative Region (SAR).
4 Since September 1993 and the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have a Palestinian self-government. Direct negotiations to determine the permanent status of these territories began in September 1999 but are far from a permanent agreement.
5 Since May 2002, Timor-Leste has been an independent country.
6 Prior to 1991 Yugoslavia was considered one country, after this date separate countries: Croatia (1991), Slovenia (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1992) and Yugoslavia (1992).
7 Prior to 1993, Czechoslovakia was considered one country, after this date separate countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia.
8 From 1992 to 2003 Yugoslavia was considered one country; in 2003, it became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and, in 2006, two separate countries: Serbia and Montenegro.

Note: n.a. signifies ‘no data available’; n.d.r. signifies ‘no disaster reported’. For more information, see section on caveats in the introductory text.

Over the last decade, the highest numbers of deaths per continent were reported in Nigeria (Africa), Haiti (Americas), Indonesia (Asia), Russia (Europe) and Australia (Oceania).

The highest numbers of people affected by disaster per continent were reported in Ethiopia (Africa), United States of America (Americas), China (Asia), Russia (Europe) and New Zealand (Oceania).

Compared to 1992–2001, the past decade has seen disaster deaths rise by 39 per cent and the number of people affected by disaster rise by 14 per cent.
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A global humanitarian organization

Founded in 1919, the International Federation comprises 186 member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies – with an additional number in formation – a secretariat in Geneva and offices strategically located to support activities around the world. The Red Crescent is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world’s largest volunteer-based humanitarian network, reaching 150 million people each year through its 186 member National Societies. Together, we act before, during and after disasters and health emergencies to meet the needs and improve the lives of vulnerable people. We do so with impartiality as to nationality, race, gender, religious beliefs, class and political opinions.

Guided by Strategy 2020 – our collective plan of action to tackle the major humanitarian and development challenges of this decade – we are committed to ‘saving lives and changing minds’.

Our strength lies in our volunteer network, our community-based expertise and our independence and neutrality. We work to improve humanitarian standards, as partners in development and in response to disasters. We persuade decision makers to act at all times in the interests of vulnerable people. The result: we enable healthy and safe communities, reduce vulnerabilities, strengthen resilience and foster a culture of peace around the world.

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies embody the work and principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. They act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, health and social programmes. During wartime, National Societies assist affected civilian populations and support the army medical services where appropriate. This unique network of National Societies comprises 13 million active volunteers, serving vulnerable communities in almost every country in the world.

Cooperation between National Societies gives the International Federation greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Together, all the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are guided by the same seven Fundamental Principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. In the same manner, all Red Cross and Red Crescent activities have one central purpose: to help those who suffer without discrimination and thus contribute to peace in the world.

Cover photo: When disaster strikes or conflict flares, people are sometimes forced to flee. Their vulnerability increases; their needs are great. They need help to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, reconnect the social networks that help bolster their resilience and feel secure again. People like 6-year-old Jollemar Semillano, seen here in her new Philippine Red Cross-built home, displaced after floods destroyed her family’s house in 2009. © Cheryl Ravelo/IFRC
Forced displacement is one of the most acute and visible consequences of disasters and conflict. Its scale and complexity have increased dramatically in recent years. The World Disasters Report 2012 makes a critical contribution to our understanding of how the changing nature of conflict, climate change, population growth and urbanization interact with and accentuate vulnerability. The report articulates a vision which places displaced and other affected communities, and their protection and assistance needs, at the heart of our collective response.

– António Guterres,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Focus on forced migration and displacement

This year’s World Disasters Report focuses on forced migration and on the people forcibly displaced by conflict, political upheaval, violence, disasters, climate change and development projects, whose numbers are increasing inexorably each year. The enormous human costs of forced migration – destroyed homes and livelihoods, increased vulnerability, disempowered communities, and collapsed social networks and common bonds – demand urgent and decisive action by both humanitarian and development actors.

The report analyses the complex causes of forced migration and its consequences and impacts on displaced populations, their hosts and humanitarian actors. It looks at the significant gaps in humanitarian protection for ever-increasing numbers of forced migrants who do not fit into conventional categories of protection, and the public health challenges caused by forced displacement, particularly for women, children and those with mental health problems. It examines the ‘urbanization’ of forced migration, the role of climate change and environmental factors in forced displacement and how new communications, information and social networking technologies are reshaping the links between aid providers and migrants. It also tracks humanitarian funding for forcibly displaced populations, as well as the positive and negative economic impacts they have on host communities and countries.

The World Disasters Report 2012 features:

• The dynamics of displacement and response
• Reducing risk and promoting security for forced migrants
• The impact of forced displacement on health
• Forced migration in an urban context
• Development and displacement
• The costs and impacts of forced migration
• Forced migration and the humanitarian challenge
• Disaster data

Plus photos, tables, graphics and index.

Published annually since 1993, the World Disasters Report brings together the latest trends, facts and analysis of contemporary crises and disasters.